Eastis v. Beasley

• Decision Date: 27 May 1926
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 590
• Parties: EASTIS et al. v. BEASLEY et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

108 So. 763

214 Ala. 651

EASTIS et al. v. BEASLEY et al.

6 Div. 590

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 27, 1926

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; W.M. Walker, Judge.

Bill in equity by W.L. Beasley and others against D.T. Eastis and others. From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill respondents appeal. Affirmed.

Ritter Wynn & Carmichael, of Birmingham, for appellants.

Smyer &amp Smyer, of Birmingham, for appellees.

GARDNER J.

Appellees filed this bill against appellants, seeking specific performance of a certain "option contract" for the sale of lands in Jefferson county, Ala., and, from a decree overruling the demurrer to the bill, respondents have prosecuted this appeal. The contract which forms the basis of this suit appears in the report of the case. It was executed June 8, 1923, by one Isham Eastis, and granted to these complainants in consideration of the payment of $500 "the option or right until the 1st day of August, 1923," to purchase the real estate therein specifically described, upon definite terms stipulated. The contract here in question, signed by Isham Eastis only, is unilateral in form, but the election of the other parties thereto (these complainants) within the period therein provided, to treat it as binding, and to enforce it, meets all the requirements of the rule as to mutuality, entitling them to the equitable remedy of specific performance. Ross v. Parks, 93 Ala. 153, 8 So. 368, 11 L.R.A. 148, 30 Am.St.Rep. 47; Blackburn v. McLaughlin, 202 Ala. 434, 80 So. 818; Bethea v. McCullough, 195 Ala. 480, 70 So. 680; 36 Cyc.

As previously noted, the time limit of complainants' option was August 1, 1923. It appears from the bill that, before the expiration of that time, said Eastis died, leaving a will which had not yet been admitted to probate. This bill was filed, also, before the expiration of the period allowed by the contract for the exercise of the option, and all the heirs at law, as well as devisees under the will and those named as executors thereunder, were made parties respondent, and, it appearing that a special administrator had been appointed of the estate since the filing of the bill, such administrator was made a party by amendment to the bill. Thus are all parties owning or asserting any claim or title to the property made parties to the bill.

It is urged that complainants did not sufficiently manifest acceptance of the contract either to Eastis during his life or to his successors in interest after his death, so as to constitute the contract mutually binding. Aside from the reasons therefor stated in the bill as an excuse for lack of notice of acceptance, the rulings of this court have established the rule that the filing of the bill within the period of time specified, and offering to do and perform all matters condition precedent to the full consummation of the contract, suffices as a sufficient acceptance and meets all the requirements of the rule. "But it will be observed that, when such contracts come to be enforced in equity, they cease to be unilateral, for, upon filing the bill, the party who was before unbound puts himself under all the obligations of the contract. By his own act he makes the contract mutual, and the other party is enabled to enforce it." Richards v. Green, 23 N.J.Eq. 536, quoted approvingly in Blackburn v. McLaughlin, 202 Ala. 434, 80 So. 818.

It follows, of course, that, Eastis having died before the expiration of the period fixed by the contract for the exercise of the option, notice of acceptance to him was not necessary.

It is further argued that the contract being a mere option, and binding only upon Eastis, was uneforceable after his death; the same not having been accepted during his lifetime. We are of the opinion the following from Ross v. Parks, 93 Ala. 153, 8 So. 368, 11 L.R.A. 148, 30 Am.St.Rep. 47, suffices as an answer to this insistence:

"It may be stated as a sound principle of law, if an owner of land in writing gives another an option on it for a valuable consideration, whether

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