Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. City of Seattle
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | UTTER; ROSELLINI; WILLIAM H. WILLIAMS, C.J., and DORE |
| Citation | Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. City of Seattle, 99 Wn.2d 861, 665 P.2d 1328 (Wash. 1983) |
| Decision Date | 23 June 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 47986-1 |
| Parties | EARLE M. JORGENSEN COMPANY; Bethlehem Steel Corporation; Northwestern Glass, a division of Indian Head, Inc.; Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation; Isaacson Corporation; Ideal Basic Industries, Inc.; Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc.; Harbor Island Machine Works, Inc.; Washington Iron Works, Inc.; Markey Machinery Co., Inc.; PSF Industries, Inc.; Stainless Piping Systems, Inc.; Alaskan Copper Companies, Inc. d/b/a Alaskan Copper & Brass Co. and Alaskan Copper Works; Rainier Brewing Company; Lockheed Shipbuilding & Construction Co.; Kaiser Cement Corporation; Olympic Foundry Company; Paccar, Inc.; Pioneer Enamel Manufacturing Co., Inc.; and John W. Chapman, Appellants, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, a Washington municipal corporation, Respondent. |
Edmund J. Wood, Cartano, Botzer, Larson & Birkholz, J. Jeffrey Dudley, Bogle & Gates, Elaine Spencer, Seattle, for appellants.
Douglas N. Jewett, Seattle City Atty., William H. Patton, Ricardo Cruz, Asst. City Attys., Seattle, for respondent.
This is a challenge of Seattle's 1980 adoption of an electrical rate increase. We reject appellants' various constitutional and statutory claims and affirm the trial court's order of summary judgment.
Appellants sought to set aside the electrical rates set by respondent City of Seattle (City) on July 21, 1980. Appellants are 19 industrial companies and one individual who purchase electricity from the City, located both within and without the Seattle city limits. The new rates increased the cost of electricity to 15 of the appellants by an average 88 percent.
In May 1978, the City, responding to an increase in power costs, formed a Citizens' Rate Advisory Committee (CRAC), which included representatives of appellants, to prepare recommendations concerning rate setting. The CRAC had 60 full committee meetings between May 1978 and July 31, 1980 in furtherance of its role in advising the City on electrical rate structure.
On April 23, 1980, Mayor Charles Royer submitted to the City Council an allocation proposal calling for roughly equal rate increases for all consumer classes. The City Council energy committee scheduled a public hearing for May 14 to obtain comments on this proposal.
On April 29 and May 5, the energy committee held public hearings to discuss electric rate assistance policies, finance policies, and Seattle City Light's revenue requirements. For these as well as other public hearings held by the Council, notice was sent to 1,000 interested parties and was published in the local newspapers.
On May 13, the day before the rate allocation public hearing, Mayor Royer submitted a new allocation proposal calling for increases of 35 percent for residential users, 27 percent for commercial users, and 82 percent for industrial users. Although various people protested at the May 14 hearing that they had had insufficient time to comment intelligently on the new proposal, no further hearings on the allocation formula were held. Instead, members of the energy committee held private meetings and informal "working sessions" with various people, including representatives of appellants, to discuss the allocation model. On June 9, the City Council approved the allocation model.
Meanwhile, on May 27, 1980, Mayor Royer had submitted to the Council a rate design proposal. A public hearing on this proposal was held on June 10. On June 20, a new rate design proposal was submitted by Seattle City Light at the request of Council member Randy Revelle, chairman of the energy committee. A deadline for comments on this proposal was set for June 27. Again, some of the appellants protested the short time allowed for comments and requested the opportunity to call and to cross-examine witnesses. No such opportunity was provided. The rates were subsequently further revised up to the day of final passage. They were finally passed by the Council as ordinance 109218 on July 21, 1980.
Appellants brought suit to have the rates set aside and for a refund of payments. They alleged: (1) the rates were unfair, unjust, and unreasonable in violation of RCW 80.28.010; (2) appellants had been denied due process; (3) appellants had been denied the rights to intervene and participate in the rate proceedings provided by the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA); and (4) the rates were unlawfully made retroactively effective. The court granted partial summary judgment for the City on claims (2) and (3). It found no just reason for delay and ordered immediate entry of judgment on these claims. That is the judgment challenged in this appeal.
On December 16, 1981, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the City on the claims that were not resolved through the court's earlier order of partial summary judgment. The court held the City did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in enacting ordinance 109218, that the rates were not unfair, unjust or unreasonable, and that the methodology employed by the City in establishing the rate increase was not fundamentally erroneous. Apparently, neither party plans to appeal this judgment.
Appellants first raise a number of claims founded upon a due process interest in meaningful participation in the setting of electric rates. The kind of process which renders participation meaningful depends on the kind of decision being made. Thus, appellants' due process claims ultimately depend on whether we characterize the Seattle City Council's decisionmaking process in setting electrical rates as legislative or administrative (and if administrative--whether its function is legislative or adjudicative).
