East Hartford Education Ass'n v. Board of Education

• Decision Date: 03 October 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H-156.
• Citation: 405 F. Supp. 94
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: EAST HARTFORD EDUCATION ASSOCIATION et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF EAST HARTFORD et al.

405 F. Supp. 94

EAST HARTFORD EDUCATION ASSOCIATION et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF EAST HARTFORD et al.

Civ. No. H-156.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

October 3, 1975.

Martin A. Gould, Gould, Killian & Krechevsky, Hartford, Conn., for plaintiffs.

Brian Clemow, Coleman H. Casey, Shipman & Goodwin, Hartford, Conn., for Bd. of Ed. of the Town of East Hartford.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CLARIE, Chief Judge.

This civil rights action was commenced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, joining as party plaintiffs, Richard P. Brimley, the East Hartford Education Association ("EHEA"), and the Connecticut Education Association, Incorporated ("CEA"). The Board of Education of the Town of East Hartford ("Board") hired Brimley as an English and film-making classroom teacher in the public school system. The members of the Board are named as defendants, both individually and in their official capacity as Board members. The complaint asks the Court to declare the dress code policy adopted by the Board on March 6, 1972, to be unconstitutional on its face and as applied to these plaintiffs. They ask the Court to declare the suit to be a class action under Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P., thereby including as plaintiffs all teachers who are employed by the Board of Education in the Town of East Hartford. They request that the Court grant a permanent injunction restraining the local Board from maintaining and enforcing the challenged dress code and grant them their attorney's fees with costs of suit. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2201 and 2202.

The present posture of the case before the Court is on the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. The defendants¹ represent that the complaint fails to state a legal basis upon which relief might be granted. The parties agree that there are no material factual issues to be decided and the case could be decided as a matter of law. After reviewing the pleadings, affidavits, exhibits and all other papers on file, the Court finds that the "dress code" prescribed by the Board meets constitutional standards and is not so vague or overly broad as to be unenforceable. The defendants' policy action is within the lawful authority delegated to local school boards by the Connecticut Legislature.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Brimley represents that he chooses to conduct his classes, while wearing a sport shirt without a tie or a sport jacket or sweater. He asserts the following reasons as the basis for his position: (1) that he wishes to present himself to his students as a person not tied to "establishment conformity"; (2) he wants to symbolically indicate to his students, his association with what he believes to be the ideas of the generation to which the students belong, including the rejection of many of the customs and values and social outlook of the older generation; and (3) he believes that dress of this type enables him to achieve a closer rapport with his students and thus enhance his ability to teach.

Historically, teachers and school administrators in East Hartford schools observed generally understood, but unwritten rules, prescribing a degree of formality in a teacher's classroom attire, which included the wearing of coats and neckties by men. Plaintiff Brimley, as far back as March 7, 1970, raised the issue by wearing a sport shirt and sweater to school without a coat or necktie. When reprimanded, he filed a grievance under the local teachers' collective bargaining agreement. The grievance was rejected by the school principal, who cited the administration's interpretation of the then existing rule as follows:

"The wearing of a jacket and tie or jacket and turtleneck shirt meets the intent of this memorandum. A sweater and sports shirt without tie are sport wear and therefore not appropriate attire."

When the case finally reached the arbitration stage, the Board claimed that the issue was not arbitrable under the teachers' bargaining contract and while the matter was pending the existing contract expired and a new agreement was negotiated. The latter agreement provided for the filing of grievances with ultimate arbitration if not settled. Much of this background information is taken from the January 25, 1973 findings of the distinguished arbiter, Archibald Cox, who declined to pass upon the issue. His decision, while expressing his personal opinion that the type of grievance was more appropriately a subject of arbitration rather than judicial determination, held that final and binding arbitration on the grievance issues presently before the Court were not jurisdictionally subject to arbitration procedures under the teachers' labor agreement.

The challenged dress code adopted by the Board on March 6, 1972, and thereafter promulgated provided:

"The attire of professional employees during the hours when school is in session must be judged in light of the following:

1. Dress should reflect the professional position of the employee.

2. Attire should be that which is commonly accepted in the community.

3. It should be exemplary of the students with whom the professional employee works.

4. Clothing should be appropriate to the assignment of the employee, such as slacks, and jerseys for gym teachers.

In most circumstances the application of the above criteria to classroom teachers would call for jacket, shirt and tie for men and dress, skirts, blouse and pantsuits for women. If an individual teacher feels that informal clothing such as sportswear, would be appropriate to his or her teaching assignment, or would enable him or her to carry out assigned duties more effectively, such requests may be brought to the attention of the Principal or Superintendent. An attempt should be made on all levels to insure that the above principles are applied equitably and consistently throughout the school system."

Issue

Does the local Board of Education have the constitutional right to establish by rule an enforceable minimal dress code guideline for teachers in the local school system; or is the individual teacher's interest in appearing as he pleases, a protected interest in "personal liberty" within the meaning and scope of the first and fourteenth amendments.

Law

The plaintiffs claim that any teacher has the constitutional right to dress and conduct himself as his own conscience commands, so long as the manner of dress and conduct do not interfere with any legitimate state interest. They assert that the municipality or the state has no more lawful interest in an unoffensive manner of attire, than it does in the bridal chamber. It is their contention that there has been no showing that the exercise of the forbidden right would materially or substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline for the proper administration of the school.

The legal claim asserted here involves the plaintiff's personal liberty to dress as he chooses during his working hours as a public school teacher, which right he claims to be protected under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Available remedies under the local teachers' collective bargaining contract have been exhausted through arbitration and no other such administrative remedies are presently available to gain effective relief. See Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969).

The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon the issue raised here. However, the Second Circuit has recently considered the case of Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1973), involving a municipal police department grooming code and found that a substantial constitutional issue had been raised by the regulation affecting the plaintiff's hair length. In that case the Court said,

"We hold only that choice of personal appearance is an ingredient of an individual's personal liberty, and that any restriction on that right must be justified by a legitimate state interest reasonably related to the regulation. Here the department has failed to make the slightest showing of the relationship between its regulation and the legitimate interest it sought to promote."

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the aforesaid case and it is presently pending before this term of the Court.

In a similar matter, Justice Black had before him an emergency motion to vacate a stay of injunction in an appellate case related to due process and equal protection, which involved a local standard for students' hair styles, Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F.Supp. 728 (W.D.Texas 1970). The judgment was stayed and Justice Black refused to vacate it. His memorandum, 401 U.S. 1201, 1202, 91 S.Ct. 592, 27 L.Ed.2d 797 (1971), disclosed his own view of the matter when he said,

"I refuse to hold for myself that the federal courts have constitutional power to interfere in this way with the public school system operated by the States. . . .

"Moreover, our Constitution has sought to distribute the power of government in this Nation between the United States and the States. Surely the federal judiciary can

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