Earle v. Runnels, 042106 FED09, 05-15739
|Party Name:||RICHARD W. EARLE, Petitioner - Appellant, v. RUNNELS, Warden, Respondent - Appellee.|
|Judge Panel:||Before: B. FLETCHER, BEEZER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||April 21, 2006|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted April 5, 2006 San Francisco, California
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Garland E. Burrell, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. CV-02-00334-GEB/KJM
Richard Earle, a California state prisoner, appeals the district courts denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition, challenging his Three Strikes sentence of 26-years-to-life imprisonment for receiving stolen property, a 16- year old motorcycle. Under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, habeas relief is proper if the state courts adjudication of the merits of the habeas claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We affirm the district courts denial of Earles petition.
Earles adult record consists of six first-degree burglary convictions. For those in 1988 and 1989, he was placed on probation. For those in 1990, he was sentenced to eight years in prison. After his release, Earle was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Despite his recidivism, Earle claims that the states imposition of a sentence of 26-years-to-life imprisonment for receiving stolen property violated the Eighth Amendment. Although Earles sentence is indisputably harsh when viewed against the underlying conduct leading to his conviction for violating Cal. Pen. Code § 496(a), the state courts denial of his claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law in light of Earles criminal history and the California legislatures decision that when . . . a person commits yet another felony, he should be subjected to the admittedly serious penalty of [potential] incarceration for life, subject only to the States judgment as to whether to grant him parole. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 278 (1980).
Earle argues that the Supreme Courts decision in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1982), provides clearly established authority...
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