Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe

Citation220 S.E.2d 672,159 W.Va. 200
Decision Date16 December 1975
Docket NumberNo. 13544,13544
CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia
PartiesEASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL CORP. v. John DOE, an Individual, etc., et al.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A circuit court judge may issue a valid injunction on the Ex parte motion of a litigant.

2. A court having jurisdiction of the parties and colorable jurisdiction of the subject matter may issue an injunction which must be obeyed regardless of whether it is ultimately determined to have been erroneously or improvidently awarded.

3. A court may protect its power to determine its own jurisdiction by issuing a temporary injunction to maintain the Status quo pending an adversary determination of its own jurisdiction.

4. A court of general equity jurisdiction has sufficient subject matter jurisdiction to enter a temporary injunction when: 1) the court has the general power to grant injunctive relief; 2) the pleadings demonstrate that a set of facts may exist under which the court could arguably grant a valid temporary or permanent injunction; and, 3) the allegations in the pleadings both with regard to the facts and the applicable law are of sufficient substance to require the court to make, in an adversary proceeding a reasoned determination of its own jurisdiction.

5. The rule that unconstitutional court orders must nevertheless be obeyed until set aside presupposes that the court issuing the injunction enjoys both jurisdiction over the persons and colorable jurisdiction over the subject matter; that adequate and effective remedies are available for orderly and prompt review of the challenged rulings; and, that the court order and subsequent conduct does not require an irretrievable surrender of constitutional guarantees.

6. The need for alacrity is paramount with regard to temporary injunctions and a court may lose its power to enforce its own temporary orders by being dilatory in providing hearings on motions to dissolve, particularly when delay may precipitate the irretrievable surrender of constitutional rights.

7. Where a court acts in bad faith with an awareness of its lack of jurisdiction, a collateral attack can be made to a charge of criminal contempt, but bad faith msut be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

8. Criminal contempt is concerned primarily with the dignity of the court itself, while civil contempt is concerned primarily with the vindication of the legal rights of interested litigants.

9. In a contempt proceeding, whenever the defendant may effect his release from jail by performing such act or acts as the court directs, the contempt is civil in nature and the rules regarding criminal contempt do not apply regardless of the ultimate length of the time served in jail.

10. Whenever a defendant is sentenced to jail for a definite period of time for having failed to obey a court order, the contempt is criminal and not civil; likewise, when a party is required to pay a fine to the State in order to purge himself of contempt the imposition of such fine makes the action one for ciminal contempt.

11. Where a court incarerates a defendant for a period in excess of six months the penalty is substantial and not trivial, and before conviction and incarceration the defendant is entitled to certain basic procedural due process safeguards including the right to counsel, the right to trial by jury, and the right to an impartial judge.

12. Where the sentence contemplated by the court is less than six months, the court may act summarily after a fair hearing, except that the defendant must be informed prior to the hearing that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, that counsel will be appointed for him.

13. A monetary fine is presumed to be trivial, but where a court contemplates levying a fine as a punishment for criminal contempt, the question of whether the penalty is trivial or substantial should be decided in each case with reference to the defendant's means and the hardship to be undergone by the defendant in paying the fine.

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Charleston, David Grabill, Garretts Bend, for plaintiffs in error.

Tutwiler, Crockett & LaCaria, Charles A. Tutwiler, Welch, Rose, Schmidt & Dixon, Daniel L. Stickler, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant in error.

NEELY, Justice:

The Court granted this appeal to clarify the law of contempt in light of recent United States Supreme Court cases. 1 This appeal presents three substantial questions with regard to the law of contempt which have not been squarely addressed by this Court for many years. The first is the extent to which the alleged invalidity of a temporary injunction may be asserted as a defense in a contempt proceeding for violation of the injunction; the second is the distinction in this jurisdiction between civil and criminal contempt and the procedural requirements necessary for the successful prosecution of each respectively; and, the third is the distinction between trivial and serious criminal contempt and the implications of that distinction upon constitutionally mandated due process standards.

