Eades v. State

• Citation: 232 Ga. 735,208 S.E.2d 791
• Decision Date: 03 September 1974
• Docket Number: No. 28953,28953
• Parties: Leroy EADES v. The STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 791

208 S.E.2d 791

232 Ga. 735

Leroy EADES v. The STATE.

No. 28953

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 3, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 17, 1974.

John Thomas Chason, James C. Carr, Atlanta, for appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Joel M. Feldman, J. Melvin England, Asst. Dist. Attys., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Thomas P. Burke, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

JORDAN, Justice.

The appellant was indicted along with three other men for the armed robbery of a grocery store and the murder of the store manager. In a separate trial the appellant was found guilty of both offenses and sentenced to consecutive life terms on each of the charges. From the overruling of his motion for new trial the appellant appeals to this court. Held:

1. The appellant enumerates as error the overruling of his motion for a directed verdict, claiming that the bulk of the state's case against him revolved around the testimony of two co-conspirators one of whom had previously entered a plea of guilty to the crime and that the jury did not have the 'benefit of any information concerning any promises or offer of reward for their testimony.' The appellant further claims that evidence submitted concerning the identification of his fingerprints found inside the vehicle alleged to have been utilized by the four was improperly admitted in that there was 'A broken chain of custody of said fingerprints,' and without such evidence there was nothing to corroborate the co-conspirator's testimony. We find neither of these contentions meritorious.

The two co-defendants testified at appellant's trial. Subsequent thereto the murder charges against them were dead-docketed, leaving only the armed robbery charge. Appellant makes the assumption that this disposition came about as a result of a promise in return for their testimony. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that '(S)uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' The appellant claims that he was entitled to any information that relates to any deal made between the co-defendants and the prosecution, and that a suppression of such information would result in a due-process constitutional infirmity.

In this case counsel for appellant questioned one of the co-defendants as to the existence of a promise, and the co-defendant replied that there had been none. Opportunity was afforded the appellant for similar questioning of the other co-defendant on cross examination, but none was made. The record is void of any evidence of a deal. The only evidence refutes it. The rule as stated in Brady, supra, is followed in Georgia (see Hicks v. State, 232 Ga. 393, 207 S.E.2d 30 and Allen v. State, 128 Ga.App. 361, 196 S.E.2d 660), but there must be evidence that such information existed and was actually withheld.

Appellant's contention that the chain of custody of his fingerprints was broken so as to make them inadmissible requires no comment by this court other than to state that both the police officer that lifted the prints and the officer that identified them as appellant's testified that the prints never left the direct control of the Atlanta Police Department. A similar chain of custody as was established here was found satisfactory in Sheats v. State, 231 Ga. 362, 201 S.E.2d 420.

The evidence amply supports the verdict and the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict.

2. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in limiting the cross examination of the state's witness, thus placing an improper limitation upon the defendant's right of cross examination and confrontation in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the State of Georgia. Although, as the appellant states in his brief, it is 'better that cross examination should be too free than too restricted,' this right to a thorough and sifting cross examination must be tempered and restricted so as not to infringe on privileged areas or wander into the realm of irrelevant testimony. Control of the cross examination of a witness is to a great degree within the discretion of the trial court all will not be controlled unless abused. McNabb v. State, 70 Ga.App. 798, 29 S.E.2d 643; Sweat v. State, 63 Ga.App. 299, 11 S.E.2d 40. The two instances complained of here dealt with (1) a question which involved the privilege between an attorney and his client and (2) a matter the trial judge found to be...