Eakins v. Nevada

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
• Writing for the Court: Hagen
• Citation: Eakins v. Nevada, 219 F.Supp.2d 1113 (D. Nev. 2002)
• Decision Date: 25 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. CV-N-01-0324-DWH(RAM).,CV-N-01-0324-DWH(RAM).
• Parties: Robert EAKINS, Plaintiff, v. State of NEVADA, Defendant.

219 F.Supp.2d 1113

Robert EAKINS, Plaintiff, v. State of NEVADA, Defendant.

No. CV-N-01-0324-DWH(RAM).

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

June 25, 2002.

Terri Keyser-Cooper, Reno, NV, Diane K. Villancourt, Santa Cruz, CA, for plaintiff.

Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General, David K. Neidert, Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Justice Division, Carson City, NV, for defendant.

Allen Lichtenstein, Las Vegas, NV, Daniel P. Tokaji, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, for intervenor.

ORDER

HAGEN, District Judge.

Before the court are cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Robert Eakins filed a motion for summary judgment (# 25) on September 4, 2001. Defendant opposed (# 39), and plaintiff replied (# 43). Defendant filed with its opposition a cross motion for summary judgment (# 40). All plaintiffs filed papers in opposition (# 44 & # 47), and defendant replied (# 54).

I. Background

Plaintiff Eakins filed this lawsuit on May 24, 2001 against Steven Daniels and the City of Reno. Plaintiff brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of NRS 199.325, which makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly file false allegations of misconduct against a peace officer. By minute order (# 24) dated August 30, 2001, the court granted the State of Nevada's motion to intervene to defend the constitutionality of the statute. On September 20, 2001, the parties stipulated to dismiss with prejudice Steven Daniels and the City of Reno from the lawsuit. By order filed November 8, 2001(# 51), the court granted a motion to intervene as party plaintiffs on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada ("ACLUN"), and individuals Kathleen Von Tobel, Brother David Buer, Magdelena Anderson, Jovan Luna, and Tina Lemon.

The case as it currently stands is a facial challenge to NRS 199.325, and it is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. Because the case concerns a question of law and there being no dispute concerning the facts, it is unnecessary to delve into the factual scenarios each plaintiff brings to the court.

II. Analysis

A. Standing for a Facial Challenge

Plaintiffs raise a facial challenge to NRS 199.325. As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, "facial challenges `are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the litigant, but for the benefit of society — to prevent the statute from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.'" 4805 Convoy, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 183 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984)). A finding that a statute is facially unconstitutional results in invalidation of the law itself. Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir.1998).

"Although facial challenges to legislation are generally disfavored, they have been permitted in the First Amendment context where the licensing scheme vests unbridled discretion in the decision-maker¹ and where the regulation is challenged as overbroad." FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (citing Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 and n. 15, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984)). Litigants also have standing in First Amendment overbreadth cases to "challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court." Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980), accord, Perry v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 121 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1047, 118 S.Ct. 1362, 140 L.Ed.2d 511 (1998). This occurs "because of the possibility that protected speech or associative activities may be inhibited by the overly broad reach of the statute." Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 634.

The overbreadth doctrine confers standing on a party who demonstrates that a statute "`create[s] an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas' and that he has suffered an injury." Young v. Simi Valley, 216 F.3d 807, 815 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 949 (9th Cir.1997)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1104, 121 S.Ct. 844, 148 L.Ed.2d 723 (2001). Overbreadth standing is an exception to traditional standing and is premised upon preventing the self-censorship and chilling of expression of individuals not before the court. See Young, 216 F.3d at 815. To meet the requirements for overbreadth standing, the litigant must establish: (1) an injury-in-fact; and (2) an ability to satisfactorily frame the issues in the case. Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1010-1011 (9th Cir.2001). In establishing an injury-in-fact, the plaintiff must show that he "has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury" as a result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both "real and immediate," not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (citations omitted). A litigant may also bring a facial challenge to a regulation provided his own conduct is protected and by arguing the statute is not capable of ever being applied in a valid manner and would chill the speech of others. 4805 Convoy, Inc., 183 F.3d at 1112 n. 4.

Plaintiffs' claims are grounded in the First Amendment; therefore, "they are entitled to rely on the impact of the ordinance on the expressive activities of others as well as their own." Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981). Further, all plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an injury in fact such that they have standing to bring this facial challenge.² Thus, insofar as plaintiffs challenge the statute on the basis of overbreadth, they have standing to bring a facial challenge. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ("Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases firmly establish appellant's standing to raise an overbreadth challenge.")

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party, Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir.1996), and for this purpose, the material lodged by the moving party must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir.1998). "A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth." Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1472, 1483 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir.1982)).

Once the moving party presents evidence that would call for judgment as a matter of law at trial if left uncontroverted, the respondent must show by specific facts the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

[T]here is no genuine issue of fact for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.

Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). "A mere scintilla of evidence will not do, for a jury is permitted to draw only those inferences of which the evidence is reasonably susceptible; it may not resort to speculation." British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 1790, 60 L.Ed.2d 241 (1979). Moreover, "if the factual context makes the non-moving party's claim implausible, then that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence than otherwise would be necessary to show there is a genuine issue for trial." Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Stanewich, 142 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); and California Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987)).

If cross motions for summary judgment are filed, the court must consider each motion separately and determine whether that party is entitled to a judgment under Rule 56. In making this determination, the court must evaluate the evidence offered in support of each cross-motion. Fair Hous. Council of Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1136-1137 (9th Cir.2001).

C. Application of the Summary Judgment Standard

NRS 199.325, entitled Filing false or fraudulent complaint or allegation of misconduct against peace officer, provides as follows:

1. A person who knowingly files a false or fraudulent written complaint or allegation of misconduct against a peace officer for conduct in the course and scope of his employment is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Plaintiffs rely heavily on the Central District of California opinion in Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino, 107 F.Supp.2d 1239 (C.D.Cal.2000), in arguing that NRS 199.325 is unconstitutional. In that case, the court applied the analysis set forth in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), and determined that California Penal Code § 148.6 was unconstitutional...