Eagon v. Cabell Cnty. Emergency Med. Servs.
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:23-0013 |
| Decision Date | 21 December 2023 |
| Parties | REX EAGON and DIANA EAGON, individually and as co-administrators of the ESTATE OF DARIEN M. EAGON, Plaintiffs, v. CABELL COUNTY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES, UNIDENTIFIED CABELL COUNTY EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES AGENT, GORDON MERRY III, HUNTINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICER J. SMITH, OFFICER D. ANDERSON, OFFICER M. CREMEANS, CAPTAIN MERRITT, CABELL COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, CABELL COUNTY COMMISSION, SHERIFF CHARLES “CHUCK” N. ZERKLE, JR. and JOHN DOE NON-PARTY FAULT ENTITY IDENTIFIED BY CO-DEFENDANTS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss filed by the various Defendants. Plaintiffs Rex and Diana Eagon individually and as co-administrators of the Estate of Darien M. Eagon, oppose the motions, in part. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES, in part, and GRANTS, in part, Defendants' motions.
On January 9, 2023, Plaintiffs filed this action against the Cabell County Emergency Medical Services (EMS); an Unidentified EMS Agent; Gordon Merry III, the Director of EMS; the Huntington Police Department (HPD); HPD Officers J. Smith, D. Anderson, M. Cremeans; HPD Captain Merritt; the Cabell County Sheriff's Department; the Cabell County Sheriff Charles “Chuck” N. Zerkle, Jr.; the Cabell County Commission; and John Doe Non-Party Fault Entity Identified by Co-Defendants. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that, on Sunday, January 10, 2021, their daughter Darien Eagon was drinking alcohol and repeatedly expressing thoughts of suicide to her live-in boyfriend. Compl. ¶17. In response, the boyfriend called Ms. Eagon's parents and Cabell County 911. Id. ¶¶18 19. Plaintiffs, EMS, and HPD came to the residence. Id. ¶20.
The boyfriend told the EMS personnel and the HPD officers that Ms. Eagon needed help. Id. ¶24. However, instead of helping Ms. Eagon, Plaintiffs claim the body camera footage from an HPD officer reveals that the EMS personnel said that neither EMS nor HPD could do anything because Ms. Eagon was alert. Id. ¶22. According to Plaintiffs, the EMS personnel also stated that, although the Sheriff's Department is supposed to handle these situations, it “would not come out because they do not do mental hygiene orders on Sundays.” Id. ¶21. Plaintiffs further allege both the EMS personnel and the HPD officers said that, even aside from Sundays, the Sheriff Department's response is lackluster. Id. ¶25. Plaintiffs claim they were told this situation “was not an isolated occurrence as the Huntington Police Department and EMS personnel noted ‘the last one was really bad' and St. Mary's wouldn't take him.” Id. ¶23.
Defendants assert Plaintiffs' factual summary of the body camera footage is inaccurate, misleading, and incomplete. They point out the footage reveals that, when the HPD officers arrived on the scene, they were informed by EMS that Ms. Eagon was “alert and oriented,” “doesn't want anyone to bother her,” and “she won't go.” Body Camera Video Footage, Ex. 3 to The City Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, at 1:28, ECF No. 15-3.[1] Rex Eagon also indicates on the footage that Ms. Eagon was unwilling to leave with him or her mother. Id. at 5:32.
Eventually, EMS, HPD, and Ms. Eagon's parents left the scene. Later that day, Ms. Eagon's boyfriend also left the residence because “Ms. Eagon was being abusive toward him.” Id. ¶28 (internal citations omitted). When the boyfriend returned that night with a friend, he found Ms. Eagon had hung herself and tragically died. Id. ¶¶30, 31.
Plaintiffs allege at the time of Ms. Eagon's death, “the Cabell County Sheriff's Department apparently had a custom, practice and policy of not properly responding to emergency mental hygiene and potential suicide calls or cases.” Id. ¶16. Plaintiffs claim that the Sheriff's Department's custom, practice, and policy “was well known to the putative co-Defendants and apparently caused the Huntington Police Department and Cabell County EMS to tell the parents that there was nothing that could be done on a Sunday to help their suicidal daughter.” Id. In fact, Plaintiffs assert that, shortly after Ms. Eagon died, West Virginia Public Radio aired a story in which it reported that Id. ¶13.[2]
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege six causes of action against Defendants. Count I is for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count II is for a violation of Article 3, § 10 of the West Virginia Constitution. Count III is for ordinariy and/or professional negligence. Count IV is for outrage and reckless infliction of emotional distress. Count V is for a violation of West Virginia Human Rights Act. Finally, Count VI asserts a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. As problematic throughout all the Counts in the Complaint, Plaintiffs refer to “Defendants” collectively and do not identify what Count applies to which Defendant(s). It seems apparent that some of the claims do not apply to some Defendants, but Plaintiffs have made no attempt to differentiate amongst them in the Counts of the Complaint.
In their motions, Defendants raise a sundry of reasons why this action and/or various claims should be dismissed against them. Defendants HPD, Captain Merritt, and the individually named HPD officers (sometimes collectively referred to as the “City Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) and Defendants Cabell County Commission, EMS, EMS Director Merry, the Sheriff's Department, and Sheriff Zerkle (sometimes collectively referred to as the “County Defendants”)[3] filed a separate Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 26. Plaintiffs oppose some of Defendants' arguments, but they also now state they do not intend to pursue some of their causes of actions against some Defendants. With this backdrop, the Court turns to Defendants' motions.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court looks for plausibility in the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This standard requires a plaintiff to set forth the “grounds” for an “entitle[ment] to relief” that is more than mere “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true (even when doubtful), the allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted). If the allegations in the complaint, assuming their truth, do “not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.” Id. at 558 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court explained the requirements of Rule 8 and the “plausibility standard” in more detail. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated that Rule 8 does not demand “detailed factual allegations[.]” 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, a mere “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is insufficient. Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility exists when a claim contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court continued by explaining that, although factual allegations in a complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation omitted). Whether a plausible claim is stated in a complaint requires a court to conduct a context-specific analysis, drawing upon the court's own judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. If the court finds from its analysis that “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. (quoting, in part, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). The Supreme Court further articulated that Id.
In the City Defendants' motion, HPD first argues it is improperly named as a Defendant because it is not a legal entity that can be sued. Weigle v. Pifer, 139 F.Supp.3d 760, 765 n.1 (S.D. W.Va. 2015) (). In their Amended Response, Plaintiffs concede that they should have named the City of Huntington and not HPD as a defendant. Pls.' Am. Resp. to the City Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 3, ECF No. 24. Plaintiffs further state they “do not oppose substituting the ‘City of Huntington' in for the ‘Huntington Police Department' as the name of that Defendant.” Id. Ordinarily, a party...
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