Earnest v. San Joaquin Gen. Hosp.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2017
• Docket Number: No. 2:16-cv-01064-MCE-CKD,2:16-cv-01064-MCE-CKD
• Parties: LILLIE EARNEST, Plaintiff, v. SAN JOAQUIN GENERAL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

LILLIE EARNEST, Plaintiff, v. SAN JOAQUIN GENERAL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-01064-MCE-CKD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 30, 2017

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Lillie Earnest brings this action against Defendants San Joaquin General Hospital ("SJGH"), San Joaquin County ("County"), Ann Mooney and Service Employees International Union Local 1021 ("SEIU"), and Defendants Jackie Bagatta, Roberta Schramek, Lynn McClain, Marshay McKnight, Conrad Uy, Doug Peterson, Rolando Cabrerea, Vandana Goswani, Adam Arroyo, and Doe Defendants (the "Individual Defendants") (collectively, "Defendants") alleging the following causes of action: (1) civil conspiracy, (2) denial of appeal rights/due process, (3) wrongful termination, (4) breach of a memorandum of understanding ("MOU"), (5) age discrimination, (6) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment in violation of Government Code § 12920 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., (7) interference of business contractual relation, (8) disability discrimination, (9) institutional racism, and (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff's allegations stem from her employment with and termination from San Joaquin General Hospital, where she was a nursing assistant. Presently before the Court are motions to dismiss by the County Defendant (sued as SJGH) and Schramek (ECF No. 9.), Defendants Mooney and the SEIU (ECF. No. 17), and the Individual Defendants (ECF No. 19), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).¹ Also before the Court is a motion to strike by the County (SJGH) and Schramek, joined by all other Defendants. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED, and Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC") is DISMISSED with leave to amend as described below. Defendants' Motion to Strike is also GRANTED in part, as described below.²

BACKGROUND³

The First Amended Complaint ("FAC") in this case is far from a model of clarity, but the Court has deduced the following from Plaintiff's pleading. ECF No. 6. It appears that the basis for much of Plaintiff's FAC stems from a July 12, 2009, investigation into a workplace complaint against Plaintiff, a 62-year old African-American woman, which Plaintiff claims was mishandled in various ways. See FAC at ¶¶ 36-46. Plaintiff was eventually terminated from her position as a nursing assistant at SJGH on April 17, 2013. At that time, Plaintiff claims she suffered from "a well-documented, bad back and neck," had undergone two previous knee surgeries, and had at some point been given a "Lifetime Medical" settlement from a Worker's Compensation claim. FAC at ¶¶ 57, 70.

Plaintiff claims that her termination was the result of a conspiracy among all Defendants and that she was terminated without receiving any offer of services from thelocal Employee Assistance Program ("EAP"), any job training, or any "Progressive Discipline techniques." Plaintiff claims she was forced to work out of class, and that accommodations were not made on account of her age. Plaintiff further claims that she was discriminated against because of her age, disability, and race, and that Plaintiff was denied due process in the course of her termination. It appears Plaintiff alleges that the County and the SEIU entered into a memorandum of understanding ("MOU") that failed to provide adequate safeguards to part-time employees, who are disproportionately African-American.

In May of 2013, Plaintiff received notice of a serious discipline hearing informing her of the reasons for her termination, and received an allegedly incomplete discovery packet. Plaintiff was represented by SEIU union representative Defendant Mooney at her hearing, but claims that she was denied the right to have a representative "of her choice." She further alleges that the investigation leading to her termination was not impartial, and that the Individual Defendants stereotyped her based on her age, disability, and race, and made statements during the investigation in order to get her fired.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual allegations. However, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds ofhis entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a "legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading must contain something more than "a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.")).

Furthermore, "Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, "[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only 'fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also 'grounds' on which the claim rests." Id. (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). A pleading must contain "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. If the "plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Id. However, "[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be "freely given" where there is no "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment . . . ." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factorsmerit equal weight. Rather, "the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . carries the greatest weight." Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that "the complaint could not be saved by any amendment." Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .")).

ANALYSIS

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that although Plaintiff cites to various sources of authority throughout her FAC, she has failed to provide the statute or law under which she brings each cause of action (with the exception of her Sixth Cause of Action brought under Cal. Gov. Code § 12920 et seq.), leaving Defendants—and the Court—to guess the basis for each of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff has also failed to specify against which Defendant each cause of action is alleged, leaving Defendants—and again the Court—to assume they each must defend against each claim. For each cause of action dismissed with leave to amend below, should Plaintiff decide to file an amended pleading, she must cure the defects described herein by providing the law under which each claim arises and by stating with specificity against which defendant(s) each claim is asserted.

A. Plaintiff's Tort Claims As To The County And Individual Defendants: First, Third, Seventh, And Tenth Causes Of Action

Plaintiff's First, Third, Seventh, and Tenth Causes of Action are dismissed as to the County and Individual Defendants because Plaintiff has failed to alleged that she complied with California's Tort Claims Act. Under the Torts Claim Act, a plaintiff cannot bring a tort claim against a public entity (or against a public employee acting in thecourse of his or her employment) until a written claim has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon or rejected by the board. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 945.4; 950.2. A plaintiff must file her tort claim within six months of the accrual of the claim and must file a late-claim request within one year. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 911.2; 911.4. Here, Plaintiff's tort claims accrued, at the latest, on the date of her termination: April 17, 2013. Plaintiff therefore would have had to file her tort claim within six months of that date. Because Plaintiff has made no such allegation in her FAC, her tort causes of action must be dismissed. Plaintiff will be given one opportunity to amend with respect to these claims to the extent Plaintiff can allege compliance with and exhaustion of...