Eadon v. White, Opinion No. 2008-UP-043 (S.C. App. 1/11/2008)
| Decision Date | 11 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 2008-UP-043. |
| Parties | Marion L. Eadon, Jr., Respondent, v. Danny White, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Scott L. Robinson, of Manning, for Appellant.
Frances Ricci Land Welch, of Manning, for Respondent.
Danny White appeals the special referee's report denying his motion for a jury trial. We affirm.
Marion Eadon, Jr., employed White as a mechanic at his automotive dealership located in Manning, South Carolina. While White was employed by Eadon, White attempted to obtain financing from the National Bank of South Carolina (the Bank) to purchase a mobile home, but was unsuccessful. Consequently, White asked Eadon if he would be willing to generate a loan in his name so White could purchase and finance a mobile home.
On January 10, 2000, Eadon endorsed a note in the amount of $ 49,536.00, the purchase price of the mobile home White selected. White then used the funds Eadon obtained from the Bank to purchase a mobile home. The security agreement accompanying the note provided a 2000 Fleetwood Heritage Pointe Mobile Home, the one White obtained, as security for repayment of the debt. The Bank set up a third party pledge/hypothecation agreement allowing Eadon to borrow money on collateral in White's name.1 The third party pledge signed by White lists the mobile home as the collateral securing Eadon's debt under the executed note and security agreement. The loan was amortized for ten years with a five year balloon. The Bank held the title to the mobile home.
Subsequently, White took possession of the mobile home and initially made scheduled payments directly to the Bank. However, when White and Eadon's employment relationship ended so did the payments. Gary Dennis, a loan officer for the Bank, testified the payment history was "very poor" and White was aware payments were past due. When White failed to make payments, the Bank drafted the payments directly from Eadon's account with the Bank. Eadon testified he paid in excess of $5,000.00 in late payments. The balloon payment became due on January 15, 2005. According to Eadon, the Bank required the loan to be paid in full since previous attempts were unsuccessful to bring the loan current under the terms of the contract. Because the Bank refused to renew the note, Eadon paid the remaining balance due, $32,821.38, and the Bank reassigned the note and title to the mobile home to him.
White does not dispute he was supposed to make the payments on the note. Rather, White contends the loan was for a ten-year period, and the Bank, not Eadon, was to hold the collateral. According to White's testimony, Eadon is wrongfully holding the title to the mobile home because the note was fully paid. White also contends he intended to continue making monthly payments, but is unable to do so because Eadon paid the balance due on the note.
At the time of the hearing, White remained in possession of the mobile home. Prior to the hearing, White made a motion for a jury trial. Following Eadon's case-in-chief and the close of all testimony, White renewed his motion for a jury trial and moved for a directed verdict on all of Eadon's causes of actions. Subsequently, the special referee issued a report (1) denying White's motion for a jury trial; (2) finding the loan documents as a whole satisfied the statute of frauds; (3) finding Eadon was entitled to the collection rights set forth in the loan documents; (4) entering a judgment, on behalf of Eadon, against White; and (5) entitling Eadon to enforce the judgment and take possession of the mobile home. This appeal followed.
On appeal from the final judgment of a master or special referee, this court has the same scope of review as if the appeal is from the circuit court without a jury. See Tiger, Inc. v. Fisher Agro, Inc., 301 S.C. 229, 237, 391 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1990) (). Under this scope, the appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its views of the preponderance of the evidence. Grosshuesch v. Cramer, 367 S.C. 1, 4, 623 S.E2d 833, 834 (2005). Thus, we may find facts and may reverse the master's factual findings if they are against the greater weight of the evidence. Campbell v. Carr, 361 S.C. 258, 263, 603 S.E.2d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2004). Pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, when an appellate court chooses to find facts in accordance with its own view of the evidence, the court must state distinctly its findings of fact and the reason for its decision. Dearybury v. Dearybury, 351 S.C. 382, 388, 544 S.E2d 620, 623 (2001).
