Easley v. University of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 84-CV-7560-AA.

• Decision Date: 18 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-CV-7560-AA.,84-CV-7560-AA.
• Citation: 632 F. Supp. 1539
• Parties: Kendrix M. EASLEY, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BOARD OF REGENTS; Terry Sandalow, Dean of Law School; Theodore St. Antoine; Peter Westen; Beverley Pooley; Susan Eklund and Kris Munroe, Jointly and Severally, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

632 F. Supp. 1539

Kendrix M. EASLEY, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BOARD OF REGENTS; Terry Sandalow, Dean of Law School; Theodore St. Antoine; Peter Westen; Beverley Pooley; Susan Eklund and Kris Munroe, Jointly and Severally, Defendants.

No. 84-CV-7560-AA.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, S.D.

April 18, 1986.

Kendrix M. Easley, in pro. per.

Doris M. Harker, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEIKENS, District Judge.

Kendrix Easley ("Easley"), plaintiff, had as his central demand in this lawsuit that I should order the University of Michigan Law School ("law school") to award him a Juris Doctor ("J.D.") degree. I conducted a trial and on January 29, 1986, 627 F.Supp. 580, I issued an opinion in which I held against Easley's claim. That opinion is incorporated herein by reference and made a part hereof.¹

I continue to regard that claim as the core of this litigation. It was because that claim went to the heart of Easley's contention that I bifurcated that issue. I do not overlook Easley's remaining legal claims. He contends that defendants denied him the J.D. degree and commenced disciplinary proceedings against him because he is a black man; that defendants charged him with cheating in retaliation for his persistent objections to a final grade of "D" in Professor Theodore St. Antoine's ("St. Antoine") employment discrimination course; and that defendants searched his briefcase while he was involved in a law school hearing and took papers from it. As to these claims defendants have moved for summary judgment. Easley has also filed a motion for a new trial "before an unbiased judge."²

The background for this litigation is set out in full detail in my earlier opinion and need not be repeated here. What I do repeat, however, for emphasis is that Professor Wade McCree³ of the University of Michigan Law School, a former Judge of both this Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, presided at the law school trials on both the cheating and plagiarism charges. Those tribunals found Easley guilty of plagiarism and not guilty of cheating on the employment discrimination course. Easley now contests his plagiarism conviction.⁴ The findings of fact of that tribunal presided over by Professor McCree established beyond doubt both the basis for and the fact of conviction.⁵

I. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BEFORE AN UNBIASED JUDGE

Easley's motion seeks two results: first, a new trial of his central equitable claim, and second, my disqualification. I have already considered and rejected Easley's argument for my disqualification.⁶ I hereby incorporate by reference my prior ruling.

The motion for a new trial is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(2), which permits a new trial "in an action tried without a jury, for any of the reasons for which rehearings have heretofore been granted." Local Rule (E.D.Mich.) 17(m)(3) provides:

Generally, and without restricting the discretion of the Court, motions for rehearing ... which merely present the same issues ruled upon by the Court, either expressly or by reasonable implication, will not be granted. The movant must not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the Court and the parties have been misled but also show that a different disposition of the case must result from a correction thereof.

Easley has not even attempted to satisfy this standard. The motion simply recites his version of the history of this litigation.

Accordingly, Easley's motion for a new trial before an unbiased judge is denied.

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Although defendants' motion seeks summary judgment, I have power to treat it as a motion for dismissal. The label is unimportant. 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2713 (1983). See also, Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). After a thorough examination of the pleadings, documents, and other materials, and after extended colloquy with Easley in open court, I am persuaded that defendants are entitled to summary disposition.

Although Easley subjectively perceives a pervasive, ever expanding conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights, this litigation is actually the product of a tragic psychological spiral. Shakespeare v. Wilson, 40 F.R.D. 500, 502 (S.D.Cal.1966), aptly describes the phenomenon:

Having been defeated in state court proceedings and being unhappy and somewhat humiliated and frustrated by the results of such proceedings, these persons lash out at judges, attorneys, witnesses, court functionaries, newspapers, and anyone else in convenient range, terming all of them corruptly evil and charging them with perjury and conspiracy in a last desperate effort to relitigate the issues on which they have once lost hoping to secure sizeable damages to boot.

