E.E.O.C. v. Federal Express Corp.
| Decision Date | 18 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:02-CV-1194. |
| Citation | 537 F.Supp.2d 700 |
| Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION and Marion Shaub, Plaintiff/Intervenor v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Cynthia A. Locke, David Ingram, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Philadelphia, PA, Martha Sperling, Silver and Sperling, Doylestown, PA, Ralph E. Lamar, IV, Ralph E. Lamar, IV, Esq., Collegeville, PA, for Plaintiff/Intervenor.
Alexandra Makosky, Pepper, Hamilton LLP, Harrisburg, PA, Frederick L. Douglas, Jeana M. Littrell, Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, TN, Sean P. McDevitt, Pepper Hamilton LLP, Berwyn, PA, for Defendant.
AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court are the following post-trial motions filed in the above-captioned case: (1) Defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (Doc. No. 257); (2) Defendant's motion to alter or amend judgment (Doc. No. 249); (3) Intervenor's motion to amend judgment to include prejudgment interest (Doc. No. 266); (4) Intervenor's motion to amend judgment to account for negative tax consequences (Doc. No. 264); (5) Intervenor's motion to amend judgment (Doc. No. 303); and (6) Intervenor's petition for attorneys' fees and costs (Doc. Nos. 260 and 271). Each motion will be addressed in turn.
On February 25, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brought suit against Defendant on behalf of Marion Shaub in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). On March 7, 2002, Ms. Shaub ("Intervenor") moved to intervene in the action, which request was granted on April 5, 2002. On that same day, Intervenor filed an intervening complaint against Defendant, alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex in violation Title VII, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa.S. § 951 et seq. ("PHRA"), and the common law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, together with a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Subsequently, pursuant to an Order dated June 6, 2002, the case was transferred to this Court.
Intervenor's claims were tried to a jury in a trial commencing on February 9, 2004. On February 24, 2004, the jury returned a verdict for Intervenor finding that although Intervenor was not subjected to unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex, Defendant was liable to Intervenor for a hostile working environment and was also liable to Intervenor for retaliation, all in violation of Title VII. In addition, the jury found that Defendant was liable to Intervenor for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress ("IIED").
The jury found that Intervenor was entitled to receive back pay damages in the amount of $101,400 and front pay damages in the amount of $290,000 for the Title VII violations. The jury further awarded Intervenor $350,000 in compensation for emotional pain and distress, apportioned 60% for the Title VII violations and 40% for the IIED claim. Finally, the jury awarded Intervenor punitive damages in the amount of $2.5 million, apportioned 50% to the, Title VII claim and 50% to the IIED claim.
Defendant argues that contrary to the jury verdict, judgment should be entered in its favor because (1) the jury's decision was based on irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony of a former employee, Lorraine Metz; (2) Intervenor failed to present evidence demonstrating that she was subjected to a hostile work environment because of her gender; (3) Intervenor failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation; (4) Intervenor's IIED claim is statutorily barred under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act and because Intervenor failed to establish that Defendant's conduct was extreme or outrageous; and (5) the punitive damage award should be set aside because the evidence did not demonstrate that Defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference.
A motion for judgment as a matter of law should be granted only if, "viewing all the evidence which has been tendered and should have been admitted in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, no jury could decide in that party's favor." Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993). "The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed, but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for that party." Id. (quoting Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir.1978)). The Third Circuit has held that denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law will be upheld where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is a "minimum quantum of evidence" from which a jury could reach a verdict for that party. Keith v. Truck Stops Corp., 909 F.2d 743, 745 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Judgment as a matter of law should be granted sparingly, although a "scintilla of evidence" is insufficient to sustain a verdict of liability. Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir.2002) (citation omitted). The Court will address in seriatim Defendant's five arguments in support of its motion.
Defendant first contends that "the jury's decision was based on irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence from a former employee, Cynthia Metz."1 (Doc. No. 258, at 5.) Defendant's argument in this regard is conclusory and unsupported by legal authority. Moreover, Defendant's challenge to the relevance of Ms. Metz' testimony to Intervenor's claims rings hollow. In a recitation of her own experience of a hostile work environment and intentional discrimination at Federal Express, Ms. Metz testified that, like Intervenor, she was the only female Ramp Transport Driver at her facility. Like Intervenor, she was supervised by Robert Flynn. Like Intervenor, she endured constant and unrelenting verbal abuse. Like Intervenor, she complained. Like Intervenor, following her complaints the abuse escalated and the brake lines on her tractor trailer were sabotaged. Like Intervenor, Ms. Metz received inadequate managerial responses to her claims of discrimination and sabotage. Like Intervenor, Ms. Metz was "driven out" of Federal Express. The testimony of Ms. Metz was linked to evidence that three members of Defendant's management who were aware of Ms. Metz's allegations of harassment were involved with the investigation of Intervenor's claims of sexual harassment. Accordingly, Ms. Metz's testimony was highly relevant to establish that Defendant was on notice regarding conditions of significant sexual harassment present in the workplace. Her testimony bears on the issue of Federal Express' liability for sex discrimination and on Intervenor's claim for punitive damages.
Defendant further complains that even if Ms. Metz's testimony was relevant to establish notice, the testimony was nevertheless unfairly prejudicial to Defendant and that "but for" this testimony, Defendant "would not have been unfairly prejudiced." (Doc. No. 258, at 6.) Again, Defendant's contention is conclusory and not supported by any legal authority. Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the balance of whether to admit relevant information should be struck in favor of admissibility. Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 453 (3d Cir.1994). Moreover, the Court is charged with weighing the probative value of evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. Here, where Intervenor presents a virtual carbon copy, of discrimination she endured, the questioned evidence is most relevant. The prejudice to Defendant is real, but not unfair in light of the unusually high probative value of the evidence.
Finally, Defendant seems to suggest, speculatively, that the verdict in favor of Intervenor is based entirely on the Lorraine Metz testimony. Nothing could be further from the fact. Intervenor's testimony alone supports the jury's verdict, and that testimony was bolstered by numerous witnesses who supported her claim. Substantial testimony was taken during the trial in support of the jury's verdict as to each claim. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the testimony of Ms. Metz.
As Defendant correctly notes, sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII and the PHRA if sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1297 (3d Cir.1997); Bishop v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 66 F.Supp.2d 650, 663-64 (E.D.Pa.1999). In order to prove a case of co-worker sexual harassment and the existence of a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must prove: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination because of her sex; (2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable woman in the same position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir.1990).
Defendant contends that Intervenor "did not suffer intentional discrimination because of her...
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