Eagle ex rel. Estate of Eagle v. Redmond, WD 60249.

• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
• Citation: 80 S.W.3d 920
• Docket Number: No. WD 60249.,WD 60249.
• Parties: Sandra K. EAGLE as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF Robert V. EAGLE and Sandra K. Eagle, Respondents, v. Thomas W. REDMOND, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 06 August 2002

80 S.W.3d 920 Sandra K. EAGLE as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF Robert V. EAGLE and Sandra K. Eagle, Respondents,
v.
Thomas W. REDMOND, Appellant. No. WD 60249. Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District. August 6, 2002.

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Don A. Peterson, Kansas City, for Respondents.

John E. Redmond, Kansas City, for Appellant.

Before: HOWARD, P.J., and SMITH and NEWTON, JJ.

EDWIN H. SMITH, Judge.

Thomas W. Redmond appeals from the judgment of the circuit court for the respondents, the Estate of Robert V. Eagle and Sandra K. Eagle, in their suit against the appellant (Redmond lawsuit) to pierce the corporate veil of Redmond Building Corporation (RBC) and hold the appellant personally liable for a judgment obtained by the respondents¹ against RBC in a prior lawsuit (RBC lawsuit), awarding the respondents $24,561.50 in damages, which the jury found that they had sustained as a direct result of RBC's failure to construct their home in a workmanlike manner. In its judgment in the Redmond lawsuit to pierce the corporate veil, the circuit court ordered the appellant to pay the respondents a total of $53,527.06, representing payment of the $24,561.50 judgment entered in the RBC lawsuit, $10,454.12 in statutory interest that had accrued on that judgment, and attorney's fees and expenses of $18,511.44.

The appellant raises six points on appeal. In Point I, he claims that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence because the respondents failed to make a submissible case for piercing the corporate veil of RBC. In Point II, he claims that the trial court erred in giving the verdict-directing instruction of the respondents, Instruction No. 5, submitting their claim for piercing the corporate veil of RBC, because it failed to submit the ultimate disputed facts the jury was required to decide in order for it to find that the corporate veil of RBC should be pierced. In Point III, he claims that the trial court erred in rejecting its proffered verdict director, Instruction A, in lieu of Instruction No. 5, because it submitted the requisite ultimate disputed facts. In Point IV, he claims that the trial court erred in awarding the respondents in the Redmond lawsuit accrued interest on the judgment entered in the RBC lawsuit because there was no statutory or contractual basis for doing so. In Point V, he claims that the trial court erred in awarding the respondents attorney's fees "because the attorney's fees were the subject of a contingent fee contract between [respondent Sandra K. Eagle] and her attorney." In Point VI, he claims that the trial court erred "in submitting the case to the jury because [Respondents'] cause of action is barred by res judicata in that their claim to pierce the corporate veil of [RBC] must have been joined with their breach of contract claim against RBC" in the RBC lawsuit.

The judgment of the trial court piercing the corporate veil of RBC and awarding the respondents $53,527.06 from the appellant is affirmed.

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Facts

On February 12, 1994, the respondents entered into a contract with RBC for the construction of a new house. On April 27, 1995, the respondents filed suit against RBC claiming that RBC breached its contract with them by failing to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. An ensuing jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the respondents, awarding them $24,561.50, which included $13,000 in attorney's fees. RBC appealed the judgment, which was affirmed by this court in Eagle v. Redmond Bldg. Corp., 946 S.W.2d 291 (Mo.App.1997).

The judgment for the respondents remained unsatisfied, and, in September of 1999, the respondents filed a petition to pierce the corporate veil of RBC and hold the appellant personally liable for the judgment. Upon a jury verdict in favor of the respondents, the trial court entered a judgment ordering the appellant to pay the respondents $53,527.06, which the trial court stated was "constituted of the $24,561.50 principal and $10,454.12 interest due on the Eagle judgment against Redmond Building Corporation together with attorney fees and expenses in the sum of $18,511.44 for a total judgment of $53,527.06 with interest thereon at the judgment rate provided for in Section 408.040 from and after March 20, 2001, and have execution therefor."

This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

The standard for review of a trial court's denial of motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict is whether the plaintiff has made a submissible case. Brown v. Hamilton Ins. Co., 956 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo.App.1997). An appellate court reviews the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, disregarding evidence to the contrary. Seitz v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 959 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Mo. banc 1998). An appellate court will reverse a jury's verdict for insufficient evidence only where there is a complete absence of probative fact to support the jury's conclusion. Id. Where reasonable minds can differ on the question before the jury, a court may not disturb the jury's verdict. Feely v. City of St. Louis, 898 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Mo.App.1995).

I.

In Point I, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence because the respondents failed to make a submissible case for piercing the corporate veil of RBC. Specifically, he claims that the respondents failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the requisite elements for piercing the corporate veil in that there was no evidence that: (a) [the appellant] "dominated the finances and business practice of [RBC] with respect to the real estate contract executed between the [respondents] and [RBC] in February, 1994 so as to that transaction, [RBC] had no separate mind, will or existence of its own"; (b) [the appellant] "exercised control of [RBC] to commit fraud in contravention of the [respondents'] legal rights with respect to the real estate contract executed in February, 1994"; and (c) [the appellant] "proximately caused any damage to the [respondents]."

"There is no requirement that the argument section of an appellate brief be perfect. An appellant's brief, however, should adequately present and address the issues to be decided." State v. Hendricks, 944 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Mo. banc 1997) (citations omitted). In that regard, it is well settled that an appellant must develop, in the argument section of the brief, error raised in the point relied on. Id.; Stickley

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v. Auto Credit, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Mo.App.2001); State ex rel. Greene v. Greene, 51 S.W.3d 537, 541 (Mo.App.2001); Weisenburger v. City of St. Joseph, 51 S.W.3d 119, 124 (Mo.App.2001); State v. Mitchell, 41 S.W.3d 574, 578 (Mo.App. 2001); Estate of Phillips v. Matney, 40 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Mo.App.2001); In re T.E., 35 S.W.3d 497, 506 (Mo.App.2001); Thomas v. Lloyd, 17 S.W.3d 177, 188 (Mo.App. 2000). "An argument is not properly before an appellate court if it merely makes bald assertions of general principles of law and never develops how such principles mandate reversal in the factual context of the particular case." Mitchell, 41 S.W.3d at 578 (citation omitted). "It is not within [the appellate court's] province ... to speculate about, then decide, arguments that are not asserted or that are merely asserted but not developed." Hendricks, 944 S.W.2d at 210 (citations omitted). A...