Earle v. Chace

• Decision Date: 19 July 1879
• Parties: ROBERT EARLE, Trustee, v. HARVEY CHACE et als.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

12 R.I. 374

ROBERT EARLE, Trustee, v. HARVEY CHACE et als.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 19, 1879

One asking relief in equity on the ground of fraud must affirmatively prove the fraud alleged.

The rule which forbids the transfer of property to a donee who holds a fiduciary relation with the donor is relaxed where the relation is not strictly fiduciary.

Hence where a step-mother conveyed certain realty to her step-sons it not appearing that they managed her property or that she relied on their advice in business matters:

Held, that the utmost burden on the donees was to show that the donor when she conveyed the estate understood her act.

Query, whether, if she attacked the validity of the conveyance, the burden was not upon her to show affirmatively that she misunderstood the nature of her act when she conveyed.

A gift from a wife to a husband will not be set aside except on proof that it was unfairly obtained and the burden of proof lies on the party attacking the gift.

Held, that no more severe rule could be applied in the case of a gift from a step-mother to her step-children.

The validity of a deed was attacked on the ground that the grantor never acknowledged it as the magistrate's certificate stated.

Query, whether this could be good ground for equitable relief.

BILL IN EQUITY to set aside a conveyance of realty.

Edward H. Hazard & Charles H. Parkhurst, for complainant.

Benjamin F. Thurston & James M. Ripley, for respondents.

DURFEE C. J.

This is a bill in equity, preferred by Robert Earle, the complainant, as trustee of the prop erty of Anna E. Chace, wife of Harvey Chace, under Gen. Stat. R.I.^[1] cap. 152, § 18, to procure a reconveyance of certain real estate, being the estate in the town of Lincoln occupied by said Harvey and Anna as their homestead, which formerly belonged to said Anna in fee simple, and which was conveyed to the defendants, James H. Chace and Jonathan Chace, by deed, bearing date of February 18, 1853. The bill alleges that Harvey and Anna were married September, 30, 1835; that they have no children living, said James and Jonathan being children of Harvey by a former wife; that the estate in question was purchased in the name of Anna and paid for out of her separate property long previous to February 18, 1853; that Anna reposed the fullest trust and confidence in her husband, and was accustomed to execute such instruments as he asked her to execute without question; that she executed the deed of February 18, 1853, on his representation that it was necessary on account of new business matters, without full knowledge of its contents and effect, confiding in his representations; that the deed was not explained to her by the magistrate before whom it purports to have been acknowledged, and that, in point of fact, she never acknowledged the deed to the magistrate, her only acknowledgment being made to a young girl, to whom, in reply to the question whether the instrument was her free act and deed, she said, after some hesitation, if it was the wish of her husband, she supposed it must be so.

The bill alleges that said Anna received no consideration for the deed except a lease back of the estate, of the same date, to her and her husband for and during their joint lives and the life of the survivor; that she knew nothing of the execution of the lease previous to October, 1876, when she discovered it in a small trunk among her private papers; that it was not then recorded, but was subsequently taken away, without her knowledge or consent, and recorded; and that, after discovering the lifelease, she also discovered that the deed, which previous to October 26, 1876, had not been recorded, was recorded on that day.

The bill alleges that said Anna was not aware until some time in the year 1876 that she had parted with the title to her said homestead estate; and it charges that " said Harvey Chace, James H. Chace, and Jonathan Chace, prior to and upon said eighteenth day of February, A. D. 1853, agreed and conspired together to obtain from the said Anna F. Chace, without consideration and without the knowledge on her part of the effect thereof, the said conveyance of her homestead estate in fraud of the rights of the said Anna E. Chace." It also alleges that said Anna reposed great trust and confidence in all the defendants, which they abused by getting her to sign the deed without consideration and without understanding its effect.

