Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Auth.

Decision Date18 December 2003
Docket NumberNo. S107792.,S107792.
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
PartiesFelicia Kay EASTBURN, a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. REGIONAL FIRE PROTECTION AUTHORITY et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Law Offices of Charles D. Sneathern, Charles D. Sneathern, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Baughman & Wang, David E. Russo, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Graves & King, Patrick L. Graves, Harvey W. Wimer III, Riverside, and Dennis J. Mahoney, San Bernardino, for Defendants and Respondents Regional Fire Protection Authority and City of Victorville.

Cuff, Robinson & Jones, W.O. Robinson and Brian C. Cuff, Tustin, for Defendant and Respondent Barstow Fire Protection District.

Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Burk E. Delventhal and Ellen Forman, Deputy City Attorneys; Pollak, Vida & Fisher, Girard Fisher and Daniel P. Barer for 76 California Cities, The California Association of Joint Powers Authorities and The California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

CHIN, J.

In California, public agencies each year receive millions of 911 dispatch calls seeking emergency, medical, and fire services. (E.g., Sen. Com. on Energy and Public Utilities and Joint Com. on Fire, Police, Emergency and Disaster Services (Nov. 21, 1990) Joint Interim Hearing on the 911 Emergency Response System — An Overview of its Effectiveness, pp. 11 [Cal. Highway Patrol], 18 [Los Angeles Police Dept.], 23 [Los Angeles County], 25 [Los Angeles Fire Dept.].) In this case, we must decide whether public entities employing emergency dispatchers are subject to direct or vicarious tort liability for injury attributable in part to a dispatcher's failure or delay in responding to a 911 call. We conclude that, based on applicable statutory provisions and the legislative policies underlying them, no statute imposes direct liability on public entities in such situations (see Gov.Code, §§ 815, 815.6 [direct liability for breach of statutory mandatory duty]), and vicarious liability (see Gov.Code, §§ 815.2, subd. (a), 820) is limited to cases involving gross negligence or bad faith (Health & Saf.Code, § 1799.107 (hereafter section 1799.107)). Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts disclosing any acts of gross negligence or bad faith on the part of defendants or their employees, and they presently assert no additional facts that might justify an amended complaint. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which had affirmed a judgment of dismissal in favor of defendants.

Because this case reaches us after the trial court sustained defendants' demurrers, we assume the facts alleged in plaintiffs' complaint are true. Defendants named in the complaint included the Regional Fire Protection Authority, the Barstow Fire Protection District, and (following amendment to the complaint) the City of Victorville. The complaint alleged defendants are public entities providing "emergency dispatch services for 911 callers." Defendants allegedly had a duty to exercise reasonable care in staffing and training emergency dispatch personnel, in promulgating reasonable guidelines for handing 911 calls, and in responding to such calls. The complaint also alleged that plaintiff Felicia Kay Eastburn, then three years old, suffered an electric shock while bathing, and that although her parents informed defendants' 911 emergency dispatcher of the injury, defendants "failed to dispatch emergency personnel with emergency equipment, so that Plaintiff [the minor] was denied early and prompt medical attention."

As a result of being deprived of prompt medical care, Felicia allegedly suffered permanent, debilitating injuries for which she sought general, special, and punitive damages from defendants. Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants acted "negligent[ly] and careless[ly]" and in "willful, wanton and ... conscious disregard of the rights of the safety of the general public, including Plaintiff," thus demonstrating malice and justifying a punitive damages award. Felicia's parents, plaintiffs Herbert and Lori Eastburn, alleged they suffered related damages and incurred expenses.

The trial court sustained defendants' demurrers without leave to amend, and plaintiffs appealed from the subsequent judgment of dismissal. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on the ground that, "under Government Code section 815 and Health and Safety Code section 1799.107, defendants are immune from liability except for bad faith or grossly negligent conduct, which plaintiffs admittedly cannot allege." (Fn.omitted.) We agree and will affirm.