This broad scope of review does not require the appellate court to disregard the findings of the lower court. Robinson v. Tyson, 319 S.C. 360, 362-63, 461 S.E.2d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 1995). Nor are we required to ignore the fact the special referee, who saw and heard the witnesses, is in a better position to evaluate their credibility. Ingram v. Kasey's Assocs., 340 S.C. 98, 105, 531 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2000). Furthermore, the appellant is not relieved of the burden of convincing this court the special referee committed legal error in its findings. Pinckney v. Warren, 344 S.C. 382, 388, 544 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2001).
White argues the special referee erred in denying his motion for a jury trial. We disagree.
At the start of the hearing White requested a jury trial. However, White and Eadon agreed to allow the special referee to hear testimony, and if the elements of White's counterclaims giving rise to a jury trial could not be established, they agreed the special referee would issue his determination. Conversely, if the evidence presented established viable causes of action, the case would go to a jury. After hearing testimony of both parties, the special referee found, based on the facts presented, White's counterclaims for conversion and slander of title were not viable.
Conversion is a wrongful act emanating from either a wrongful taking or wrongful detention. Moore v. Weinberg, 373 S.C. 209, 227, 644 S.E.2d 740, 749 (Ct. App. 2007); Kirby v. Horne Motor Co., 295 S.C. 7, 366 S.E.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1988). Conversion is defined as "the unauthorized assumption and exercise of the rights of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or to the exclusion of the rights of the owner." Mullis v. Trident Emergency Physicians, 351 S.C. 503, 507, 570 S.E.2d 549, 550-51 (Ct. App. 2002); Green v. Waidner, 284 S.C. 35, 37, 324 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Ct. App. 1984); see Owens v. Andrews Bank & Trust Co., 265 S.C. 490, 496, 220 S.E.2d 116, 119 (1975) ().
"Conversion may arise by some illegal use or misuse, or by illegal detention of another's personal property." Moore, 373 S.C. 209, 227, 644 S.E.2d at 749; Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 354 S.C. 648, 667, 582 S.E.2d 432, 442 (Ct. App. 2003); Castell v. Stephenson Fin. Co., 244 S.C. 45, 50-51, 135 S.E.2d 311, 313 (1964). In order to prevail in a conversion action, the plaintiff must prove either title or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion. Oxford Fin. Co. v. Burgess, 303 S.C. 534, 539, 402 S.E.2d 480, 482 (1991).
In the case sub judice, White has had and continues to have actual possession of the mobile home. Eadon did not exercise any unauthorized or wrongful ownership over the mobile home as he never had actual possession of the mobile home. Instead, Eadon possesses the title of the mobile home that the Bank assigned to him after the debt was paid. Further, White understood he would not have possession of the title until payments relating to his agreement with Eadon were made in full. Accordingly, White failed to establish the necessary elements of conversion and does not have the right to hold the title to the mobile home.
The term slander of title is defined as "a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title to real or personal property, causing him injury." Pond Place Partners, Inc. v. Poole, 351 S.C. 1, 18-19, 567 S.E.2d 881, 890 (Ct. App. 2002); 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel & Slander § 548 (1995). Generally, an action under slander of title may only be maintained by one who possesses an estate or interest in the affected property. Id.; see generally Jeffrey F. Ghent, Slander of Title: Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Interest in Real Property to Maintain Action, 86 A.L.R.4th 738 (1991). The tort of slander of title is almost identical to the tort of product disparagement, the only difference being the former tort involves aspersing the quality of one's title to property and the latter tort involves aspersing the quality of one's property. Poole, 351 S.C. at 18-19, 567 S.E.2d at 890. Slander of title is grounded in the tort of injurious falsehood, and the terms are often used interchangeably. Id.
An action for slander of title should not be confused with personal defamation. Id. The two differ in at least three ways. Id. First, in slander of title causes of action, proof of a special harm is required in all cases; second, there must be proof of a greater amount of fault than negligence regarding the falsity of the statement; and, third, disparagement of property may, in a proper case, be enjoined. Id. To establish slander of title, one must show: "(1) the publication of (2) a false statement (3) derogatory to plaintiff's title (4) with malice (5) causing special damages (6) as a result of diminished value in the eyes of third parties." Huff v. Jennings, 319 S.C. 142, 146, 459 S.E.2d 886, 889 (Ct. App. 1995).
Here, White failed to establish the...
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