Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Homes Sales, Inc.

Decision Date16 August 1988
Docket NumberNo. 13310,13310
Citation208 Conn. 620,546 A.2d 805
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesStephen EAMIELLO et al. v. LIBERTY MOBILE HOME SALES, INC.

Robert L. Hirtle, Jr., Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Edward G. Fitzpatrick, with whom, on the brief, was Peter E. Mariano, Naugatuck, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Robert M. Langer, William M. Rubenstein, and Stephen R. Park, Asst. Attys. Gen., filed a brief for the state of Connecticut as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and COVELLO, JJ.

SHEA, Justice.

In this action the plaintiffs, Stephen Eamiello and his wife, Rita Eamiello, owners of a mobile home, sought injunctive relief and monetary damages against the defendant, Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., which owns the lot where the home is located. The plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that the parties' rental agreement in regard to this lot illegally prevented the plaintiffs from selling the home while it remained on the defendant's lot. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs and attorney's fees on the count of the complaint alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. It also issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from interfering with the on-site sale of the plaintiffs' mobile home and ordering the defendant to restore running water to the home upon the condition that the plaintiffs resume paying monthly use and occupancy fees to the defendant ten days after their water service has been restored. In addition, it rendered judgment for the plaintiffs on the counterclaim for failure to pay rent to the defendant from December 1, 1984, through the date of judgment, August 31, 1987, on the ground that the plaintiffs' home became untenantable because the defendant had turned off the water supply during this period and the defendant's action in this regard excused the plaintiffs from paying rent or use and occupancy fees pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-4a. 1

In its appeal from the judgment, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in concluding that: (1) the parties' rental agreement imposed resale conditions that were not permitted by General Statutes § 21-79; 2 (2) General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-70(c) 3 gave the department of consumer protection authority to approve resale standards in regard to mobile homes, other than aesthetic standards; (3) the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements of the supplemental judgment in an unreported action the defendant had brought against the town of Prospect; (4) General Statutes § 21-68a 4 is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority when it permits a local building inspector to determine whether a mobile home is safe and sanitary, but does not provide any measuring standards; (5) § 21-79(a) is constitutional despite the claim that it amounts to an unjustified taking of property; 5 (6) § 47a-4a applies to an owner of a mobile home located in a mobile home park and precludes recovery on the counterclaim for rent from December 1, 1984; (7) a permanent injunction should be issued prohibiting the defendant from enforcing the resale standards in the parties' lease in order to prevent the on-site sale of the plaintiffs' mobile home; (8) the defendant's attempt to enforce the resale standards in the parties' lease constitutes a violation of CUTPA; (9) and the plaintiffs should be awarded compensatory damages pursuant to the CUTPA count of their complaint. We find no error on the first seven claims, but error on the eighth and ninth. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court with direction to deny relief on the CUTPA count of the complaint and to recalculate the amount of compensatory damages.

The court found the following facts. On August 29, 1980, the plaintiffs purchased a used 1971 Newport mobile home from the defendant for $12,500. The mobile home was purchased "in place" on a lot in Harmony Acres Mobile Home Park, which the defendant owned, in the town of Prospect. On the date of purchase, the parties entered into a rental agreement for the lot for a period commencing on September 8, 1980, and ending on September 30, 1981. The rental agreement contained the following provision relating to the resale of this mobile home: "The owner hereby notifies the Resident that the resale of his mobile home is restricted by Section 4 of P.A. 74-333. Only mobile homes meeting the requirements of applicable federal, state and municipal laws may be sold in the park. The Resident may, where applicable, file with Owner a certificate from the local building official that the mobile home meets the requirements of applicable federal, state and municipal laws. Said certificate shall be filed with Owner prior to sale and shall be conclusive evidence of compliance. If such a certificate is not filed and the Resident sells his mobile home without the prior approval of the Owner, this lease shall automatically terminate and the mobile home be removed from the premises." Attached to and made a part of the initial rental agreement as appendix A was a copy of rules and regulations. Included in paragraph 10.1 of the rules and regulations was the statement that "[n]o mobile home over ten years old may be resold in place."

