Easley v. Empire Inc.
| Citation | 757 F.2d 923 |
| Decision Date | 24 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1305,84-1305 |
| Parties | 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2354, 37 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 542, 37 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,286 Vicki EASLEY, Appellee, v. EMPIRE INCORPORATED and Empiregas, Inc. of Wheaton, Appellants. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Steven G. Emerson, Kansas City, Mo., for appellants.
Ransom A. Ellis, III, Springfield, Mo., for appellee.
Before ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Empire Incorporated and Empiregas, Inc. of Wheaton appeal judgments in favor of Vicki Easley on her claims of sex discrimination in violation of federal equal employment law, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2 (1982), and of failure to timely respond to a request for a service letter in violation of section 290.140 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. Empire argues that the district court 1 improperly directed a verdict on the service letter issue and that punitive damages were barred by a subsequent amendment to the relevant statute, that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of sex discrimination, and that the amount of the attorney fee award was so excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We find little merit in any of these arguments, and we affirm.
Vicki Easley had been office manager for Empiregas, Inc. of Wheaton, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Empire Incorporated, for more than three years when, on January 7, 1978, the position of retail manager, that of her immediate superior, became vacant. Easley told Joe Leikam, the Empire employee who had supervisory responsibilities over Empiregas, that she would like to apply for the job. Leikam, however, responded, "You know men do not like to take orders from women," a comment later echoed to Easley by Darrell Kays, Leikam's superior at Empire. Despite several such oral requests for promotion by Easley, the Empiregas retail manager position remained open, and Leikam continued seeking applicants, until June 22, 1978, when Joseph Agofsky was hired. Subsequently, Easley refused to defer her vacation plans to assist in training Agofsky and acquainting him with office procedures. When she returned on July 20, 1978 (the date July 19 also appears in the record), she contacted Leikam concerning rumors that she was to be terminated. Leikam said he would be coming to Empiregas soon to talk over the matter, but Easley persisted, a heated discussion ensued, and Leikam discharged Easley over the phone.
On September 13, 1978, Easley filed discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, a prerequisite to Title VII litigation. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5 (1982). Nearly three years later, on August 13, 1981, she wrote to Leikam requesting a letter "showing the dates of my employment, the kind of work that I did, including my duties and responsibilities and the reason for my termination." Leikam consulted with Kays, and Kays referred the letter to the attorney handling the discrimination complaint. Easley then received authorization to proceed with her Title VII action, and in November she filed suit in federal district court on two counts, the first alleging that Empire discriminated on the basis of sex both in failing to make her retail manager and in discharging her and the second alleging that Empire violated the Missouri service letter statute. On January 23, 1982, Easley made a second request for a service letter, this time directed to Kays, who again referred the matter to the attorney. The district court permitted Easley to amend her complaint to allege a second service letter violation. The required letter was finally provided to Easley on April 1, 1983, shortly after Empire's initial counsel withdrew and was replaced.
After a jury trial on the service letter issue, the district court directed a verdict and an actual damage award of $1 for Easley. The jury assessed $40,000 punitive damages against Empire. The discrimination claim was tried to the district court, which found that Easley had orally requested the retail manager's job, that she was a qualified applicant, and that Leikam had continued to interview similarly qualified applicants for the position. The district court rejected as pretextual Empire's claim that it failed to promote Easley because she was performing unsatisfactorily as office manager and held that Easley had been the victim of unlawful sex discrimination in this regard. The court, however, found that Easley's discharge was justified by her failure to obey the order to defer her vacation plans to train Agofsky.
Relief thus was limited to back pay in the amount of $1,808.22, the difference between the office manager's and retail manager's salary for the period from the approximate date of Easley's first request for promotion to the day of her discharge. The district court further awarded Easley $30,000 in attorney fees, reducing the amount initially sought by more than half because she prevailed on only part of her discrimination claim. The court, however, rejected Empire's argument that the minimal dollar recovery and contingent fee arrangement required further reduction of the fee award, holding that Easley had provided the public a great service by successfully proving intentional sex discrimination by a large corporate employer.
In challenging the directed verdict in favor of Easley on the service letter claim, Empire alleges first that the district court improperly acted sua sponte. In addition, Empire contends that the court was incorrect in holding as matters of law that Easley was an "employee" of Empire (and not just of Empiregas) within the contemplation of the Missouri service letter statute, that Easley's first letter to Leikam did constitute a request for a service letter, and that Empire did not respond to Easley's requests within a statutorily "reasonable" time.
The shortest answer to these contentions addresses Empire's concern with the alleged sua sponte nature of the district court's action in directing a verdict. Easley in fact made a motion for such a verdict before the introduction of any evidence on the basis of the following comments during opening statement by Empire's counsel:
We anticipate that because the letter was not sent promptly, because the letter was not sent within a few weeks or a month, that you will award $1 in nominal damages for the violation of the Missouri statute.
The letter was not sent within a few weeks, it was not sent within a few months, and because of this we expect you will be instructed to award $1 in actual damages to this plaintiff.
* * *
* * *
The evidence will be that the Empire's employee response was reasonable under the circumstances, even though they technically violated the Missouri service letter statute.
Transcript at 23-24, 32 (emphasis added). The district court recognized that a directed verdict would be appropriate but deferred final ruling pending submission of evidence. The court's ultimate action at the close of all evidence could not be erroneous in light of the clear admissions of counsel in opening statement. See Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 13 Otto 261, 263, 103 U.S. 261, 263, 26 L.Ed. 539 (1880); Stuthman v. United States, 67 F.2d 521, 523 (8th Cir.1933); Hays v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 304 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo.1957).
We also agree with the district court that issues of control, rather than the "piercing the corporate veil" theory urged by Empire, should determine whether Easley was an employee of that corporation or just of its subsidiary. Empire argues that proper interpretation of the statutory term "employee" requires consideration of the purpose of the service letter provision, which is to "deter corporate employers from destroying or severely impairing the employability of former employees by furnishing false or misleading information as to their service or false reasons for their discharge." Stark v. American Bakeries Co., 647 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Mo.1983) (en banc). This purpose, however, implicates the entity having control over personnel matters, and in this case that entity is Empire, rather than Empiregas. Easley's initial employment as office manager had to be approved by Kays, an employee of Empire; her request for the retail manager's position was made to Leikam and Kays, employees of Empire; and she was fired by Leikam, an employee of Empire. The district court further found that all salary and promotional decisions regarding Empiregas personnel were made by Empire. The district court properly decided this issue as a matter of law.
Finally, insofar as further discussion is called for, we are satisfied that the district court did not err in ruling that Easley's first letter to Empire was, as a matter of law, a request for a service letter. Easley asked for a letter showing the dates of her employment, the kind of work she had done, and the reason for her termination--substantially the information Empire was required to provide under section 290.140. 2 Such language has been held sufficient to constitute a service letter request. E.g., Carr v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 363 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Mo.1963). Similarly, the determination whether Empire's response to the service letter request was made within a reasonable time does not become an issue of fact for the jury because, as argued by Empire, of the alleged ambiguous nature of Easley's request given the pending sex discrimination charges, particularly since the letter was sent by Empire to its lawyer for response shortly after receipt.
Even assuming a service letter violation, Empire argues that the district court erred in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury because such an award was barred by amendments, effective August 13, 1982, to the service letter statute. Compare Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 290.140 (Supp.198...
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