Easley v. State

• Decision Date: 09 November 1970
• Citation: Easley v. State, 459 S.W.2d 410, 249 Ark. 405 (Ark. 1970)
• Parties: Bud EASLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No 5529.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 410

459 S.W.2d 410

249 Ark. 405

Bud EASLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No 5529.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Nov. 9, 1970.

Eugene Coffelt and W. Gary Kennan, Bentonville, for appellant.

Joe Purcell, Atty. Gen., Milton Lueken, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

JONES, Justice.

Bud Easley was charged on information filed by the prosecuting attorney of Benton County with the unlawful possession of stimulant and/or depressant drugs. Upon waiving a jury trial, he was tried before the circuit judge sitting as a jury and was convicted.

Easley's father owned a farm near the small village community of Hiwasse in Benton County. He had moved an extra house onto the farm and the appellant Easley was in the process of moving into the house. Mr. Carl Merkey, an electrician, was employed to do electrical wiring in the house and while he was so engaged and after Easley had moved some furniture and personal effects into the house, Mr. Merkey found a large supply of contraband drugs in one of the clothes closets. He reported his find to the authorities.

A search warrant was issued on Merkey's affidavit and the drugs were seized through the use of the search warrant. The drugs were accepted in evidence after Easley's motion to suppress was denied by the trial court. The search warrant was directed to the sheriff of Benton County and reads as follows:

'Whereas, complaint has been made on oath before the undersigned, one of the Municipal Judges in and for the County of Benton, by Carl Merkey that certain personal property of Bud Easley to-wit: Stimulant and/or Depressant Drugs (Amphetamines and/or Barbiturates) are in the possession of Bud Easley the said complainant knows of his own knowledge that such property is concealed in the house occupied by Bud Easley in or near Hiwasse in the County of Benton; and, whereas, being satisfied that there is reasonable ground for such suspicion, you are, therefore, hereby commanded to search the place above mentioned, where such property is suspected to be concealed, in the p.m. time, and to bring such property, or any part thereof which may be found, before me, the said Judge, forthwith.'

Easley has appealed to this court and relies on the following point for reversal:

'The judge erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence.'

Easley was not present when the warrant was executed but he had left the doors open or unlocked for the convenience of Merkey. The officers who executed the warrant testified that Merkey gave them some additional verbal directions as to how to get to the Easley house. Easley presents two primary arguments in support of his designated point. He argues that the search warrant was invalid on its face in that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched as required in the second clause of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and that the search was invalid because Easley was not notified of the impending search and the search warrant was not served on him.

A search warrant is directed to the officer who is to make the search and Easley does not contend that the officers searched the wrong house under the warrant. Common sense dictates that the constitutional requirement that a search warrant contain a particular description of the property to be searched, is designed and intended to aid the officers in locating the right property to be searched, as well as to protect innocent property owners from unreasonable searches and seizures and prevent officers from searching the wrong property.

In the Tennessee case of O'Brien v. State, 158 Tenn. 400, 14 S.W.2d 51, the court said:

'* * * In this case the warrant directed the officer to search the dwelling house of James O'Brien on TeCoy Road in Ninth civil district, Knox county, Tenn. According to numerous authorities, such a description is held sufficient because it enables the officer to whom it is directed to locate with reasonable certainty the place to be searched.'

In the Tennessee case of Webb v. State, 17o Tenn. 518, 121 S.W.2d 550, the affidavit for a search warrant was incorporated by reference in the warrant. In that case, the Tennessee court quoted from 56 C.J. 1233 and 1237 as follows:

"Moreover, it is held that the word 'particularly' in the constitution requiring such a description means that the description must be such that any person familiar with the locality can by inquiring identify the premises described.

As it seems neither necessary nor practicable to describe a farm dwelling house with the same degree of particularity as a dwelling house located in the city, the requirements are therefore not so strict, although the degree of particularity required is obviously governed by the circumstances of each case. Thus since houses in rural communities are commonly known by the name of the owner rather than by any technical legal description, a description of rural property as the premises occupied by a named person may be held sufficient, even though the property is incorrectly...