1. Applicable Statutes

The California Tort Claims Act provides that "[a] public entity is not liable for an injury," "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute." (Gov.Code, § 815, subd. (a).) As that language indicates, the intent of the Tort Claims Act is to confine potential governmental liability, not expand it. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1127, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171 (Zelig ).) We first must determine whether any statute imposes direct liability on defendant agencies here. At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel suggested that Government Code section 820, subdivision (a), applied. But that section provides only that public employees are liable for injuries from their acts or omissions in the scope of their employment to the same extent as private persons, unless otherwise provided by statute. As we recently observed, no similar provision makes public agencies liable for their own negligent conduct or omission to the same extent as a private person or entity. (Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1127-1128, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171.)

Government Code section 815.6, makes a public entity directly liable for its breach of a statutory "mandatory duty," but with the exception of Health and Safety Code section 1799.107, discussed below, plaintiffs cite, and we have found, no statutory provision declaring or defining a public agency's duty of care with respect to handling 911 emergency calls. Civil Code section 1714 imposes a general duty of care on all persons but, as we explain below in connection with our discussion of Ma v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 488, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 (Ma), section 1714 is an insufficient statutory basis for imposing direct liability on public agencies.

Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), makes a public entity vicariously liable for its employee's negligent acts or omissions within the scope of employment (see Gov.Code, § 820), but section 815.2, subdivision (b), adds the important qualification that a public entity is not liable for injuries committed by an employee who is immune from liability for such injuries. Once again, Health and Safety Code section 1799.107 is the only statute we have found pertaining to the subject of the liability and immunity of public employees performing emergency rescue services such as 911 dispatching.

In our view, therefore, the critical statute at issue here is section 1799.107. This statute provides in pertinent part: "(a) [A] qualified immunity from liability shall be provided for public entities and emergency rescue personnel providing emergency services.[¶] (b) [N]either a public entity nor emergency rescue personnel shall be liable for any injury caused by an action taken by the emergency rescue personnel acting within the scope of their employment to provide emergency services, unless the action taken was performed in bad faith or in a grossly negligent manner." (Italics added.)

Section 1799.107, subdivision (d), defines "emergency rescue personnel" to mean "any person who is an officer, employee, or member of a fire department or fire protection or firefighting agency of the federal government, the State of California, a city, county, city and county, district, or other public or municipal corporation or political subdivision of this state, or of a private fire department, whether that person is a volunteer or partly paid or fully paid, while he or she is actually engaged in providing emergency services as defined by subdivision (e)."

Finally, subdivision (e) of section 1799.107 provides that "emergency services" includes "first aid and medical services, rescue procedures and transportation, or other related activities necessary to insure the health or safety of a person in imminent peril." (Italics added.)

2. The Zepuda and Ma Decisions

Two appellate cases have expressed somewhat conflicting views regarding the reach of section 1799.107, and the liability of public agencies providing emergency rescue services. (See Ma, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 488, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 544; Zepeda v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 232, 272 Cal.Rptr. 635 (Zepeda).) We believe the following review of these cases demonstrates that Zepeda more correctly interprets section 1799.107.

In Zepeda, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 232, 272 Cal.Rptr. 635, the plaintiffs' decedent had been shot in the neck, but city paramedics who were summoned to the scene allegedly refused to render medical aid until the police arrived. After the decedent died of his wounds, the plaintiffs sued the city for wrongful death damages but the trial court sustained its demurrer and dismissed the plaintiffs' action. The appellate court affirmed, observing that "[a]s a general rule, one has no duty to come to the aid of another," absent some special relationship between the parties. (Id. at p. 235, 272 Cal.Rptr. 635, citing, e.g., Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137; Rest.2d Torts, § 323; see also Zelig, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1128-1129, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171.)

According to Zepeda, these principles likewise apply to law enforcement and emergency rescue personnel employed by public entities: "Therefore, recovery has been denied for...

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