Easler v. State, Supreme Court Case No. 19S-CR-324

• Citation: 131 N.E.3d 584
• Decision Date: 20 September 2019
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 19S-CR-324
• Parties: Tracie EASLER, Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

131 N.E.3d 584

Tracie EASLER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff).

Supreme Court Case No. 19S-CR-324

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Argued: June 18, 2019

Filed September 20, 2019

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: Talisha Griffin, Valerie K. Boots, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Caryn N. Szyper, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 18A -CR-1371

Goff, Justice.

Deciding issues of great importance under time constraints is but one burden borne by our trial courts. However, every case is important to the parties involved and adequate time must be allocated to fairly resolve any meritorious issues presented. In this case involving charges of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a juror—after being selected to serve on the jury but before being sworn—submitted a note informing the trial court that one of her family members had been killed by a drunk driver. Defense counsel requested an opportunity to explore the juror's potential bias, but the trial court did not allow further questioning. We conclude that the information conveyed by the juror to the trial court before the jury was sworn should have resulted in a hearing to determine whether the defendant could have properly challenged the juror's service for cause. The trial court's refusal to conduct a hearing was an abuse of discretion. Further, given the subjective nature of the information conveyed and concerns about the passage of time and potential juror harassment, we cannot say that remand for a hearing will ensure the fairness of the proceedings below. Accordingly, we reverse and remand these proceedings for a new trial.

Factual and Procedural History

Based on an incident where emergency personnel found her unconscious behind the wheel of her SUV, the State charged Defendant Tracie Easler with two counts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.

After assembling the prospective jurors, the trial court introduced the parties and explained the voir dire process, saying "the objective of the attorneys here today is to obtain a fair and impartial jury." Tr. Vol. II, pp. 12–13. See also id. at 12 ("Jurors must be free as humanly possible from bias, prejudice, sympathy, and must not be influenced by pre-conceived ideas as to either what the facts are, or what the law is."). At this point, the court asked all the potential jurors to stand and promise to answer any questions honestly during jury selection. The State and defense counsel then conducted their voir dire examinations of the potential jurors. After the dust settled, the trial court announced the six-person jury, which included M.M. ("Juror 4"). Up until this time, Juror 4 had spoken only two times, answering direct questions from counsel about signs of intoxication and reasonable doubt. But when she was announced as a member of the jury, Juror 4 interjected, "Are those—they're not going to ask us any more questions that are relevant?" Supp. Tr. Vol. II, p. 29. The court informed her that questioning was over, and the bailiff escorted the six newly selected jurors from the room.

Another set of potential jurors was seated for the court and the parties to examine and select an alternate juror. Before the court announced who had been selected, it asked counsel to approach and disclosed a note that Juror 4 had given to the bailiff. The note read, "a family member was killed by a drunk driver. It was before I was born, but altered my family dynamic irreparably. I can be a jury member, but thought it is relevant to disclose." Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 127. Defense counsel asked if Juror 4 could be brought out and questioned over whether she could be a fair and impartial juror. Supp. Tr. Vol. II, p. 35. Instead of responding to defense counsel, the court said, "I just thought I'd share that with you, okay. But I don't think there's anything else we can do." Id. at 36. Defense counsel did not otherwise immediately respond to the court's dismissal of Juror 4's note. The court then announced the alternate juror, had her join the other people selected as jurors, and dismissed the remaining potential jurors.

Once all the jurors and potential jurors had left the courtroom, the court returned to Juror 4's note to clarify the record. After the court summarized the note and the disclosure of the note, defense counsel challenged Juror 4 for cause, arguing that Juror 4 had not been forthcoming on her juror questionnaire when "she said that her grandmother was the victim of murder, but ... did not disclose anything else." Id. at 37. The State disagreed, arguing that Juror 4 had been forthcoming. The State said that on Juror 4's questionnaire, she had explained her sympathy for victims of violent crimes as the result of seeing the effect of those crimes on families. The State also summarized Juror 4's note as saying that she could still be a fair and impartial juror, and it noted that she had voluntarily made the parties aware of her past. The court denied the motion to remove the juror. The entire jury was then sworn in as jurors, and it found Easler guilty on both counts.

