Earley v. Annucci
| Decision Date | 27 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 9:08-CV-669 (FJS/DJS) |
| Parties | SEAN EARLEY, Plaintiff, v. ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, Executive Commissioner and Counsel, New York State Department of Correctional Services, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
EATON LAW FIRM
Attorney for the Plaintiff
27 Locust Street
Pittsford, NY 14534
MULDOON, GETZ LAW FIRM
144 Exchange Boulevard, Suite 402
Rochester, NY 14614
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
New York State Attorney General
K. WADE EATON, ESQ.
JON P. GETZ, ESQ.
KEITH J. STARLIN, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General
This civil rights case arises out of the administrative imposition of five years of post-release supervision ("PRS") by the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS")1 ontothe sentence of Plaintiff Sean Earley. See Dkt. No. 60, 2d Am. Compl. Specifically at issue are the actions of Defendant Anthony Annucci, counsel for DOCS, in response to the Second Circuit's decisions in Early v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 ("Early I"), reh'g denied, 462 F.3d 147 ("Early II") (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Burhlre v. Earley, 551 U.S. 1159 (2007), which concluded that the administrative imposition by DOCS of a term of PRS violated Plaintiff's Due Process rights under the United States Constitution.
Currently pending before the Court is the Earley's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability and Annucci's Motion for Summary Judgment based, inter alia, on the grounds of qualified immunity. Dkt. Nos. 124, Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. & 125, Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that the Plaintiff's Motion be granted in part and denied in part and Defendant's Motion be granted in part and denied in part.
In the Fall of 1999, Plaintiff was charged with multiple violations of the New York Penal Law prohibiting burglary. Dkt. No. 83, Rep.-Rec. and Order, dated Dec. 28, 2011, at p. 3.2 On February 29, 2000, after pleading guilty to attempted burglary in the second degree, Plaintiff was sentenced by the Honorable Michael Ambrosio, Acting Justice of the New York State Supreme Court for Kings County, to a determinate prison term of six years. Id. Judge Ambrosio did notspecify any inclusion of PRS in the sentence.3 Id.
In March 2000, Plaintiff was received by DOCS at Downstate Correctional Facility to begin his six-year period of incarceration. Id. In February 2002, Plaintiff requested a statement of his sentence; a DOCS official provided him with a copy of his commitment order and time calculation sheet, the latter of which included the notation "PRS 05 00 00," from which Plaintiff concluded that a five-year term of PRS had been added to his determinate prison sentence. Id. at p. 4.
In July 2002, Plaintiff filed a motion in state court requesting the sentencing court to vacate "any term of post release supervision that DOCS had imposed." Id. Plaintiff further stated that he wished to retain his plea and have only the sentence in his judgment modified. Id. at p. 5. By decision and order, dated March 4, 2003, the Kings County Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's motion based, in part, on the fact that PSR was mandated. Id. On May 19, 2003, the New York State Appellate Division, Second Department, denied Plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal. Id.
On June 20, 2003, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Id. By an Order, dated December 31, 2003, the Honorable Edward R. Korman, then-Chief United States District Judge, dismissed Plaintiff's petition. Id. On June 18, 2004, Chief Judge Korman granted Plaintiff's motion for rehearing and again denied Plaintiff's petition. Id.
On or about September 16, 2004, Plaintiff was conditionally released from prison and advised by DOCS that he would remain subject to PRS for five years. Id. at pp. 5-6. On July 21, 2005, Plaintiff was taken into custody for violating the terms of his PRS. Id. at p. 6. This arrestoccurred one week before Plaintiff's six-year incarceration sentence was scheduled to expire. Id. On September 17, 2005, pursuant to a parole revocation hearing, Plaintiff was re-incarcerated for twelve months. Id.
On June 9, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the Eastern District's denial of Earley's habeas corpus petition and remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether the petition was timely, and if so, to issue a writ removing the term of PRS from Plaintiff's sentence. See Earley I, 451 F.3d 71. In that decision, the Second Circuit held that the administrative imposition of PRS to Plaintiff's sentence violated his federal constitutional rights. Id. at 74-76. Defendants requested rehearing, arguing that even though the sentencing court did not specify any period of PRS, New York law automatically imposed it. In August 2006, the Second Circuit rejected this position, reiterating that "[a] judicially-imposed sentence includes only those elements explicitly ordered by the sentencing judge." Earley II, 462 F.3d at 149.
Meanwhile, on July 21, 2006, Plaintiff was again conditionally released. Dkt. No. 83 at p. 6. But, on September 11, 2006, Plaintiff was taken into custody for another violation of the terms of his PRS, and on October 5, 2006, following another parole revocation hearing, Plaintiff was re-incarcerated for twelve months. Id.
Upon remand from the Second Circuit, the Eastern District determined, on May 1, 2007, that the petition was timely submitted, and thus it granted Plaintiff's petition for habeas relief and expunged the term of PRS from Plaintiff's sentence. Earley v. Murray, 2007 WL 1288031 . However, in that decision, Judge Korman stayed the order granting the writ for twenty-eight days in order to "permit the sentencing court to exercise its power to conformthe sentence to the mandate of New York law." Id. at *3. Judgment was entered on May 11, 2007. Dkt. No. 83 at p. 6. By order, dated May 16, 2007, Judge Korman vacated the stay granted in the previous order granted the Kings County District Attorney's motion for a stay pending the State's petition to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari from the Second Circuit's decision. Id. at pp. 6-7. But, by an order, dated June 13, 2007, the Second Circuit denied the District Attorney's motion for a stay, and on June 27, 2007, Plaintiff was released from custody. Id. at p. 7.
On June 26, 2008, Plaintiff filed this civil action pro se,4 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant Anthony Annucci and others, alleging that DOCS's administrative imposition of PRS onto Plaintiff's sentence violated his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. See Dkt. No. 1, Compl. On August 24, 2009, while a Motion to Dismiss was pending on the Court's Docket, K. Wade Eaton, Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 33. Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, which was endorsed by the Court, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on September 24, 2009, and the pending Motion to Dismiss was deemed withdrawn without prejudice. Dkt. Nos. 37, Stip. and Order, & 38, Am. Compl.
616 F.3d 100, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
By Stipulation and Order, dated January 13, 2011, Plaintiff was granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 59, which was filed on the following day, Dkt. No. 60.5 On March 21, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, which upon referral to this Court, was sua sponte converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. Nos. 63 & 66. On December 28, 2011, this Court issued a Report-Recommendation and Order, which, relying specifically upon the authority of Scott as well as other district court cases, recommended that all Defendants be afforded qualified immunity for both the imposition and enforcement of PRS. Dkt. No. 83 at pp. 13-14. The Report-Recommendation and Order was adopted by the District Court, and Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint was dismissed. Dkt. No. 85.
Plaintiff appealed to the Second Circuit, which, after combining this matter with several other appeals, reversed the District Court's ruling as to Defendant Annucci's entitlement to qualified immunity. Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Annucci v. Vincent, 135 S. Ct. 948 (2015). In issuing its decision, the Second Circuit noted that the Earley I decision made clear that any administrative addition of PRS to the actual sentence articulated and imposedby the sentencing judge was unlawful, and that this holding was understood by Defendant Annucci at least as of the time that Earley I was decided. Id. at 168-69. In other words, at least under federal law, the sentence is what the sentencing court says it is, nothing more and nothing less. With regard to the ambiguity of New York State court decisions, the Second Circuit noted that the fact that the New...
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