Easterling v. Crawford
| Decision Date | 03 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:13-cv-430 |
| Parties | WARREN EASTERLING, Petitioner, v. JUDGE DALE CRAWFORD, And CHIEF JUSTICE MAUREEN O'CONNOR Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Petitioner Warren Easterling brought this action against Greene County Court of Common Pleas Judge Dale Crawford1 and Chief Justice Maureen O'Connor of the Ohio Supreme Court. (Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Doc. No. 1, PageID 1); (Complaint, Doc. No. 2).
In his Complaint Easterling asserts various violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 18 U.S.C. § 241, and 18 U.S.C. § 242. These alleged violations of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, bias, and prejudice, arise out of Respondents' respective failures to hear Easterling's Motion for Relief from Judgment, the court's order to the Greene County Clerk of Courts declaring Easterling to be a vexatious litigator, and Respondent Chief Justice O'Connor's refusal to disqualify the sittingjudge, Respondent Judge Crawford. (Complaint, Doc. No. 2);(Notice of 2 Federal Questions, Doc. No. 3 at PageID 206.)
This case is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and prior to issuance of process.
Petitioner was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Title VIII of P.L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321(effective April 26, 1996)(the "PLRA"), reads as follows:
A complaint is frivolous under this statute if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). In deciding whether a complaint is "frivolous" the Court does not consider whether a plaintiff has good intentions or sincerely believes that he or she has suffered a legal wrong. Rather the test is an objective one: does the complaint have an arguable basis in law or fact?
It is appropriate for a court to consider this question sua sponte prior to issuance of process "so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324. The Court "is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff'sallegations." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Dismissal is permitted under § 1915(e) only "if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), disagreed with by Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1985); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1985). Section 1915(e)(2) does not apply to the complaint of a non-prisoner litigant who does not seek in forma pauperis status. Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
As previously stated, §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) require the Court to dismiss any portion of an action or appeal that 1) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or 2) is frivolous. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-471 (6th Cir. 2010). In making this determination the Court applies the standards for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as has been recently re-stated by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004)("[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action"), on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)(" Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations"); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ().
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, "'this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.'" 5 Wright & Miller § 1216, at 233-234 (quoting Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F.Supp. 643, 645 (D. Hawaii 1953) ); see also Dura [Pharmaceuticals, Inc.v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005)], at 346, 125 S.Ct. 1627; Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 289 F.Supp.2d 986, 995 (N.D.Ill.2003) () ("[S]ome threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset before a patent antitrust case should be permitted to go into its inevitably costly and protracted discovery phase").
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558; see also Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2007).
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and even the issuance of process constitutes to some extent the exercise of judicial power, this Court regularly considers whether it may have subject-matter jurisdiction of a case at the same time as it conducts the § 1915 review.
The basis for this case, as well as several additional cases filed by Mr. Easterling in both the Greene County Courts as well as this United States District Court, originated from Greene County case 2009 CV 1357. In that case Easterling alleged that he had been terminated without cause and sought reinstatement to his position as a mortgage loan officer at Union Savings Bank as well as compensatory damages. (Case No. 2009 CV 1357, Complaint, 12/7/2009.) The complaint was dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Judgment, 2/9/2010.) Easterling did not appeal.
Instead, Easterling initiated a second case against Union Savings Bank on April 1, 2010, again seeking reinstatement and compensatory damages. See Case 2010 CV 0375. Defendant countered by filing a Motion to Dismiss on the basis that "the identical Complaint previously was dismissed by this Court with prejudice on February 9, 2010 for failure to state a claim underOhio Civ. R. P. 12(B)(6) and thus res judicata bars Plaintiff's subsequent and virtually identical Complaint." Easterling v. Union Savings Bank, 2010-Ohio-4753 ¶ 5, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4028 at **2 (Oct. 1, 2010), citing to Motion to Dismiss, 4/29/2010. The trial court compared the complaint from the prior case to the one before it and found them to be "indistinguishable in any material way." Id. at ¶¶ 2, 11. The prior determination dismissing the complaint became final when Easterling failed to properly appeal. As such, it follows that the second virtually identical complaint was barred by res judicata. Id., see also Judgment Entry, 5/28/2010. The court further articulated that in accordance with Civil Rule 41(b)(3), the judgment entry was to operate as an adjudication upon the merits, thus making it an appealable final order. Easterling appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals. (Case 10-CA-39.) The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding the complaints to be indistinguishable and as such, the second case was properly dismissed on the grounds of res judicata. Easterling, 2010-Ohio-4753 ¶ 48.
Easterling filed a new case against Union Savings Bank, 2010 CV 1267, on December 3, 2010. In response Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and a counterclaim for both attorney fees and to have Easterling declared a vexatious litigator under Ohio Revised Code § 2323.52. (Motion For Summary Judgment; Defendant's Answer and Counterclaims, 12/30/2010.) The Magistrate granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment and scheduled a hearing for oral arguments on attorney fees and the vexatious litigator status of Plaintiff. (Magistrate's Decision, 3/17/2011.) Plaintiff objected to the decision on summary judgment; however, on June 7, 2011, a judgment entry adopting the magistrate's decision was filed. The judgment specifically stated that
In July of 2011, a hearing was conducted in front of the magistrate on attorney fees and Easterling's status as a vexatious litigator. On December 12, 2011, the Magistrate's Decision was filed prohibiting Mr. Easterling from continuing any legal proceedings against Union Savings Bank. Plaintiff immediately filed a motion to set aside verdict. (Motion, 12/19/2011.) A second hearing on the motions for summary judgment, attorney fees, and the declaration of vexatious litigation was then conducted in front of Judge Crawford. The judge allowed both parties to supplement their motions for summary judgment, permitting the addition of affidavits and other documentation as provided under Rule 56. The rehearing took place on July 2, 2012, and on July 19, 2012, an entry was filed granting Defendant's Motion on Summary Judgment. The court additionally held that the filing of the lawsuit...
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