Eastern Elevator Co., Inc. v. Scalzi

• Decision Date: 01 May 1984
• Citation: 193 Conn. 128,474 A.2d 456
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: EASTERN ELEVATOR COMPANY, INC. v. Leonard SCALZI, Jr.

Page 456

474 A.2d 456

193 Conn. 128

EASTERN ELEVATOR COMPANY, INC. v. Leonard SCALZI, Jr.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 13, 1984.

Decided May 1, 1984.

[193 Conn. 129] David M. Wallman, Stamford, for appellant (defendant).

R. Jeffrey Sands, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Joan G. Margolis, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA, GRILLO and BIELUCH, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Leonard Scalzi, Jr., d/b/a Horizon Development Co., has appealed from the denial by the trial court, Fracasse, J., of his motion to open default and judgment after default. We find no error.

The plaintiff, Eastern Elevator Company, Inc., and the defendant executed a contract on July 2, 1980, for the sale and installation of an elevator. The plaintiff agreed to sell, deliver and install the elevator for which the defendant agreed to pay. The plaintiff performed the contract and made demand for $27,428.12 for so doing. After the defendant paid $10,000 on this debt nothing further was paid although a demand was made for the balance due. This action was On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the defense presented in his motion was sufficient as a matter of law to support his motion, and (2) an affidavit filed under General Statutes § 52-212 is assumed to be well pleaded and the test the trial court should have applied is whether the affidavit on its face states a defense. We disagree.

                instituted to seek the principal balance of $17,428.12 plus interest and reasonable attorney's fees. 1  The defendant's counsel filed his appearance on September 17, 1982, two days after the action was returned to court.   On October 25, 1982, the plaintiff filed a motion for default for failure to plead, which appeared on the short calendar on November 12, 1982, and was granted by the court, Hurley, J., on November 15, 1982.   On November 24, 1982, the plaintiff filed its motion for judgment which appeared on the short calendar on December 13, 1982, but was marked off by agreement of counsel.   This motion next appeared on the short calendar on January 3, 1983.   It was granted on January 6, 1983, by the court, Celotto, J., in the amount of $20,826.60.   On [193 Conn. 130] February 7, 1983, the Superior Court, upon the plaintiff's application, issued a property execution.   Thereafter, on March 1, 1983, the defendant filed his motion to open default and judgment after default. 2  On that date, after hearing argument by both counsel, the trial court, Fracasse, J., denied the defendant's motion. 3  This appeal followed
                

The power of a court to open a default judgment is controlled by § 52-212 of the General Statutes. A.D.C. Contracting & Supply Corporation v. Thomas J. Riordan, Inc., 176 Conn. 579, 580, 409 A.2d 1027 (1979); Munch v. Willametz, 156 Conn. 6, 9, 238 A.2d 424 (1968); see Practice Book § 377. That statute provides in relevant part that any judgment rendered upon a default "(a) ... may be set aside ... upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good ... defense ... existed at the time of the rendition of the judgment ... and that the ... defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from ... making the defense." It further provides that "(b) [t]he complaint or written motion ... shall state in general terms the nature of the ... defense ...." (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 377 contains substantially similar language. It is thus clear that there is a two-pronged test to set aside a judgment rendered after a default. A.D.C. Contracting & Supply Corporation v. Thomas J. Riordan, Inc., supra, 176 Conn. 580-81, 409 A.2d 1027. There must be a showing that (1) a good defense, the nature of which must be set forth, existed at the time judgment was rendered The defendant's first claim is that the defense presented was sufficient as a matter of law to support his motion. This claim lacks merit. While admitting that the defense presented in his motion was "sketchy and brief," he argues it is sufficient, claiming that § 52-212 requires only that the moving party state "in general terms the nature of the ... defense" and that "[a] great deal is not required of the Defendant, only that a defense existed at the time of the rendition of the Judgment." There is no "showing"; Manchester State Bank v. Reale, supra, 172 Conn. 523, 375 A.2d 1009; that the defense asserted existed at the time of the judgment as the first prong of the test requires. While the nature of the defense may be stated in "general terms," this "showing" is critical. Significantly, at the hearing on the motion, the court inquired whether the plaintiff "had any correspondence with the defendant regarding either the liability or the payment?" The plaintiff's counsel indicated that she had had "telephone conversation with the defendant's attorney." Not once during that hearing did the defendant's counsel indicate the time when, with reference to the time the judgment was rendered, the defense now asserted had arisen. ⁴ In any event, mere lack of knowledge that a particular defense was available is insufficient cause for opening a judgment. Id. The claim that the defense presented was sufficient as a "matter of law" is, therefore, rejected.

                and (2) the party seeking to set aside the judgment was prevented from making that defense because of mistake, accident or other reasonable cause.   General Statutes § 52-212;  Practice Book § 377;   Kaplan & Jellinghaus v. Newfield Yacht Sales, Inc., 179 Conn. 290, 292, 426 A.2d 278 (1979);   Manchester State Bank v. Reale, 172 Conn. 520, 523, 375 A.2d 1009 (1977).   The plaintiff argues that the defendant's motion and accompanying affidavit do not satisfy either prong of the test and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.  " 'Whether proceeding under the common law or a statute, the action of a trial court in granting or refusing an application to open a judgment is, generally, within the judicial discretion of such court, [193 Conn. 132] and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its discretion.   See  Freccia v. Martin, 163 Conn. 160, 165, 302 A.2d 280 [1972];   Stocking v. Ives, 156 Conn. 70, 72, 238 A.2d 421 [1968];  46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 682.'   Manchester State Bank v. Reale, 172 Conn. 520, 523-24, 375 A.2d 1009 [1977];   Sebastiano v. Corde, 171 Conn. 324, 325, 370 A.2d 946 [1976].  General Statutes § 49-15.  'The denial of such relief to a party who has suffered a default judgment by his failure to defend properly should not be held an abuse of discretion where the failure to assert a defense was the result of the moving party's own negligence.'   Manchester State Bank v. Reale, supra, [172 Conn.] 524 [375 A.2d 1009];   Jaquith v. Revson, 159 Conn. 427, 431, 270 A.2d 559 [1970];   Jacobson v. Robington, 139 Conn. 532, 95 A.2d 66 [1953]."   Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Stage Harbor Corporation, 181 Conn. 141, 143-44, 434 A.2d 341 (1980);  see  Kaplan & Jellinghaus v. Newfield Yacht Sales, Inc., supra, 179 Conn. 293, 426 A.2d 278
                

The defendant next claims that General Statutes § 52-212 "requires" the court to "assume" the defense set out in the affidavit accompanying the motion to open to be "well pleaded" and that the test is whether the affidavit states a defense. He suggests, in advancing this argument, that a proper analogy may be made to a motion to strike, where...