E.E.O.C. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n

• Decision Date: 13 August 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-3587,79-3587
• Citation: 623 F.2d 1054
• Parties: 24 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 20, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,173 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association, et al., Defendants, I.L.A. Local 1576, Defendant-Appellee, I.L.A. Local 851, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1054

623 F.2d 1054

24 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 20, 23 Empl. Prac.

Dec. P 31,173

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated

association, et al., Defendants,

I.L.A. Local 1576, Defendant-Appellee,

I.L.A. Local 851, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 79-3587.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 13, 1980.

Moore & Laurence, Robert M. Moore, Houston, Tex., for Local 851.

Sidney L. Ravkind, Houston, Tex., for Local 307.

Joel M. Cohn, EEOC, App. Div., Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellant.

Simpson & Burwell, Inc., James P. Simpson, Texas City, Tex., for ILA Local 1576.

Bryan F. Williams, Jr., Galveston, Tex., for amicus curiae.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before FAY, KRAVITCH and RANDALL, Circuit Judges.

FAY, Circuit Judge:

Appellants Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.), International Longshoremen's Association (I.L.A.) Local 851, and I.L.A. Local 307 seek reversal of a district court order excluding I.L.A. Local 1576 from the merger of the remaining I.L.A. deep sea locals ¹ in Galveston, Texas. There are four deep sea locals in Galveston: Local 307 is composed of white longshoremen, Locals 329 and 851 are composed of black longshoremen, and Local 1576 has a predominantly Mexican-American membership. The district court ordered the merger of the white and black locals but excluded the Mexican-American local from the merger. Notwithstanding the earnest efforts and good intentions of then District Judge Garza, ² the clear mandate of this court in E.E.O.C. v. International Longshoremen's Association, 511 F.2d 273, 280 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994, 96 S.Ct. 421, 46 L.Ed.2d 368 (1975), requires us to reverse the order of the district court excluding Local 1576 from the merger and remand the case with directions that all four Galveston locals be merged.

I. A Very Brief ³ History of the Case

Over a decade ago the United States filed an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ⁴ alleging that the International Longshoremen's Association (I.L.A.), the South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District of the I.L.A., and thirty-seven local general cargo longshoremen's unions chartered by the I.L.A., were engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on grounds of race, color, and national origin. The United States alleged that the defendants maintained local unions, hiring halls, and gangs which were classified and segregated on grounds of race and national origin, resulting in the denial of equal working opportunities to black and Mexican-American longshoremen. The relief sought included a court-ordered merger of the segregated locals, and the discontinuance of separate locals, hiring halls and gangs based upon race and national origin.

After hearing several days of testimony in the cause and reviewing the hundreds of exhibits filed, Judge Garza found

that the Defendants have chartered and still maintain locals on a segregated basis, that the prevalent rule of dividing the work fifty-fifty between the White and Negro locals violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, because it deprives longshoremen, be they Black or White, Anglo, Mexican-American or Negro, equal working opportunities depending on which group is in the majority in the different ports, and that this will be a continuing violation in the future.

United States v. International Longshoremen's Association, 334 F.Supp. 976, 981 (S.D.Tex.1971). Despite his findings that the maintenance of segregated locals deprived on longshoremen of equal employment opportunities, Judge Garza refused to order the consolidation of the locals in each port. Rather, the court held that the violations of Title VII "can be fully corrected by the abolishment of separate hiring halls and the establishment of a common hiring hall" and by the adoption of common seniority classifications "on a port by port basis for each defendant local union which does the same kind of work . . . ." Interlocutory Decree, Supp. Record, vol. I, at 700-11. The E.E.O.C. appealed the court's refusal to merge the locals, and this court reversed, holding that "the edict of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(2) (Title VII) cannot be satisfied in the present case by measures short of the merger in each particular port of the racially segregated locals within that port." E.E.O.C. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 511 F.2d 273, 280 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994, 96 S.Ct. 421, 46 L.Ed.2d 368 (1975), (Thornberry and Godbold, JJ., specially concurring). The cause was remanded with directions to merge the I.L.A. locals within each Texas gulf port.

