Easterly v. Inc. Town of Irwin

• Decision Date: 29 October 1896
• Parties: EASTERLY v. INCORPORATED TOWN OF IRWIN.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

99 Iowa 694

68 N.W. 919

EASTERLY

v.INCORPORATED TOWN OF IRWIN.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 29, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Shelby county; A. B. Thornell, Judge.

Action for false imprisonment. The court sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's petition, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.B. I. Salinger, for appellant.

Byers & Lockwood, for appellee.

DEEMER, J.

The petition alleges that the defendant, in virtue of its power as a municipal corporation, enacted the following ordinance:

“An Ordinance Regulating License No. 8. Town Ordinance of Irwin.

Sec. 7. That no person, firm, company or corporation shall be engaged in prosecuting or carrying on any trade or profession hereinafter mentioned and described, within the incorporated town of Irwin, Iowa, until he, she or they shall have first procured a license therefor in the manner hereinafter provided.”

“Sec. 9. It shall be unlawful for any transient merchant or peddler to sell or offer to sell, by auction or otherwise, any property within the town without first having obtained a license therefor for which he shall pay such sum as the mayor may determine in each particular case.”

That about March 22, 1893, the plaintiff was employed as the agent of a wholesale grocery house located in Chicago, Ill., to solicit orders for goods, and to subsequently deliver all goods for which orders might be obtained; that about said time plaintiff took orders for goods in the defendant town, which he subsequently delivered; that while so engaged, and on account thereof, defendant caused him to be arrested under the ordinance aforesaid, and to be fined thereunder, and plaintiff, failing to pay the fine so imposed, was imprisoned in the county jail for the term of three days; that the defendant, at a special meeting of its council, expressly directed its town marshal to make the arrest for the malicious, corrupt, and oppressive purpose of preventing plaintiff from competing with the resident merchants who were selling like goods. The demurrer to the petition was based upon the ground that defendant was not liable for the acts of its officers in attempting to enforce its police regulations. It may be conceded that the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff was, under the allegations of his petition, unlawful, for the reason that plaintiff was not a transient merchant; and for the further reason that the ordinance was void in so far as it authorized the mayor to fix the amount of the license, under the authority of Town of State Center v. Barenstein, 66 Iowa, 249, 23 N. W. 652. But the question remains, is the defendant responsible for the acts of its officers in such cases? The rule of law seems to be well settled that a city or town is not liable for the acts of its officers in attempting to enforce its police regulations, for the reason that in such matters the officers can in no sense be regarded as the agents or servants of the city. Their duties are of a public nature; and their appointment by the city is simply a convenient mode of exercising governmental functions. In the matter of enforcing its police regulations the city acts as an agent of the state in the discharge of duties imposed by law for the promotion and preservation of the public good, and not as a mere private corporation in the management of its corporate concerns. Calwell v. City of Boone, 51 Iowa, 687, 2 N. W. 614;Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495. The...