Easley v. State

Decision Date24 June 2003
Docket NumberNo. A03A0674.,A03A0674.
PartiesEASLEY v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Hudson, Montgomery & Kalivoda, David R. Montgomery, Athens, Richard F. Connelly, Jr., for appellant.

Kenneth W. Mauldin, Dist. Atty., Edward H. Brumby, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.

Duntay Tromaine Easley appeals from denial of his post-trial motions for new trial, for judgment and acquittal, in arrest of judgment, and to bar imposition of sentence, and plea of double jeopardy following his conviction by a jury of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.

1. Easley was charged with malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime as a result of the shooting death of Goss and was convicted of the possession of a firearm count and the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Viewed with all inferences in favor of the jury's verdict, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Hodges v. State, 248 Ga.App. 23(1), 545 S.E.2d 157 (2001), the evidence was that Easley walked into the yard outside a house in Athens where Goss and Faust were standing and talking. As Easley walked up, Goss asked him if he was "still going to do it" to which Easley responded, "nah, man, nah." Shortly after Easley arrived, he produced a cocked pistol and pointed it at Goss. There was no evidence that Goss and Easley were arguing. Goss then said, "damn, man, go on, do what you going to do." The pistol fired, and the bullet entered Goss' right front shoulder and exited the left side of his upper back, killing him.

Easley was known to play around with the gun, jacking it back and "bull shooting" (pretend shooting) it at people. When Goss fell to the ground, Easley first froze, then approached and attempted to give him CPR.

Easley threw the pistol to the side and then asked Faust to hide it, which he did by putting it in a bucket down the street. Faust later led police to the bucket where they found the gun in an inch of water with the clip removed.

Easley left the area and told Deadwyler he thought he had shot Goss and asked him to take Goss to the hospital. Deadwyler refused and suggested they call an ambulance. Easley and Deadwyler got another person to call for an ambulance, and Easley returned to Goss, where he was found by police, kneeling beside Goss' body.

The evidence of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony was legally sufficient. Jackson v. Virginia, supra; Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. 408, 409(1), 577 S.E.2d 570 (2003).

2. Both of Easley's enumerations address his contention that the trial court should have accepted the jury's second of three verdicts and that directing them to continue considering the involuntary manslaughter and aggravated assault lesser included offenses was error. They are considered together.1

The trial court properly charged the jury on malice murder, felony murder (the felony being aggravated assault), possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (the crime being murder and aggravated assault), as well as the lesser included crimes of aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter. The trial court also charged that their verdict was to be "signed by one of your number as foreperson, dated and returned to be published in open court. You'll find a space at the top of the indictment on the reverse side down at the bottom where it says verdict, whatever your finding it is you would write it in and have your foreperson sign it on the reverse side of the bill of indictment."

The jury, having deliberated several hours on the third day of trial, began deliberating again at 9:15 a.m. on the fourth day, and at 11:20 a.m., the trial court reported that

The foreperson sent out a form here. They haven't written this out on the back of the indictment, but they will. It's malice murder, not guilty; felony murder, not guilty; possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, guilty; aggravated assault, guilty; involuntary manslaughter, guilty; reckless conduct, guilty; pointing and aiming a gun at another—Of course, that's the two—part of the ... misdemeanor part under involuntary manslaughter. And they need to put this on the back of the indictment.... That's what she wanted to know, correct?

The form was sent back to the jury with the judge's instruction, and the court inquired of counsel whether the verdicts on aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter were inconsistent.2 During that discussion, defense counsel stated that "I think the Court should instruct the jury that the findings on aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter are mutually exclusive and that they need to decide on one or the other of those." After discussion, the court instructed the jury that if they wanted to make this form their verdict, it should be attached to the indictment and signed by the foreperson. The jury did this and returned the verdict to the courtroom.

At this point, the trial court refused to accept the verdict and told the jury that "I am not accepting the verdict at this time, at least proposed verdict, and the reason I am not is I am instructing you that you have rendered inconsistent guilty verdicts on the charge of aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter; therefore, I am sending you back into the jury room to further consider that matter."