The answer of James and Jonathan Chace denies all the allegations of fraud and abuse of confidence contained in the bill, and avers that the deed was executed by said Anna understandingly and in due form, in pursuance of a design deliberately matured by her and her husband, without any solicitation from them, and without any knowledge on their part that it was in contemplation until immediately before the deed was executed. The answer of Harvey Chace was filed by his guardian ad litem, he having become non compos mentis, and contains similar denials and averments.

The complainant's claim to relief rests on three grounds, to wit: first, that the deed was obtained by actual fraud and deception practised on Anna E. Chase by the defendants; second, that it was obtained by taking advantage of her trust and confidence in them; and third, that it was never duly acknowledged by her.

1. The complainant is not relievable on the first ground without proving affirmatively the fraud and deception alleged. The evidence which he has adduced does not satisfy us. It comes mainly from Anna E. Chace. It is negative and inferential rather than positive and direct. Anna E. Chace testifies that she cannot remember having ever intended to make such a conveyance as hers of February 18, 1853, at least not with any intent to have it remain a permanent thing; and therefore the complainant asks the court to infer that she was deceived into making it by the defendants. The defendants, James and Jonathan Chace, testify that they did not know the conveyance was in contemplation until immediately before it was executed; that they then understood that the making of it was already determined upon; that the determination was communicated to them by their father, Anna E. being present, and apparently assenting; and that they simply received the conveyance and executed the life-lease in return, in compliance with what they supposed to be the concurrent desire of both Anna E. and Harvey Chace. In the face of testimony so distinct it is impossible for us to find that James and Jonathan Chace ever conspired with Harvey Chace to defraud and deceive Anna E. Chace as alleged, unless we are ready to find that they have committed perjury. Such a finding is unwarranted. It follows that if Anna E. Chace was deceived, she was deceived by her husband. Mrs. Chace does not accuse her husband of having intentionally deceived her; on the contrary, she confesses that he has always seemed to be true and affectionate; but she asserts that in point of fact she must have been deceived. In 1853 she was fifty-six years old and had no living child; but she had an adopted daughter. Under the then law she, being a married woman, had no power to make a will devising her real estate; consequently, if she had then died, all her real estate would have descended, subject to the curtesy of her husband, to her adopted daughter. The defendants, James and Jonathan Chace, testify that Mrs. Chace, at that time, had for them all the affection of a mother. She admits it. It was felt, they say, that they had the superior claim to succeed to the homestead estate. In their view, therefore, the purpose of the conveyance was testamentary. Their view finds confirmation in the fact that shortly after the conveyance Mrs. Chace made, as she had the legal right to make, her will, bequeathing her personal estate to James and Jonathan Chace and her adopted daughter. It is reasonable to believe that the will was designed to supplement the conveyance. Another fact corroborates this hypothesis. In 1853 Jonathan Chace was living in Philadelphia. He was invited to come home by his father with " reference to arrangements respecting property in future, after some of us shall have passed away." The letter states: " I have said nothing to any one but Anna about this invitation or the business we propose, she and I, to consider." In compliance with the invitation Jonathan came home, and the interview, previously mentioned, between Harvey, Anna, James, and Jonathan, occurred, followed by the conveyance. It seems incredible that Mrs. Chace should not have had her eyes open to the character of a transaction which was preceded by so much preparation, or that any actual fraud could have been perpetrated upon her, where there was so much to attract attention, without leaving in her memory some more significant traces of the manner of its perpetration.

The complainant contends that it is improbable that Mrs. Chace would knowingly have made the deed of February 18, 1853 because the estate which it conveys was bought for her by her husband as an equivalent for personal property which she inherited after marriage, and which came into his hands. The property referred to was inherited previous to 1844, and under the law which was applicable to it vested in the husband when reduced to possession. The estate was therefore in reality given by Harvey to Anna, though it may have been given in view of what he had received by virtue of his marital right. Under these circumstances, we think it not improbable that she may have been desirous of having the estate go after her decease to the children of Harvey, whom she loved, rather than to her own kindred or her adopted daughter. And this is the less improbable because the estate was not ancestral,...