Eagleston v. Guido
| Decision Date | 07 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | D,No. 1719,1719 |
| Citation | 41 F.3d 865 |
| Parties | Cecelia N. EAGLESTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel GUIDO, Detective Rivera, Dennis Donnelly, Police Officer, Daniel Moore, Police Officer, and James Rooney, Police Officer, Defendants, Brian K. Bugge, Police Officer, Edward Kopf, Police Officer, Jack Ozer, Police Officer, Dewitt C. Treder, MP Milward, Police Officer, Michael Pesale, Police Officer, Paul Kern, Police Officer, Suffolk County, Suffolk County Police Department, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 93-9053. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Bartholomew J. Rebore, Lindenhurst, NY (Rebore, Thorpe & Pisarello, P.C., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
Jeltje deJong, Asst. County Atty., Hauppauge, NY, (Robert J. Cimino, Suffolk County Atty., of counsel), for defendants-appellees.
Before: MAHONEY and JACOBS, Circuit Judges. 1
Plaintiff-appellant Cecelia N. Eagleston alleges under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 that the Suffolk County in the State of New York, and the County's police, deprived her of equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect her from her husband, Thomas Eagleston, despite her numerous complaints that he was harassing her in violation of two orders of protection. In December 1986, Mr. Eagleston stabbed his wife 30 or more times. Mrs. Eagleston's complaint charges that "defendant, County of Suffolk, acting through its police department, condoned a pattern [or] practice of affording inadequate protection, or no protection at all, to women who have complained of having been abused by their husbands or others with whom they have a close relationship."
Mrs. Eagleston has presented her claim to two juries in the Eastern District of New York; the first trial was conducted by Judge Wexler and the second by visiting Judge Tsoucalas (Court of International Trade, sitting by designation). Both juries deadlocked. At the end of the second trial, Judge Tsoucalas entered an order directing a verdict in favor of the defendants then remaining in the case. Mrs. Eagleston's appeal alleges a variety of errors committed in the course of the proceedings. First, Mrs. Eagleston disputes the district court's conclusion that the statute of limitations had expired on her claims against police officers Bugge, Kopf, Kern and Donnelly. Second, she challenges the dismissal of the defendant police officers Ozer, Pesale and Milward on qualified immunity grounds. Third, she challenges several of Judge Tsoucalas's evidentiary rulings, most notably his refusal to receive in evidence a report prepared by Suffolk County which records a sharp increase after 1987 in the number of domestic incidents resulting in arrest. Fourth, she We affirm the judgment.
challenges Judge Tsoucalas's order following the second trial, directing a verdict against her and dismissing the complaint against the County of Suffolk and the County's former Police Commissioner, on the ground that Mrs. Eagleston had failed to produce sufficient evidence to support her equal protection claim. Her remaining arguments do not justify extended treatment.
Mrs. Eagleston's marriage turned violent on October 20, 1986, the day she served her husband with divorce papers. Between then and December 27, 1986, Mrs. Eagleston contacted the police ten times to report harassment and threats against her by Mr. Eagleston. On one occasion, Mrs. Eagleston brought her complaint directly to the police station; on another occasion, a police officer was summoned to a neighborhood restaurant; eight times, police were dispatched to the Eagleston home. During this two month period, Mrs. Eagleston resided on the ground floor of the Eagleston home while Mr. Eagleston sporadically occupied the same house, sometimes with his wife, and sometimes in a basement apartment that the Eaglestons had rented to his sister before divorce proceedings began. 2
Mr. Eagleston reacted to notice of the divorce proceedings on October 20, 1986 by threatening Mrs. Eagleston, by throwing objects at her and by smashing plasterboard walls in their home. Mrs. Eagleston called the Suffolk County police department, which dispatched officers to the house. The officers concluded that an arrest was not justified.
On October 23, 1986, the Suffolk County Supreme Court issued an Order to Show Cause, returnable on November 3, 1986, which included a "temporary order of protection" requiring Mr. Eagleston "to refrain from any acts of violence" towards Mrs. Eagleston or the Eagleston's son, Steven. A second judge of that court extended this order of protection on November 26, 1986, and temporarily granted Mrs. Eagleston "exclusive use of and occupancy of the marital residence." On November 10, 1986, Mr. Eagleston sought and obtained his own temporary order of protection requiring Mrs. Eagleston to refrain from acts of violence against him.