At 12:30 p.m., the jury indicated it had a second verdict. The following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Do you have the indictment too? We need the indictment too.... Let's see what you've got. What's the other—There's no finding as to the other charges.
THE FOREPERSON: We were thinking that they were included in—
THE COURT: No, it's—Let me speak to the attorneys here.
[Untranscribed bench conference]
THE COURT: I sent you back to make a disposition of the further consideration between the—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor—
THE COURT:—involuntary manslaughter and the other, so I'm going to have to ask you to go back in the jury room. I'll let you know my instructions in just a moment.

The court stated he would not accept this verdict, and defense counsel then argued that this verdict was not inconsistent on its face and was a proper verdict. The trial court then told the jury

I told you a little bit earlier that there was in my opinion that the verdict as far as the offense of aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter was inconsistent, and I sent you back for further deliberation on that. I am unable to ascertain from this verdict what you did with that, so you need to make—let the Court be aware of what you did. So I'm going to send you back in to further deliberate on this matter. That's what I charged you. So go back in, make your findings, whatever they may be. I have no opinion whatsoever.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The jury then returned the third verdict upon which judgment was entered. It found Easley not guilty of malice murder, not guilty of felony murder, guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and guilty of aggravated assault.

The first and second verdict forms are not part of the record here, only discussion of them by the court and counsel. After return of the third verdict, the following exchange occurred:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: ... I would like to have the record reflect that when the jurors came out the last time the indictment had written at the bottom of it—
THE COURT: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:—not guilty on Count 1, not guilty on Count 2, and guilty on Count 3.
THE COURT: That's correct.

Easley argues, based on Maltbie v. State, 139 Ga.App. 342, 344(2), 228 S.E.2d 368 (1976), that the second verdict controls this case because actions taken thereafter were void as violative of double jeopardy. Pretermitting the fact that the first and second verdict forms are not contained in the record before us and the only indication of what they contained is the reading by the court of the jury's note and the colloquy set out above,3 we consider whether the first verdict, which was signed by the jury foreman, received and published in open court, contained mutually exclusive convictions of aggravated assault and involuntary manslaughter and whether the court's directing the jury to continue deliberating after the jury indicated it had a second verdict was proper.

Verdicts are mutually exclusive "where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other. (Cits.)" United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69 fn. 8, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Accord Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797, 800, 471 S.E.2d 508 (1996) (verdicts are mutually exclusive where it is "both legally and logically impossible to convict (the accused) of both counts").

(Emphasis supplied.) Jackson v. State, supra at 410(2), 577 S.E.2d 570.4

Here, both the malice murder and felony murder counts alleged that Easley intentionally shot Goss. In his charge to the jury on aggravated assault as a lesser included offense of either the malice murder or felony murder count, the trial court instructed them that a person commits aggravated assault "when he assaults another with a deadly weapon. An assault within the meaning of this crime means the commission of a violent injury to the person of another." Therefore, the trial court's instruction limited the consideration of aggravated assault to OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1).

"`(A)n aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1) cannot be committed by criminal negligence.' Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 591-592(2), 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998). Proof of criminal intent is essential for a conviction of an (a)(1) assault. Id." Jackson v. State, supra at 411(2), 577 S.E.2d 570.

Involuntary manslaughter, however, requires the commission of an unlawful act, other than a...

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  • Washington v. State
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • 16 Julio 2015
    ...at 292(2), 582 S.E.2d 487.24 Groves v. State, 162 Ga. 161, 162, 132 S.E. 769 (1926) (punctuation omitted).25 See Easley v. State, 262 Ga.App. 144, 149(2), 584 S.E.2d 629 (2003) (“Since verdicts acquire their legality from return and publication, there was no verdict in this case until it wa......
  • Ellis v. State, A06A1500.
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • 2 Octubre 2006
    ...is charged, the trial court commits no error in directing them to deliberate further to decide those counts. Easley v. State, 262 Ga.App. 144, 150(2), 584 S.E.2d 629 (2003). Then, based on the foreperson's note about his error, the trial court devised a solution that allowed the jury to mak......
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    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • 24 Abril 2007
    ...or cruelty to children. Carter v. State, supra. Compare Jackson v. State, supra at 411-412(2), 577 S.E.2d 570; Easley v. State, 262 Ga.App. 144, 148(2), 584 S.E.2d 629 (2003). The rule against mutually exclusive verdicts applies only where the convictions result from the same act involving ......
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    • United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)
    • 8 Septiembre 2005
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