Eastern Food Services v. Pontifical Catholic Univ.

Citation357 F.3d 1
Decision Date20 January 2004
Docket NumberNo. 02-2391.,02-2391.
PartiesEASTERN FOOD SERVICES, INC., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY SERVICES ASSOCIATION, INC., and Coca Cola Puerto Rico Bottlers, Inc., Defendants, Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Pedro Jiménez with whom Katarina Stipec-Rubio and Correa, Collazo, Herrero, Jiménez & Fortuño were on brief for appellant.

Luis A. Oliver-Fraticelli with whom Diego A. Ramos and Fiddler, González & Rodríguez PSC were on brief for appellee Pontifical Catholic University Services Association, Inc.

Néstor M. Méndez-Gómez with whom Oreste R. Ramos and Pietrantoni Méndez & Alvarez LLP were on brief for appellee Coca Cola Puerto Rico Bottlers.

Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and HOWARD, Circuit Judges.

BOUDIN, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal by Eastern Food Services, Inc. ("Eastern") from the dismissal of its antitrust suit. The defendants in the district court were Pontifical Catholic University of Puerto Rico Services Association Inc., ("University Services") and Coca Cola Puerto Rico Bottlers, Inc. ("Coca Cola"). Because dismissal was on the complaint, we take the factual allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of this appeal. Martin v. Applied Cellular Tech., Inc., 284 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.2002).

Eastern is a company based in San Juan, Puerto Rico, engaged in distributing food and beverage products in Puerto Rico; this includes sales through cafeteria operations and food and beverage machines. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Puerto Rico is a university based in Ponce, Puerto Rico; University Services is a related entity that provides ancillary services for the university and has control over its cafeteria and other food distribution points.

In 1997, Eastern and University Services entered into a three-year contract, extendable to five years, whereby Eastern agreed to operate the cafeteria at the university and was given, for specified payments, the exclusive concession (with a few narrow exceptions) for other food and beverage distribution inside the university. Eastern alleges that in 1998, in order to secure a donation from Coca Cola to the university, University Services allowed Coca Cola to place its own food and beverage machines on the campus and told Eastern to have the machines it was using removed.

There were negotiations between the parties as to this and other matters. Ultimately, University Services terminated the contract, claiming that Eastern had breached its provisions in various respects; Eastern made similar claims against University Services. Asserting that it made large investments in reliance upon the contract, Eastern brought the present suit in federal district court in 1999 against both University Services and Coca Cola.

Although the complaint asserts contract, tort, and other claims under local law (and University Services filed a counterclaim based on breach of contract), our concern is solely with Eastern's claim based upon section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). This claim alleged a conspiracy by the two defendants, through unfair business practices, to eliminate competition by Eastern in the supply of food and beverage service within the university. This was, according to the complaint, unlawful per se and under the rule of reason.

The district court dismissed the antitrust claim on the merits. The ruling most important to this appeal was that the complaint failed to allege a valid geographic market; the district judge said that Eastern's alleged geographic market — the university — was "extremely narrow" and not "large enough so as to constitute an economically significant area of commerce." The local law claims were dismissed without prejudice to their assertion in Puerto Rico's courts. This appeal followed.

Our review of a dismissal for failure to state a claim is de novo. Martin, 284 F.3d at 5-6. In addition to accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint, we draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Nevertheless, we conclude that this is essentially a contract dispute with possible attendant tort claims; and it is not a plausible antitrust case, however tempting may be the lure of treble damages and attorney's fees.

In substance, Eastern alleges that it had from the university, through its services auxiliary, something close to an exclusive contract to provide food services on the university campus, and that after receiving a large donation for the university from Coca Cola, University Services broke the contract in order to transfer to Coca Cola exclusive rights to a part of Eastern's domain, namely, the vending machine portion of the business on the campus. Indulging all inferences in favor of Eastern, we will assume that Coca Cola was complicit in the breach.

The line is not always clear between antitrust violations and ordinary business wrongs, such as breach of contract or tortious interference. Indeed, both antitrust and ordinary contract or tort claims may sometimes arise out of the same body of conduct, see Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 973 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078, 100 S.Ct. 1028, 62 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980); IIIA Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 782a (1996); imagine a near monopolist who burns down the plant of his only competitor. But antitrust claims are concerned not with wrongs directed against the private interest of an individual business but with conduct that stifles competition. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962).

From the outset, Eastern's description of what happened raises warning flags for anyone familiar with antitrust law. The university, like most landlords, controls who may set up shop on its premises. It could act as the sole on-campus supplier of food and beverages, allow multiple suppliers, or give exclusive access to one supplier. Here, before the dispute, Eastern was virtually the sole supplier of food and beverages; after, Coca Cola has exclusive control of the vending machine portion of the business.

In all events, antitrust doctrine does not operate by purely ad hoc judgments as to whether an action adds to or detracts from competition. Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes unlawful contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade and the courts have developed algorithms for implementing this generalization. The easiest way is for the plaintiff to show a "per se" violation, that is, that the challenged conduct falls within a small set of acts regarded by courts as sufficiently dangerous, and so clearly without redeeming value, that they are condemned out of hand — that is without a showing of wrongful purpose, power or effect. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940).

Almost the only important categories of agreements that reliably deserve this label today are those among competitors that amount to "naked" price fixing, output restriction, or division of customers or territories. Augusta News Co. v. Hudson News Co., 269 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir.2001).1 Agreements between a supplier and a buyer as to a minimum resale price remain per se unlawful, id., but that category is a narrow one. In this case Eastern invokes a different category of agreements sometimes labeled per se, namely, concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts. E.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-67, 61 S.Ct. 703, 85 L.Ed. 949 (1941).

As to this last category, the label is deceptive because lots of arrangements that might literally be described as agreements not to deal are not per se unlawful. A common arrangement that involves an agreement not to deal but is far from unlawful per se is the exclusive dealing contract (e.g., a sole supplier contract, a exclusive territorial franchise for an outlet). Such arrangements can be attacked under the rule of reason — i.e., on their facts — but are not per se violations. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327, 81 S.Ct. 623, 5 L.Ed.2d 580 (1961).

Those refusals to deal arrangements that are treated as per se violations are "horizontal," that is, they are agreements between competitors. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593-94 (1st Cir.1993). (Even then, not all such horizontal arrangements are subject to per se treatment or necessarily violate the antitrust laws, e.g., Northwest Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295-98, 105 S.Ct. 2613.). An entity that grants an exclusive franchise is ordinarily in a vertical, not a horizontal, relationship with the grantee. XI Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1800a (1998).

What is alleged here is nothing other than an exclusive dealing arrangement by which one supplier — Coca-Cola — is given the sole right by the university to supply and stock vending machines on campus.2 Eastern was itself the beneficiary of just such a contract — indeed, a broader one since it included other on-campus food distribution — until it was terminated. There might be circumstances in which exclusivity was unlawful for Coca-Cola but not for Eastern; but in neither case does such a contract fall into the category of a per se violation.

To show an antitrust violation in the transfer of exclusive rights from Eastern to Coca Cola, Eastern had to commit itself to show that the new arrangement would have anti-competitive effects outweighing the legitimate economic advantages that it might provide. U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 595; see Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 885, 123 S.Ct. 118, 154 L.Ed.2d 144 (2002). This is usually a demanding and fact-intensive process, cf. Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 329, 81 S.Ct. 623, which is why plaintiffs almost always allege a per se violation where they can do so. But plaintiffs are free to urge per se and non-per se theories at the same time. U.S. Healthcare, ...

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