During February and March of 1974 numerous individuals, including appellants, apparently became dissatisfied with the so-called 'quarter-tank rule' issued by the Governor of West Virginia for the purpose of conserving gasoline during the international oil embargo in effect at that time. The Governor's rule required that motorists have less than a quarter of a tank in reserve before buying gasoline. In an attempt to exert political pressure against the 'quarter-tank rule' appellants and others picketed coal mines in Southern West Virginia. The picketers relied upon the well established tradition in the coal fields that miners will not cross picket lines of any kind. The picketing successfully interfered with the orderly operation of the appellee's coal mine.

The evidence discloses that immediately before the 12:01 a.m. shift of March 4, 1974, certain individuals established picket lines on the road leading to appellee's Keystone No. 1 Mine in McDowell County which caused appellee's employees to refuse to work. Appellee's supervisory employees were also denied access to the mine by the pickets who allegedly assaulted and struck one supervisory employee. Picketing was repeated again before the 8:00 a.m. shift on March 5, 1974, and again the mine shut down for refusal of miners to cross the picket lines.

As a result, appellee filed suit in the Circuit Court of McDowell County seeking to enjoin this picketing activity. On March 5, 1974, after an in-chambers hearing, a preliminary injunction was issued. At approximately 10:30 p.m. the same night, a deputy sheriff of McDowell County served copies of the preliminary injunction on appellants Ellis England, Gary Morgan, Thomas Craft, Lloyd Felts and Roger England. At the time of the service of process these men were engaged in picketing at the Keystone No. 1 Mine. These appellants continued their activities despite notice of the preliminary injunction, and their continued picketing once again resulted in the refusal of the miners to cross the picket line. On March 6, 1974, appellants William Stevenson, Jr. and Louis Pierce were personally served by the deputy sheriff.

All the appellants were observed near the entrance to the Keystone No. 1 Mine before the 4:00 p.m. shift on March 6, 1974, After they had all been served with the preliminary injunction. On March 8, 1974, the appellee moved for an order requiring appellants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for violating the preliminary injunction. A show cause order was issued returnable March 12, 1974, but at appellants' request the hearing was continued until March 15, 1974.

At the hearing on the show cause order, appellee presented seven witnesses, all of whom identified one or more of the appellants as persons engaged in picketing after the issuance and service of the preliminary injunction. The only issues before the lower court at the show cause hearing were whether the appellants had been served with the preliminary injunction and whether they continued the prohibited activity after notice of the existence of the injunction. The appellants were not represented by counsel, although they had had seven days after the issuance of the show cause order to retain counsel and to prepare their defense. At the hearing the circuit court judge advised the appellants of their right to counsel. A fair reading of the record, with particular regard to the knowledgeable way in which the appellants conducted themselves during the hearing, demonstrates that the appellants knowingly and voluntarily waived representation by counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). The appellants did not deny any of the evidence offered by the appellee's witnesses, and while the appellants questioned the legal consequences of their activity, and maintained that they were engaged merely in the exercise of their First Amendment right to free speech, the evidence demonstrates that they were engaged in the activity commonly known as 'picketing,' with all of the economic consequences that implies--in particular, work stoppage.

Following the hearing the lower court imposed a monetary fine and jail terms on each of the appellants with the provision that they were to serve the jail term 'until sooner released by this Court.' One of the appellants was fined $500.00 and sentenced to the county jail for six months; the remaining six of the appellants were fined $250.00 and sentenced to the county jail for thirty days. The appellants were placed in the custody of the Sheriff of McDowell County, but released by the lower court that same day after the appellants agreed 1) to pay their fines within one hundred twenty days, 2) to cease and desist from coercing or preventing the employees of plaintiff or others from performing their work, and 3) to return to their own work at the first regular...

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  • Hendershot v. Handlan
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    ...the states to provide a jury in all criminal trials except those involving petty offenses. This Court, in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe, W.Va., 220 S.E.2d 672 (1975), discussed some aspects of contempt and required the appointment of counsel where the contemnor is indigent. In that c......
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    ...cases focus on the nature of the punishment inflicted. We stated in Syllabus Point 9 and in part of Syllabus Point 10 of Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe, W.Va., 220 S.E.2d 672 (1975): "In a contempt proceeding, whenever the defendant may effect his release from jail by performing such ......
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