After the initial incident on October 20, Mrs. Eagleston reported incidents involving her husband to the Suffolk County police on November 7, 9, 20, 23 and December 7, 8, 9, 19 and 24. The police responded to all of these demands for assistance. Most of the complaints did not allege physical injury. In each instance, Mrs. Eagleston expressed fear of harm, and in some instances she reported threats by her husband. Prior to the stabbing on December 27, 1986, the only reported knifing took place on November 9, 1986, when Mrs. Eagleston stabbed her husband in the leg with a paring knife; and the only arrests were made on November 23, 1986, when both Mr. Eagleston and Mrs. Eagleston were arrested following an incident in which Mr. Eagleston claimed his wife had violated his order of protection while Mrs. Eagleston claimed her husband had beaten her. Both Eaglestons subsequently withdrew the charges against each other arising out the November 23 fracas.
On December 27, 1986, following an argument in which Mr. Eagleston charged his wife with infidelity, Mr. Eagleston stabbed her 30 or 33 times with a carving knife.
Mrs. Eagleston filed suit on December 7, 1989 against the County; the Suffolk County Police Department (hereinafter sometimes referenced collectively with the County as the "County"); Police Commissioner Daniel Guido; the former commissioner, Dewitt C. Treder; and ten police officers. Judge Wexler dismissed the claims against two policemen in a ruling that has not been appealed. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims against another policeman and against Commissioner Guido. On April 22, 1992, Judge Wexler granted partial summary judgment dismissing Mrs. Eagleston's claims against In May 1992, the case proceeded to its first jury trial against the County, the former police commissioner and the two remaining policemen. At the close of plaintiff's case, Judge Wexler dismissed the claims against police officers Pesale and Milward on the ground of qualified immunity. The claims against the County and its former police commissioner, Dewitt Treder, were submitted to the jury, which deadlocked after three days of deliberations. Judge Wexler declared a mistrial.
defendant police officers Bugge, Kopf, Kern and Donnelly on statute of limitations grounds, and those against police officer Ozer on the ground of qualified immunity, 790 F.Supp. 416.
The second jury trial commenced August 11, 1993, Judge Tsoucalas presiding, solely on the issue of the liability of the County and its former police commissioner. After four days of deliberation, the eight-member panel was able to reach a unanimous verdict on only two issues: first, that the plaintiff failed to prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that Suffolk County and/or [Police] Commissioner Treder had an unconstitutional policy which denied women equal protection of the law"; and second, that the plaintiff did establish "by a preponderance of the evidence that Suffolk County and/or [Police] Commissioner Treder had an unconstitutional policy which denied victims of domestic violence equal protection of the law." (Emphasis added.) The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on whether this "unconstitutional policy" was the proximate cause of Mrs. Eagleston's stabbing injuries.
After excusing the jury and declaring a mistrial, Judge Tsoucalas granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict, and dismissed the remainder of the case, explaining his reasoning as follows:
[T]here is no evidence that this Court heard that there was a policy of Suffolk County or the Police Commissioner that deprived the plaintiff of her constitutional rights. It hasn't been proven at all.
There was testimony showing that some police officers didn't do their job and were negligent in their job and in performing their duties, but that doesn't mean that there was a policy for all police officers to do something, and most of the police officers acted in accordance with the law and in accordance with the Constitution ... and didn't deprive Mrs. Eagleston of her constitutional rights at all.
There is nothing in the facts that I have heard that showed any policy on behalf of Suffolk County or any policy on behalf of the Commissioner.
The fact that the Commissioner didn't know what was going on shows that he wasn't a good commissioner, that he may have been an incompetent commissioner, ... but it doesn't mean that he had a policy of discriminating against women or discriminating against victims of domestic violence.
There was no testimony whatsoever to show that there was discrimination in domestic violence cases
....
In his written order, dated August 25, 1993, Judge Tsoucalas stated simply that he had dismissed the matter because the plaintiff had failed to establish that either the County of Suffolk or Police Commissioner Treder "had a policy of denying women or victims of domestic violence equal protection of the law."
Final judgement was entered on November 10, 1993.
Mrs. Eagleston raises numerous claims of error, none of...
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