Early v. City of Gardendale
| Decision Date | 14 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-cv-1368-RDP |
| Parties | JOHN EARLY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GARDENDALE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This case is before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant City of Gardendale and Defendants Waldrop Sharpe, and Grigsby. (Doc. # 23). The Motion (Doc. # 23) has been fully briefed and is ripe for review. (Docs. # 23, 24 28, 29). After careful consideration, the court concludes that Defendants' Motion (Doc. # 23) is due to be granted.
This action stems from the alleged lack of medical care that Plaintiff received while incarcerated at the Gardendale City Jail. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant City of Gardendale (“the City”) and Defendants Lisa Waldrop, Steve Sharpe, and Vicki Grigsby -- all of whom are employed by the City as public safety dispatchers[2] (collectively the “Dispatchers”) -- violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his health and safety. (Docs. # 1; # 22-3 at 3; # 22-4 at 3; # 22-5 at 3). Plaintiff has also asserted a state-law claim of negligence against the City based on the allegedly negligent conduct of the Dispatchers. (Doc. # 1 at 12-13).
Plaintiff John Early was arrested on or about October 1, 2019 for failure to pay traffic citations and sentenced to 40 days at the Gardendale City Jail. (Docs. # 1 at 7; # 22-2 at 10, 18; # 22-7 at 1). On or about October 10, 2019, Plaintiff noticed that his foot was swollen, draining yellow puss, and that his toes had turned purple. (Doc. # 1 at 7). Plaintiff also noticed that his chest was bleeding and draining.[3] (Id. at 7-8; Doc. # 22-3 at 12). When Plaintiff attempted to show Defendant Waldrop the condition of his foot and chest, Defendant Waldrop stated that she did not want to look for fear of upsetting her breakfast. (Id. at 9). Defendant Waldrop told Plaintiff that his foot condition “was probably just athlete's foot” and that the issue with his chest likely resulted from him scratching a scab. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff himself identified the issue as athlete's foot and stated that his chest had started bleeding when he “squeez[ed] on it some.” (Doc. # 22-2 at 15-16).
(Doc. # 22-9 at 4). The paramedics noted no other abnormalities. (Id. at 3-4). Plaintiff, on the other hand, testified that his foot had a “massive infection” and that the paramedics cleaned his foot and provided him with gauze. (Doc. # 22-2 at 14). Plaintiff further testified that he was denied “medical help” even after the paramedics stated in the presence of Defendant Waldrop that he “needed medical attention” and a hospital was “a mile down from the jail.”[6] (Id.). After the paramedics left, Defendant Waldrop allegedly told Plaintiff that if he “were to do any more complaining or give them any more hard time,” then she would “see that [he] got extra days in that jail ....” (Doc. # 22-2 at 15).[7]
After the paramedics left Plaintiff demanded - but claims he was denied -- medical treatment on two occasions.[8] (Doc. # 22-2 at 17). He contends that other inmates told the “jailers” that he needed medical help, although it is unclear what specific needs they referenced. (Id.). At some point while Plaintiff was in the medical observation cell, two “jailers” provided Plaintiff with ointment and Band-Aids (allegedly from their personal funds as the Jail did not provide those items). (Doc. # 22-2 at 17-18).
Plaintiff's forty day sentence was cut short on the evening of November 1, 2019 when the Tarrant Police Department arrested him on an outstanding warrant. (Doc. # 22-10 at 1-3). During the Police Department's intake process, the Department noted “staph” in the cell next to the question, “Is the skin in good condition and free of vermin?” (Id. at 5). The notation “No” appears next to the 29 other health-related questions. (Id.). The following day, Plaintiff was released on a medical bond. (Id.).
On November 4, 2019, Plaintiff presented to the emergency room at St. Vincent's Hospital and reported that he had “staph to left lower leg and thumb on left hand.” (Doc. # 22-6 at 6). The physician who observed Plaintiff's foot stated that his condition looked like athlete's foot. (Doc. # 22-2 at 20). Indeed, Plaintiff was diagnosed that same day with tinea pedis (also known as athlete's foot), along with bacterial cellulitis and poison oak. (Doc. # 22-6 at 2, 9). Plaintiff's discharge papers instructed him to “[k]eep the area between the toes clean and dry,” apply a topical cream, take medication, and follow up in two days. (Doc. # 22-6 at 4). Notably, there are no records from St. Vincent's indicating that Plaintiff had a staph infection or was otherwise experiencing issues related to his chest.
On November 5, 2019, Plaintiff presented to the emergency room at the University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital (“UAB Hospital”) with thumb pain and swelling, as well as skin lesions on his foot, leg, and forearm. (Doc. 22-8 at 1). Wound cultures from his thumb revealed the existence of MRSA, although there is no indication of what caused this injury other than Plaintiff's report that he spent time in the woods and got stuck by thorns. (Id. at 1, 4). Following biopsies of the lesion on his chest (which the physician noted “had been present for a number of years”), Plaintiff was diagnosed with basal cell carcinoma. (Id. at 4). Surgical oncology performed a wide local excision and gave Plaintiff instructions on wound care. (Id.).
UAB records related to Plaintiff's foot are minimal. Initially, Plaintiff complained of a rash that he believed was consistent with a staph infection. (Doc. # 22-8 at 11). A physical examination revealed that he had unroofed blisters and lesions on his second toe, which would be “covered” by the antibiotics already prescribed for the infection of his thumb. (Id. at 9, 17). By the date of discharge on November 11, 2019, the only note made with respect to his foot was that his third toe had “some superficial crusting.” (Id. at 14). There are no records indicating that Plaintiff was diagnosed with a staph infection or sepsis while at UAB.[9] In fact, medical records revealed that sepsis was expressly ruled out as a possible diagnosis. (Doc. # 22-8 at 10).
On August 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit in state court against the City and the Dispatchers. (Doc. # 1 at 6-17). Defendants timely removed the action to this court. (Doc. # 1). In his complaint, Plaintiff has asserted two claims against the City: (1) deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and (2) negligence. (Doc. # 1 at 11-13). Plaintiff has also asserted a single claim of deliberate indifference pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against each of the Dispatchers. (Id. at 13-16). Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them. (Doc. # 23).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(c) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and -- by pointing to affidavits, or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions on file -designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. For Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine, “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249.
When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the non-moving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc. 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson, teaches, under Rule 56(c) a plaintiff may not simply rest on her allegations made in the complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, she must come forward with at least some evidence to support each element essential to her case at trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere...
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