On September 30, 1981, the plaintiffs' lease was extended through September 30, 1982, by a written addendum. One of the attached rules and regulations provided that "[n]o Mobile home over ten years old will be allowed to enter the park or [be] resold on the lot, unless it is built to ANSI-119.1 [American National Standards Institute] minimum specifications." The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), a body sponsored by the Mobile Homes Manufacturers Association, in 1973 established minimum standards for mobile homes. ANSI-119 provides standards for mobile homes concerning body and frame design, and construction requirements for the installation of plumbing, heating and electrical systems.

On September 29, 1982, the parties renewed the plaintiffs' lease until October 1, 1983. An addendum to this lease contained an identical provision providing that no mobile home could be resold on its lot unless it met ANSI-119 minimum specifications. The last addendum to the plaintiffs' lease was executed on August 9, 1983, extending the term from October 1, 1983, to September 30, 1984. Provisions regulating in-place resales were included in both the addendum itself and in the resale standards attached thereto. These resale standards contained a requirement that the plaintiffs obtain a zoning permit and a building permit from the town of Prospect as the original rental agreement of September 8, 1980, had provided, as a condition precedent to selling their mobile home on the lot.

On March 12, 1984, the plaintiffs sent a certified letter to the defendant notifying it of their desire to sell their mobile home. In response to this letter, Arthur Rourke, an independent mobile home broker acting on behalf of the defendant, inspected the plaintiffs' home. He found that the home was sited properly on its lot and that it was in saleable condition, but noticed that the home did not contain a seal certifying that it met ANSI-119 minimum specifications. 6 Following Rourke's inspection, the plaintiffs sent a second certified letter to the defendant in which they requested advice as to further steps that might be necessary to prepare for an on-site resale. The defendant sent a reply letter in which it stated that paragraph one of the resale standards effective on October 1, 1983, required that their mobile home bear a seal certifying that it met ANSI-119 and federal minimum specifications. In addition, this letter informed the plaintiffs that they had to obtain approval from the local building inspector for the wood stove in their home and also had to comply with the requirements of the resale standards attached to the last addendum concerning the permits from the town of Prospect.

After receiving that letter, the plaintiffs learned on April 1, 1984, from Jo Ann Boyce, an employee in the defendant's rental department, that a seal could not be obtained for the mobile home because it was built before 1976, when the federal government began requiring seals. Boyce informed the plaintiffs that they must sell their home "off-site." Two days later, Boyce contacted the plaintiffs and offered to buy their mobile home for the amount of the plaintiffs' initial purchase price of $12,500. The plaintiffs refused this offer.

The plaintiffs took a number of steps in order to sell their home on-site despite the fact that Boyce had told them that they could not do so. On June 6, 1984, a building official for the town of Prospect issued a "certificate of occupancy" approving the plaintiffs' wood stove. In June, 1984, the plaintiffs moved out of their mobile home into a new home. In October, 1984, a prospective buyer offered to buy their mobile home on-site for $17,500. This buyer withdrew his offer when the defendant refused to permit an on-site sale. In November, 1984, the plaintiffs found a tenant ready to move into their mobile home at a rent of $375 per month with an option to purchase for $17,900. The defendant refused to accept this prospective tenant. On November 24, 1984, the defendant shut off the water connection to the mobile home. On April 10, 1985, a Prospect building official issued a "certificate of occupancy" approving the home for resale. Following a contested hearing, the commissioner of the department of consumer protection on April 15, 1985, issued a declaratory ruling that the resale standards in the parties' lease violated § 21-79(b). Subsequently, the fire marshall of Naugatuck, in the company of the Prospect fire marshall, found that the home's electrical system was in...

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