East St. Louis Lumber Co. v. Schnipper
Decision Date | 07 December 1923 |
Docket Number | No. 15473.,15473. |
Citation | 310 Ill. 150,141 N.E. 542 |
Parties | EAST ST. LOUIS LUMBER CO. v. SCHNIPPER, Sheriff, et al. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit by the East St. Louis Lumber Company against Martin Schnipper, Sheriff, and others. From a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity, complainant appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Farmer, C. J., dissenting.Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Clair County; George A. Crow, judge.
D. E. Keefe and S. W. Baxter, both of East St. Louis, for appellant.
Robert I. Pugh, State's Atty., of Shelbyville, and John W. Freels, of East St. Louis, for appellees.
Appellant, the East St. Louis Lumber Company, a corporation engaged in the wholesale and retail lumber trade in East St. Louis, filed its bill in the circuit court of St. Clair county praying for a decree that three parcels of real estate in that city, the legal title to which stood of record in the name of M. C. Reis, were the property of appellant; that Reis should be required to execute a conveyance of the same to appellant, and that a levy of an execution in favor of the people of the state of Illinois upon a judgment against Reis should be removed as a cloud upon appellant's title. The state of Illinois, under the name of the was made a defendant, against the prohibition of section 26 of article 4 of the Constitution. Necessarily there was no attempt at service on that defendant, but the state's attorney, assuming to represent it, filed a purported answer for it. The officers interested in the levy of the execution and M. C. Reis were also so made defendants and answered the bill. On a hearing before the chancellor the bill was dismissed for want of equity.
The bill alleged that complainant purchased and paid for the three parcels of real estate in question and deeds for the same were made to the defendant Reis, who was the general manager of the complainant; that about one year before filing the bill Reis was claiming to be the owner of the property, and the complainant proposed that he should convey the title to it or make some suitable arrangement whereby it would be shown as a matter of recordthat the complainant was the owner; that Reis dissented from the arrangement and claimed a right to hold the legal title so long as he was security for the corporation to protect him against any contingent liability, and refused to make any deed or declaration of trust; that the circuit court of Shelby county entered a judgment for $6,500 against Reis and another surety on an alleged forfeited recognizance entered into in compliance with an order made in a cause wherein Angelo Zangain, who had been convicted in said court of burglary and larceny, was plaintiff in error in this court, by which the writ of error was made a supersedeas and Zangain admitted to bail; that the judgment against Zangain was affirmed by this court, and the cause was redocketed in the circuit court of Shelby county and default was entered on the recognizance; that scire facias was issued returnable to the next term, and judgment was then entered and a transcript of the judgment and proceedings was made and certified to the clerk of the circuit court of St. Clair county and an execution was issued and levied upon the real estate in question. The bill charged that the judgment was void, and that the complainant being the equitable owner of the three parcels of real estate they were not subject to the execution.
No attention will be given to the supposed answer of the people of the state of Illinois. The answer of the sheriff and state's attorney denied the averments of the bill that the complainant paid for the parcels of real estate, charged that Reis was the owner, and denied all allegations as to the invalidity of the judgment. The answer of Reis admitted the charges of the bill that the judgment was void, alleged that he had signed notes and obligations for the complainant and had a right to hold the real estate as security against any liability that might accrue on such notes and obligations, and admitted that he had refused to convey the real estate or to execute any instrument showing the ownership of the same to be in the complainant.
[1][2]A judgment which is void for want of jurisdiction may be attacked collaterally by any one whenever any right or title is claimed under it, but if a court pronouncing judgment has jurisdiction of the subjectmatter and the parties, the judgment, however erroneous, is binding upon all parties and privies to it unless and until reversed in a regular proceeding for that purpose. Such a judgment cannot be impeached collaterally in any other court for errors of law or irregularities in practice. Swiggart v. Harber, 4 Scam. 364,39 Am. Dec. 418;Clark v. People, 146 Ill. 348, 35 N. E. 60;Miller v. Rowan, 251 Ill. 344, 96 N. E. 285. The first inquiry, therefore, is whether the circuit court of Shelby county had jurisdiction to render the judgment on the forfeited recognizance, and if it had, the validity of the judgment could not be called in question in this suit. The jurisdiction of the court over cases of the class to which the proceeding belonged is not questioned, but the objections made to the judgment by the complainant, which was not a party to it, are that the recognizance was not certified to the circuit court, as required by the statute, and was not entered of record, and that the sheriff did not have the custody of Zangain when he took the recognizance, but Zangain was at liberty under a recognizance which had been taken in open court.
The sheriff took the recognizance as authorized by the order of a justice of this court admitting Zangain to bail, and the sheriff indorsed his approval upon it and filed it in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Shelby county. It was conditioned, according to the statute, for his appearance in that court. The mandate of this court affirming the judgment and directing its execution was filed in the circuit court, and Zangain being called and not appearing according to the condition of the recognizance, it was forfeited. A scire facias, which was to be regarded as a declaration, was filed, showing the recognizance properly entered into, the approval, filing, and forfeiture, so that the court had jurisdiction to determine all the questions which the complainantattempted to raise by its bill. The judgment was not void but was binding upon Reis, and his property not exempt from execution was liable to be taken in satisfaction of the judgment. The chancellor did not err in so deciding.
[3] The defendants having made proof of the judgment and the levy of the execution upon the real estate as the property of M. C. Reis, the question was presented whether the parcels of real estate the title to which stood in the name of Reis were subject to the execution on the judgment against him, and the complainant attempted to prove by a witness that it paid the purchase price for each parcel of the real estate and deeds were taken in the name of Reis. If such proof were made the law would imply a trust resulting from the payment of the consideration and would hold the complainant to be the equitable owner. Reynolds v. Summer, 126 Ill. 58, 18 N. E. 334,1 L. R. A. 327, 9 Am. St. Rep. 523;Ackley v. Croucher, 203 Ill. 530, 68 N. E. 86;Brennaman v. Schell, 212 Ill. 356, 72 N. E. 412;Masters v. Mayes, 246 Ill. 506, 92 N. E. 945;Harrison v. Harrison, 265 Ill. 432, 107 N. E. 128. Upon objection by counsel for the judgment creditor, the chancellor made the following ruling:
‘Now, all that you have said with regard to it shows that the legal title stands in M. C. Reis, and if there is any trust it is a secret trust and the public has no notice of it, and the public will not be bound by that, and any claim that the defendant might have against M. C. Reis by reason of the execution or judgment or any other claim could not possibly be thwarted by reason of that secret trust, and for that reason I sustain the objection to that proof.’
The complainant then offered to prove every averment of its bill which would raise a resulting trust in its favor, and that Reis had refused to do anything to show that the real estate was the property of the complainant, on the ground that he had signed notes for the complainant to different banks and was entitled to keep the property in his name for his security. The chancellor having ruled that although there was a resulting trust in favor of the complainant and it was the equitable owner of the real estate,the bill did not show any right to call upon a court of equity to protect the equitable title, and this being equivalent to sustaining a general demurrer to the bill, it was dismissed for want of equity.
[4][5] If the complainant had been permitted to do so and had proved the averments of its bill, it would have established the fact that M. C. Reis was the holder of the naked legal title to the real estate and complainant was the equitable owner, and the question would be whether such real estate could be taken for the debt of Reis. On that question it would make no difference whether or not Reis was entitled to retain the legal title as security against a possible...
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