Eads v. Allstate Indem. Co.

Decision Date17 November 2014
Docket NumberCase No. 14-CIV-61791-BLOOM/Valle
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
PartiesCARL R. EADS, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Leanne Eads, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY, Defendant.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Allstate Indemnity Company's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [4]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, all opposing and supporting filings, and the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons that follow, the Court now denies Defendant Allstate's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND1

On October 27, 2003, Leanne Eads was stopped at the intersection of Copans Road and North Dixie Highway in Broward County, Florida, when the vehicle she occupied was involved in a multi-vehicle accident. ECF No. [1-3] at ¶¶ 8, 10-11. The accident was caused by the negligent operation of a 2002 Chevrolet Cavalier driven by Frederick Feldtmann, who was operating the vehicle with the permission and consent of Maria Lardani, the owner of the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 9. As a result of the accident, Mrs. Eads suffered severe and permanent injuries.Id. at ¶ 11. At the time of the incident, Ms. Lardani's Cavalier was insured by Defendant Allstate Indemnity Company ("Allstate") through a motor vehicle liability insurance policy, Policy No. 941057263 (the "Policy"). Id. at ¶ 7. Ultimately, the accident resulted in seven claims for personal injury. Id. at ¶ 15.

Pursuant to the Policy, Allstate agreed to pay for damages on behalf of the insureds in the sum of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per occurrence. Id. at ¶ 13. According to Plaintiff, Allstate arbitrarily "and without considering the merits of the respective claims," simply divided the total motor vehicle coverage of $20,000 by the number of claims (7), and paid six of the seven claimants an amount equal to their share, or $2,857.00. See id. at ¶ 16. Further, Plaintiff contends that Allstate failed to investigate the claims arising under the policy and make further evaluations of the loss actually sustained, breaching its duty of good faith to the insureds. See id. at ¶¶ 17-18, 21. Based on this allegedly capricious decision, Plaintiff opines that Allstate acted in its own self-interest, failed to reasonably settle the claims, and exposed the insureds to excess judgments. See id. at ¶¶ 18-19, 22. Consequently, on June 23, 2005, Plaintiff Carl Eads and Leanne Eads2 commenced an action in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, seeking damages for the injuries suffered as a result of the accident. Id. at ¶ 20. During the pendency of the state court action, Allstate failed to allow the insureds to negotiate a settlement. Id. at ¶ . The repercussions of Allstate's willful failure to properly evaluate, defend, and settle Plaintiff's state court claim were substantial. See id. at ¶ 24. On April 25, 2010, after a jury trial, Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Maria Lardani and Frederick Feldtmann for $308,000.00, plus post judgment interest and costs. See id. at 44-45.

Presently, Plaintiff brings an action for common law bad faith (Count I) and statutory bad faith pursuant to § 624.155, Florida Statutes (Count II), seeking damages stemming from the aforementioned judgment. See id. at ¶¶ 24-30. In response, Allstate asserts that Count II of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See ECF No. [4]. The Court disagrees.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A pleading in a civil action must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation"). Nor can a complaint rest on "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009) ("On a motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to thenon-moving party, and all facts alleged by the non-moving party are accepted as true."). A court considering a Rule 12(b) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached exhibits, including documents referred to in the complaint that are central to the claim. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009); Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 433 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[A] document outside the four corners of the complaint may still be considered if it is central to the plaintiff's claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity.") (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1135 (11th Cir. 2002)). While the court is required to accept as true all allegations contained in the complaint, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. DISCUSSION

Allstate essentially presents four reasons as to why Count II of the Amended Complaint must be dismissed. See ECF No. [4]. First, Allstate contends that Plaintiff's civil remedy notice is substantively deficient, lacking the requisite specificity. See id. at 4-6. In the alternative, Allstate asserts that it had no legal obligation to pay the sums Plaintiff now seeks as those sums were above and beyond those required by the Policy. Id. at 6. Third, Allstate maintains that the civil remedy notices are invalid because no opportunity to cure the purported errors was given. Id. at 6-7. Finally, Allstate avers that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint constitutes a "shotgun pleading." Id. at 8-9. The Court addresses these issues in turn.

A. The Civil Remedy Notices Are Sufficiently Specific

In its pertinent part, § 624.155, allows an individual to bring a civil action against an insurer when the individual has been damaged by the insurer, as a result of, inter alia, "[n]ot attempting in good faith to settle claims when, under all the circumstances, it could and shouldhave done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insured and with due regard for her or his interests." See Fla. Stat. § 624.155. Before any litigation under this cause of action may be commenced, a plaintiff must provide the insurer with sixty (60) days written notice of the violation. See id. at (3)(a). Talat Enterprises, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 753 So. 2d 1278, 1283 (Fla. 2000) ("We find that the requirements of written notice to the Department of Insurance and the insurer are conditions precedent to bringing an action under subdivision (1)(a) or (b)."); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clohessy, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1333 (M.D. Fla. 1998) ("[The notice requirement] is, without a doubt, a condition that must be satisfied in order for one to perfect the right to sue under the statute."). The statute further provides that this civil remedy notice ("CRN") must state with specificity the following:

1. The statutory provision, including the specific language of the statute, which the authorized insurer allegedly violated.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the violation.
3. The name of any individual involved in the violation.
4. Reference to specific policy language that is relevant to the violation, if any. If the person bringing the civil action is a third party claimant, she or he shall not be required to reference the specific policy language if the authorized insurer has not provided a copy of the policy to the third party claimant pursuant to written request.
5. A statement that the notice is given in order to perfect the right to pursue the civil remedy authorized by this section.

Id. at (3)(b). If the alleged violation is remedied during the 60-day period, the plaintiff's action is barred: "No action shall lie if, within 60 days after filing notice, the damages are paid or the circumstances giving rise to the violation are corrected." Id. at (3)(d). Thus, the statute provides a 60-day period which allows the violating insurer to "cure" the error, the purpose of which is to "encourage payment of the underlying claim, and avoid unnecessary bad faith litigation." See id;Talat Enterprises, 753 So. 2d at 1282 (quoting Talat Enterprises, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 952 F. Supp. 773, 778 (M.D. Fla. 1996)). According to the Florida Supreme Court, the statute is to be "strictly construed." Talat Enterprises, 753 So. 2d at 1283 (citation omitted).

Allstate contends that the CRNs are inadequate because they fail to indicate what action Plaintiff wished Allstate to take in order to cure the alleged violation. Plaintiff submitted three CRNs. See ECF Nos. [4-1], [4-2], and [4-3]. Under the section requesting the "facts and circumstances giving rise to the insurer's violation," the first two CRNs assert:

There were 7 claims made as a result of the accident. Without a proper investigation into the liability and damages
...

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