Appellants urge us to adopt a functional analysis of whether the Council's action is legislative or administrative. We have embraced this functional approach in the past, Westside Hilltop Survival Comm. v. King Cy., 96 Wash.2d 171, 634 P.2d 862 (1981), and are not bound by who makes the decision (e.g., a legislative body) or the form the decision takes (e.g., ordinance) in determining the decision's character.
In arguing the setting of electrical rates is administrative, appellants rely on case law dealing with whether certain matters are subject to referendum. See, e.g., Leonard v. Bothell, 87 Wash.2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976). All these cases in turn rely on 5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 16.55 (3d ed. 1969) which identifies the factors by which to distinguish legislative from administrative acts in this context:
Actions relating to subjects of a permanent and general character are usually regarded as legislative, and those providing for subjects of a temporary and special character are regarded as administrative....
The test of what is a legislative and what is an administrative proposition, with respect to the initiative or referendum, has further been said to be whether the proposition is one to make new law or to execute law already in existence. The power to be exercised is legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new policy or plan; whereas, it is administrative in its nature if it merely pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body itself, or some power superior to it.
(Footnote omitted.) Appellants also point to the apparent anomaly of State ex rel. Haas v. Pomeroy, 50 Wash.2d 23, 308 P.2d 684 (1957), a referendum case in which the City's bond council argued and the court found convincing (though it did not rely on) the position that the City's rate setting powers are administrative.
There are two problems with appellants' reliance on the referenda case law. First, analysis of the legislative/administrative distinction with respect to powers of referenda is not the same analysis relevant to the procedural safeguards that must inhere in administrative as opposed to legislative action. When a court determines that an action is administrative and thus not subject to referendum, it does not hold such administrative action is subject to greater procedural safeguards than acts subject to referendum. Quite the contrary, courts deny referenda with respect to administrative acts because of the broad discretion attached to such acts.
We rely on a more germane body of case law, which specifically holds a municipality's setting of rates is a legislative act. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co. v. Springfield, 257 U.S. 66, 70, 42 S.Ct. 24, 66 L.Ed. 131 (1921); Connett v. Jerseyville, 110 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir.1940); Algoma v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 91 Wis.2d 252, 283 N.W.2d 261 (1978); Apartment & Office Bldg. Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 415 A.2d 797 (D.C.App.1980); Fort Collins Motor Homes, Inc. v. Fort Collins, 30 Colo.App. 445, 496 P.2d 1074 (1972); C. Rhyne, Local Government Operations § 23.14 (1980); 12 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 35.37 (Supp.1981). Courts have found no contradiction in finding such acts legislative yet not subject to the referendum process. In re Initiative Petitions, 534 P.2d 3 (Okl.1975); Aurora v. Zwerdlinger, 194 Colo. 192, 571 P.2d 1074 (1977). We, too, have held the setting of rates is a legislative act. Scott Paper Co. v. Anacortes, 90 Wash.2d 19, 28, 578 P.2d 1292 (1978).
Appellants' second problem is that they wrongly assimilate "administrative" with "quasi-judicial." While administrative adjudications require many procedural safeguards the same is not true with respect to administrative policymaking functions. Appellants concede some aspects of rate setting involve policymaking, but they claim the revenue allocation among customer classes and the design of the actual rates are adversarial processes, which, though stemming from legislative authority, should be characterized as quasi-judicial. While it is true the setting of electrical rates involves weighing individual factors, it can hardly be said, as it can be in the rezoning context, that the final decision is for A and against B. Both A's and B's interests must be considered in...
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1000 Friends of Washington v. McFarland
...ex rel. Haas v. Pomeroy, 50 Wash.2d 23, 25, 308 P.2d 684 (1957) (collecting cases), overruled in part by Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. Seattle, 99 Wash.2d 861, 665 P.2d 1328 (1983). Courts will exercise their inherent power to keep such matters from the ballot. See, e.g., id. at 25, 308 P.2d ¶ ......
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City of Sequim v. Malkasian
...See generally State ex rel. Haas v. Pomeroy, 50 Wash.2d 23, 27-28, 308 P.2d 684 (1957) (distinguished by Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. Seattle, 99 Wash.2d 861, 866, 665 P.2d 1328 (1983)); Benton v. Seattle Electric Co., 50 Wash. 156, 96 P. 1033 (1908). By far, the best practice is to expedite r......
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Blocktree Props., LLC v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2 of Grant Cnty. Wash.
...ratepayers have no constitutional right to participate in legislative procedures setting rates); Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. City of Seattle , 99 Wash.2d 861, 665 P.2d 1328, 1331–32 (1983) (confirming that rate setting is a legislative act, "even with respect to rate allocation and design"). ......
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Holbrook, Inc. v. Clark County
...874 P.2d 853 (1994)). Constitutional due process rights do not attach to purely legislative acts. See Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. City of Seattle, 99 Wash.2d 861, 865-67, 665 P.2d 1328, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 982, 104 S.Ct. 425, 78 L.Ed.2d 359 (1983) (analyzing amount of participation by elec......