Easler appealed, claiming the trial court should have granted a hearing to discover Juror 4's possible bias and, separately, should have removed Juror 4 for cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Easler v. State , 118 N.E.3d 84, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). It rejected Easler's hearing-request argument because neither "the incompleteness of Juror 4's questionnaire" nor the note Juror 4 provided to the court "present[ed] specific, substantial evidence establishing Juror 4's bias" that would entitle Easler to a hearing. Id. at 90 (relying primarily on Lopez v. State , 527 N.E.2d 1119, 1130 (Ind. 1988) ). The court explained that "Juror 4 completed the questionnaire to the best of her ability." Id. Juror 4 took steps to divulge the information as soon as she could, and "coupled with the affirmation that she could remain on the jury despite her background, [she] resolved the need for any questioning." Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court correctly declined to remove Juror 4 for cause because either party could have asked related questions during voir dire, and Juror 4 shared her information as soon as possible. Id. at 91–92.

We granted Easler's petition to transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

Generally, "[a] trial court has broad discretionary power to regulate the form and substance of voir dire." Ward v. State , 903 N.E.2d 946, 955, aff'd on reh'g , 908 N.E.2d 595 (Ind. 2009). This discretion extends to ruling on requests to question a juror regarding potential bias or misconduct. See Lopez , 527 N.E.2d at 1130. Error from an abuse of discretion arises in this context "if the decision is illogical or arbitrary." Oswalt v. State , 19 N.E.3d 241, 245 (Ind. 2014) (citation omitted).

Although a trial court exercises its discretion in regulating voir dire, Easler suggests this Court has not addressed how to secure a hearing if, after a jury is selected but before the members are officially sworn in as jurors, new evidence emerges possibly indicating a juror's bias. This issue qualifies as a pure question of law, requiring "neither reference to extrinsic evidence, the drawing of inferences therefrom, nor the consideration of credibility questions for its resolution." Bader v. Johnson , 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ind. 2000) (citation omitted). This Court reviews pure questions of law de novo. Id.

Discussion and Decision

"The right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system" guaranteed by both the United States and Indiana constitutions. Whiting v. State , 969 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind. 2012) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI and Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13 ). "The presence of even one biased juror on the jury is a structural error requiring a new trial." Id. Thus, "the trial court has ‘a broad discretion and duty ... to see that the jury as finally selected is subject to no solid basis of objection on the score of impartiality.’ " Id. at 29 (omission in original) (quoting Frazier v. United States , 335 U.S. 497, 511, 69 S.Ct. 201, 93 L.Ed. 187 (1948) ).

This case implicates these foundational principles by questioning how counsel can ferret out a potential juror's possible bias or misconduct when new information comes to light in the moments between a person being selected as a juror and the person being sworn in as a juror. Specifically, this case raises the following question: What is the minimum amount of new information—in terms of quality and quantity—that would require a court to hold a hearing to investigate the alleged bias or misconduct? To answer this question, we first examine our prior cases and determine whether and to what extent they apply in these contexts. Then, we analyze the facts of this case in light of the applicable legal standard.

I. When a party requests to question a juror on possible bias, timing matters.

A. Barnes , Stevens I & II , and Lopez lay the groundwork for determining when a hearing should be conducted.

Our law regarding requests for hearings to question jurors on possible bias or misconduct has been developed primarily through three cases: Barnes v. State , 263 Ind. 320, 330 N.E.2d 743 (1975) ; Stevens v. State (Stevens I ), 265 Ind. 396, 354 N.E.2d 727, aff'd on reh'g , 265 Ind. 396, 357 N.E.2d 245 (1976) ( Stevens II ); and Lopez v. State , 527 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. 1988). The parties' arguments rely on these important cases, but the parties disagree as to how these cases impact the outcome here. Before diving into the parties' arguments, we find helpful a brief review of each case's holding relating to hearings on juror bias or misconduct.

Barnes is the seminal case regarding...