East Camp, L.L.C. v. Spruill, No. COA08-1081 (N.C. App. 6/2/2009)
| Decision Date | 02 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. COA08-1081.,COA08-1081. |
| Parties | EAST CAMP, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HARRY SPRUILL, SHARON SPRUILL, and SCUPPERNONG FARM, LLC, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Windy H. Rose for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Miller and Shedor, PLLC, by Marty E. Miller, for Defendants-Appellants.
East Camp, L.L.C. (Plaintiff) is the owner of real property located in Tyrrell County, North Carolina. Plaintiff verbally agreed to allow Harry Spruill, Sharon Spruill, and Scuppernong Farm, LLC (Defendants) to farm the tillable acreage on Plaintiff's property beginning in the spring of 2000. In September 2000, Defendants requested that Plaintiff provide a written statement regarding the parties' lease agreement to the Tyrrell County Farm Service Agency. Plaintiff provided a letter dated 9 September 2000 (the Letter) to the Tyrrell County Farm Service Agency, that stated in full: Bob L. McDuffie, the Member/Manager for Plaintiff, signed the Letter. Plaintiff also provided a statement entitled "CASH LEASE AGREEMENT" (the Agreement) which states: Bob L. McDuffie signed the Agreement under the words "EAST CAMP LLC BY:" and above the words "Owner Signature." Defendants recorded the Letter and the Agreement in the Tyrrell County Register of Deeds in Book 202, Pages 786-87 on 21 December 2004.
Defendants allowed Plaintiff to access the real property through land owned by Defendants on a road known as Niland Road from 4 May 1999 until the spring of 2004. Defendants ended Plaintiff's access along Niland Road in the spring of 2004.
Plaintiff granted the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) a conservation easement on a portion of Plaintiff's property on 23 March 2007. Defendants contacted the NRCS and informed NRCS that Defendants had a ten-year lease on Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants were told in 2004 and again in October 2007 to discontinue farming Plaintiff's property. Defendants denied that Plaintiff instructed Defendants to discontinue farming Plaintiff's land in 2004 and alleged that Plaintiff continued to accept rent payments from 2000 to 2007.
Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants for slander of title and trespass on 13 November 2007. Plaintiff attached to its complaint the Letter and the Agreement. Plaintiff sought and was granted a temporary restraining order preventing Defendants from entering and farming Plaintiff's land during the pendency of Plaintiff's action against Defendants.
Defendants filed an answer and counter claims on 14 January 2008. Defendants pleaded several defenses to Plaintiff's claims, including the defense of license based on Defendants' purported lease to farm Plaintiff's land, memorialized in the Letter and the Agreement. Defendants' counter claims were to quiet title, for injury to real property, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Defendants also attached the Letter and the Agreement to their answer and counter claims.
Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants' counter claims on 22 February 2008 and denied the material allegations of Defendants' counter claims. Plaintiff pleaded the statute of frauds as a defense to Defendants' counter claims to quiet title and for breach of contract, alleging the lease between Plaintiff and Defendants was not in writing as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22-2. Plaintiff pleaded the statute of limitations as a defense to Defendants' counterclaim of injury to real property.
Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c). The trial court heard Plaintiff's motion on 31 May 2008 and entered judgment on 5 June 2008, granting judgment on the pleadings for Plaintiff and dismissing Defendants' counter claims to quiet title, for injury toreal property, and breach of contract. Defendants appeal.
As a preliminary matter, Defendants argue their appeal is properly before our Court as an appeal from an interlocutory order affecting a substantial right, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(D)(1). "AN ORDER OR JUDGMENT IS INTERLOCUTORY if it is made during the pendency of an action and does not dispose of the case but requires further action by the trial court in order to finally determine the entire controversy." Bob Timberlake Collection, Inc. v. Edwards, 176 N.C. App. 33, 37, 626 S.E.2d 315, 320 (citing Cagle v. Teachy, 111 N.C. App. 244, 247, 431 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1993)), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 531, 633 S.E.2d 674 (2006). However, an appeal of an interlocutory order is permitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d)(1) "if the trial court's decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review." Id. (citing Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1994)). "[T]he possibility of undergoing a second trial affects a substantial right . . . when the same issues are present in both trials, creating the possibility that a party will be prejudiced by different juries in separate trials rendering inconsistent verdicts on the same factual issue." Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 608, 290 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1982).
In the present case, the trial court's judgment on the pleadings is an interlocutory order because Plaintiff's claims for slander of title and for trespass, and Defendants' counterclaim for unjust enrichment remain pending. However, the validity of the purported lease between Plaintiff and Defendants, memorialized by the Letter and the Agreement, is both a defense to Plaintiff's pending claims and is the basis for Defendants' counter claims. Because there are overlapping factual issues, there exists the potential for inconsistent verdicts. Therefore, the trial court's judgment on the pleadings affects a substantial right of Defendants and thus Defendants' appeal is properly before us. See Liggett Group v. Sunas, 113 N.C. App. 19, 437 S.E.2d 674 (1993).
In Defendants' assignments of error numbers one and four, Defendants argue the trial court erred in dismissing Defendants' counter claims to quiet title and for breach of contract. Plaintiff pleaded the statute of frauds as a defense against Defendants' counter claims to quiet title and for breach of contract. Defendants argue the trial court erred in dismissing Defendants' counter claims because the pleadings raised an issue of material fact as to whether the Letter and the Agreement between the parties met the requirements of the statute of frauds pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22-2.
In determining a motion for judgment on the pleadings Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974) (citing Beal v. Missouri Pacific R.Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 85 L. Ed. 577 (1941)).
[A] motion under Rule 12(c) must be carefully scrutinized lest the nonmoving party be precluded from a full and fair hearing on the merits. The movant is held to a strict standard and must show that no material issue of facts exists and that he is clearly entitled to judgment.
In order for a lease with a term of three years or more to be valid, the essential terms of the contract must be in writing and signed by the party being charged. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22-2 (2007). "A valid lease contains four essential elements: (1) identity of [lessor] and [lessee], (2) description of land to be leased, (3) a statement of the term of the lease, and (4) rental or other consideration to be paid." Purchase Nursery, Inc. v. Edgerton, 153 N.C. App. 156, 161, 568 S.E.2d 904, 907 (2002) ().
Defendants argue the pleadings raised an issue of material fact as to whether the Letter and the Agreement between the parties met the requirements of the statute of frauds pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22-2. The Letter is addressed to Tyrrell County Farm Service Agency and states in full: Bob L. McDuffie, the Member/Manager for Plaintiff, signed the Letter. Defendants recorded the Letter in the Tyrrell County Register of Deeds in Book 202, Page 787. We address each of the essential elements of a valid lease with respect to the Letter in turn.
The statute of frauds requires a lease to be "signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some other person by him thereto lawfully authorized." N.C.G.S. § 22-2. Black's Law Dictionary defines the party to be charged as "[a] defendant in an action to enforce a contract falling within the statute of frauds." Black's Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004). Our Court has interpreted "party to be charged" as "'the one against whom relief is sought.'" Purchase Nursery, Inc. at 161, 568 S.E.2d at 907 (quoting Lewis v. Murray, 177 N.C. 18, 20, 97 S.E....
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