On remand, the district court conducted several evidentiary hearings for the sole purpose of determining whether I.L.A. Local 1576 should be required to merge with the other three deep sea locals in Galveston. ⁵ In a Memorandum and Order dated October 1, 1979, ⁶ the district court examined the historical development, business activities, seniority systems, and employee benefit plans of the four locals in question. ⁷ The court next considered the three alternatives before it.

First, the Court can merge the four locals together under a uniform seniority system. Second, it can order a merger excluding Local 1576 but requiring those members of Local 1576 who have dual seniority to choose between Locals 307 and 1576. This election would result in the elimination of the member's seniority in one of the locals. Third, the Court could order the merger excluding Local 1576 and allowing its members to retain their dual seniority.

Supp. Record, vol. I, at 813.

The court rejected the first alternative, the merger of all four locals, because the difference in the seniority systems of each local would place members of Local 1576 at the bottom of the seniority list. If the merged local were willing to grant a year's seniority to any longshoreman who had qualified in his own local and who had been available for longshore work, regardless of the hours actually worked, the first alternative would have been acceptable. Locals 307, 329 and 851 refused however, to accept this proposal, and because of this attitude, the court refused to merge all four locals. Supp. Record, vol. I, at 814.

The second alternative considered by the court was also rejected because of its discriminatory effect on Local 1576, leaving only the options of merging Locals 307, 329 and 851 while keeping Local 1576 separate. In support of this alternative, the court pointed out "that unlike the situation in the other locals, Local 1576 has not discriminated against any racial group. Although the great majority of members and work gang foremen are Mexican-American, its membership is open to anyone. There is no evidence that members of Local 1576 have ever discriminated against any individuals or refused admittance to their local." Supp. Record, vol. I, at 815. Finding the third alternative to be most equitable, the court ordered the merger of Locals 307, 329 and 851; Local 1576 was excluded from the merger and removed as a defendant in the case. The E.E.O.C. and Locals 307 and 851 now appeal the order of merger excluding Local 1576. Relying on the law of the case set forth in this court's prior opinion, 511 F.2d 273, we reverse and remand the cause with directions to merge all four Galveston locals.

II. The Law of the Case

It is well established that a decision of a legal issue by an appellate court establishes "the law of the case" which must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later appeal in the appellate court unless: (1) a subsequent trial produces substantially different evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to such issue, or (3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice. White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1967); see Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1289-1290 (5th Cir. 1978); Schwartz v. NMS Industries, Inc., 575 F.2d 553, 554-555 (5th Cir. 1978). The doctrine does not reach questions which were not decided in a former proceeding, but does comprehend "things decided by necessary implication as well as those decided explicitly." Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 567 F.2d 1316, 1320 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original). Under the "law of the case" rule, the trial and appellate courts are bound by any findings of fact or conclusions of law made by the appellate court in a prior appeal of the case at issue. De Tenorio v. Lightsey, 589 F.2d 911, 917 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831, 100 S.Ct. 59, 62 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979).

The district court here did not follow the law of the case as established by this court in the prior appeal. This court held that Title VII required "the merger in each particular port of the racially segregated locals within that port." 511 F.2d at 280. Judges Godbold and Thornberry, specially concurring, explained that such merger is required whenever the district court finds (as was done here) that segregated locals have caused unequal employment opportunity. Id. There is no question that this court's prior mandate comprehended the Galveston locals. The district court opinion singled out Galveston Locals 1576 and 329 as prime examples of locals whose members had been denied equal employment opportunity due to segregation. 334 F.Supp. at 980-81. Moreover, its interlocutory order requiring merger of hiring halls referred specifically to Galveston Locals 307, 329, 851, and 1576. See Interlocutory Decree, Supp. Record, vol. I, at 700-11. When this court reversed and remanded the case, holding that there was no discretion to refuse merger, it clearly contemplated that the four deep sea locals in Galveston would be merged. This message was clearly understood; on remand Judge Garza told counsel he would listen to arguments why Local 1576 should not be...