The telltale sign of this sort of case is a string of conclusory allegations of a broad and malevolent conspiracy coupled with a persistent inability on the part of plaintiff to state briefly, simply, and clearly, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and 8(e)(1), the factual basis for his conclusions. Such cases are subject to dismissal. See Shakespeare, supra at 504; Echols v. Voisine, 506 F.Supp. 15, 19 (E.D.Mich.1979) (Judge Harvey), aff'd, 701 F.2d 176 (6th Cir.1982). Cf. Package Machinery v. Hayssen Mfg. Co., 164 F.Supp. 904 (E.D.Wis.1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d 56 (7th Cir.1959) (dismissing complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) where plaintiff alleged that defendant stole trade secrets, but plaintiff refused to specify which trade secrets were stolen).

A. Race Discrimination

Easley claims that he was denied a Juris Doctor degree and subjected to disciplinary proceedings because of his race. My January 29, 1986 decision establishes as a matter of law that Easley has no entitlement to a Juris Doctor degree. Even if there were racial animus here (and I find none — to the contrary, he was greatly helped by Associate Dean Susan Eklund ("Eklund") because of an affirmative action policy at the law school), I would have no power to award him a degree. He cannot be deprived of something to which he has no entitlement. Further, his conviction for plagiarism conclusively establishes the legitimacy of that charge. See Howell v. Tanner, 650 F.2d 610, 615 n. 6 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918-19, 102 S.Ct. 1775-77, 72 L.Ed.2d 178, 180 (1982). Thus, the sole basis for Easley's allegation of race discrimination is the coincidence of the cheating charge of which he was acquitted and Easley's race.

Conclusory allegations are subject to dismissal. See German v. Killeen, 495 F.Supp. 822 (E.D.Mich.1980) (Judge Cohn) (§ 1981 complaint dismissed because plaintiff failed to allege any facts indicating that he, a black man, was treated differently than white co-workers). Echols, supra; Shakespeare, supra. Easley has not alleged any facts supporting an inference that he was disparately treated because of his race. At the hearing on this motion I asked him to provide any evidence he had that tended to show race discrimination. He steadfastly refused to do so, choosing to rely instead on conclusory allegations.⁷

Moreover, St. Antoine and the Committee on Professional Responsibility made the charge because of probable cause to believe that Easley altered his examination booklet. (St. Antoine Depo., pp. 13-17). St. Antoine outlined his concerns in a memorandum to Dean Eklund. (St. Antoine Depo., p. 4).

As I was preparing to return Mr. Easley's bluebooks to the file, something about the cover registered with me for the first time. The original cover bluebook, the one I had first graded, had contained an I.D. number with transposed middle digits, "7485" when it should have been "7845." This led the proctor, apparently, to write in "7845(?)," the missing number in the sequence. The bluebook now in my possession had the correct I.D. number on the name line (see attached xerox). The number is in ink, and there is no sign it has been altered. Plainly, there had been a substitution of bluebooks.

My daughter Claire, who put the bluebooks back in numerical order after I had graded them, independently confirms the transposition of the middle digits in the original I.D. number. She recalls it was way out of sequence, and only by reference to the proctor's corrected number could she place it properly. There was no other misnumbered exam. Moreover, my wife Lloyd, who reviews my arithmetic, puts a small check mark in the upper left-hand corner of the cover bluebook as she finishes each one. That too is missing from the existing set.

(St. Antoine Depo., Ex. 13). Easley submits no affidavits or other proof controverting St. Antoine's testimony⁸. Proceedings brought on the basis of probable cause cannot be the basis of a subsequent § 1983 claim. See Howell, supra, 650 F.2d at 614-15 (affirming summary judgment for defendants sued under § 1983 for alleged false arrest and malicious prosecution where defendants had probable cause for the arrest and prosecution).

Accordingly, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiff's race discrimination claim is granted. Alternatively, the race discrimination claim is dismissed for failure to plead briefly, simply, and clearly, facts showing a basis for relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), 8(e)(1), 12(b)(6), and 41(b).

B. First Amendment

Easley claims for the first time in his trial brief that cheating charges were brought against him in retaliation for exercising his first amendment right to complain to a professor at a state university about a final grade. The complaint does not allege deprivation of a first amendment right. During the hearing on this motion, Easley was unable to find such a claim, although he steadfastly asserted that it was there; he was able only to reiterate conclusory or irrelevant allegations.⁹ First amendment claims that are not supported by specific factual allegations are subject to dismissal. See Pace v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir.1971) (affirming dismissal...