Easterly v. State, CA

• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CLONINGER
• Citation: Easterly v. State, 648 S.W.2d 843, 8 Ark.App. 135 (Ark. App. 1983)
• Decision Date: 13 April 1983
• Docket Number: No. CA,CA
• Parties: Norma Louise EASTERLY, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. CR 82-188.

Page 843

648 S.W.2d 843

8 Ark.App. 135

Norma Louise EASTERLY, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CA CR 82-188.

Court of Appeals of Arkansas.

April 13, 1983.

Murphy & Carlisle by Marshall N. Carlisle, Fayetteville, for appellant.

Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Michael E. Wheeler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

CLONINGER, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of violation of Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-2804 (Repl.1977), interference with a law enforcement officer, and was assessed a sentence of six years in prison. On this appeal, appellant's sole point for reversal is that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We must affirm the conviction.

Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-2804, supra, provides that:

A person commits the offense of interference with a law enforcement officer if he knowingly employs or threatens to employ physical force against a law enforcement officer engaged in performing his official duties.

When the evidence in this case is viewed in the light most favorable to the State appellant and a friend, Johnny Thomas, had been drinking on January 26, 1981. Mr. Thomas had called several law enforcement agencies to report that his vehicle had been stolen. When a friend called Mr. Thomas to tell him that the car was parked in front of a friend's duplex in Prairie Grove, appellant and Mr. Thomas were taken to the duplex. A dispatcher informed Officer Gage that appellant and Mr. Thomas were at the address in Prairie Grove, that they had a gun, and said they were going to take care of it themselves. Officer Gage went to the address and observed the residence and the car. A few minutes later, appellant and Mr. Thomas came out, got in the car and left. Officer Gage followed, and he testified at trial that Mr. Thomas was driving in an erratic manner. Officer Gage decided to stop the car because he thought Mr. Thomas was intoxicated. When Officer Gage approached the car with a flashlight in his hand, he testified that he saw Mr. Thomas hand a gun to appellant. At that time Officer Gage set the flashlight on the ground, took out his gun, and opened the car door. He then told both appellant and Mr. Thomas to put their hands on the dash. Mr. Thomas put his hands on the dash, but appellant did not. The officer then told Mr. Thomas to get out of the car. Mr. Thomas got out and leaned up against the car. The officer saw appellant put the gun in her dress. The officer then asked appellant to put her hands on the dash again, but appellant cursed the officer and told him that she was going to kill him. At that time appellant took the gun out and pointed it at the officer. As the officer started backwards, appellant fired directly at him. The officer fired three shots, one of which struck appellant in the head. Appellant was handcuffed and given first aid.

Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-2804, supra, was first interpreted by the Arkansas Supreme Court in the case of Breakfield v. State, 263 Ark. 398, 566 S.W.2d 729 (1978). In that case the court reversed a conviction of interference with a police officer because the whole affair occurred when the appellant appeared at the jail to inquire about the arrest of his brother. Breakfield made no attempt to prevent the officers from performing their normal duties at the jail and was arrested only because of the disturbance he created. The court observed that a provision in the new criminal code, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-2803 (Repl.1977), for the first time, defined the offense of resisting arrest. Such misconduct was usually charged under statutes defining obstructing or resisting an officer, assaulting an officer or threatening an officer. The court found that there was not sufficient evidence to support the conviction of Breakfield for interfering with a police officer in the performance of his duties, but that he should have been charged with resisting arrest, or disorderly conduct, or both.

In State v. Bocksnick, 268 Ark. 74, 593 S.W.2d 176 (1980), the Court of Appeals had reversed Bocksnick's conviction of interference with a law enforcement officer on the grounds that it was not supported by substantial evidence. The Arkansas Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In that case a policeman suspected that Bocksnick had been involved in an incident at a local trailer park. Bocksnick refused to surrender his weapon and fired two shots at the officer. The court first discussed ...