Eastman v. United States
| Decision Date | 15 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-mc-00023 RB/KK |
| Parties | JOHN EASTMAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff John Eastman's Amended Motion for Return of Seized Property Under Fed. R Crim. P. 41(g) and Request for Injunctive and Other Relief filed on July 8, 2022. (Doc. 6.) Eastman alleges that federal agents violated his constitutional rights when they served a search warrant on him on June 22, 2022, and seized his phone. He asks the Court to order the Government to return his phone, or alternatively, to enter a temporary restraining order (TRO) requesting that the Government take no action with his phone until the Court has ruled on the issues he raises in this lawsuit. In this Opinion, the Court takes up Eastman's request for a TRO. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the Court will deny the TRO and enter a briefing schedule order on Eastman's remaining requests.
Federal Agents served a warrant on Eastman on June 22, 2022, as he exited a restaurant. (See Doc. 6 at 8.) The warrant authorized agents to search “[t]he person of John Eastman and the area within his immediate control, including any clothing, garments, bags, or personal effects.” (Doc. 6-1 at 2.) The warrant described the things to be seized as “[a]ny electronic or digital devices-including cell phones, USB devices, iPads, and computers identified in the affidavit- and all information in such devices.” (Id. at 3.) Pursuant to the warrant, agents seized Eastman's iPhone Pro 12. (Doc. 6 at 8.) Eastman “was forced to provide biometric data to open said phone” and “was not provided a copy of the warrant until after his phone was seized ....” (Id.) Eastman, who is an attorney as well as the client of an attorney in litigation pending outside of this district, asserts that his phone contains material protected by the First and Sixth Amendments. (See id. at 8, 18-20.)
Eastman filed a Motion for Return of Property Under [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 41(g) in this Court on June 27, 2022. (Doc. 1.) He served a summons on the United States on July 5, 2022, and its answer is due on September 6, 2022. (See Doc. 3.) See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(2). The Government has not yet entered an appearance; accordingly, it has not received notice through CM/ECF of the motion under consideration.[1] (See Notice of Electronic Filing attached to Doc. 6.)
“The requirements for a TRO issuance are essentially the same as those for a preliminary injunction order.” People's Tr. Fed. Credit Union v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 350 F.Supp.3d 1129, 1138 (D.N.M. 2018) (citations omitted). “The primary differences between a TRO and a preliminary injunction are that a TRO may issue without notice to the opposing party and that TROs are limited in duration.” Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)). “In both cases, however, injunctive relief is an ‘extraordinary remedy,' and the movant must demonstrate a ‘clear and unequivocal right' to have a request granted.” Id. (citations omitted).
“To establish its right to preliminary relief under rule 65(b), a moving party must demonstrate that ‘immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result' unless a court issues the order.” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)). Thus, Eastman must establish: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that [he] will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) the balance of equities is in [his] favor; and (4) the preliminary injunction is in the public interest.” See Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. “The likelihood-of-success and irreparable-harm factors are ‘the most critical' in the analysis. Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 455 F.Supp.3d 1100, 1132 (D.N.M. 2020) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). “It is insufficient, moreover, that a moving party demonstrate that there is only a ‘possibility' of either success on the merits or irreparable harm.” Id. (quoting Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2016)).
“[T]he limited purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held ....” Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the exception rather than the rule.” Mrs. Fields Franchising, LLC v. MFGPC, 941 F.3d 1221, 1232 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “[B]ecause a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the movant's right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne, 698 F.3d 1295, 1301 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
Eastman seeks a TRO to prohibit the Government from taking “action with respect to [his] phone and data (or any copies already made) until the issues animating this motion can be worked out.”[2] (Doc. 6 at 28-29.) Because Eastman has not established a likelihood of success on the merits of his constitutional claims or an unequivocal right to relief from an immediate, irreparable injury, the Court finds that the temporary restraining order should be denied but will order briefing on the motion for preliminary injunction.
Eastman argues that the agents' seizure of his phone violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. (See Doc. 6.)
Eastman argues that the phone contains information protected by the First Amendment right to political association. (Doc. 6 at 19-20.) In support of this claim, he cites a civil case to which he is a party in the Central District of California. (Id.) There, Eastman sued “Chapman University and the [Select Committee to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol (‘Select Committee')] to block a subpoena to Chapman seeking Dr. Eastman's documents relating to the 2020 election and the January 6th Capitol attacks.” Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-CV-00099 DOC/DFM, 2022 WL 1407965, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022). He applied for a TRO and moved for a preliminary injunction, claiming that the subpoena violated his rights under the First and Fourth Amendments and authorized seizure of documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege. Id. Given that Eastman filed the complaint on January 20, 2022, and his response to the subpoena was due the following day, the Court granted the TRO through January 24, 2022, “to allow thoughtful decision-making on the merits.” Id. at *4. On January 25, 2022, the court denied the motion for preliminary injunction, noting that Congress's interest in understanding the events of January 6 attack on the Capitol and the related “public interest . . . is weighty and urgent.” See id. at *8. Notably, Eastman “identified neither any specific associational interest threatened by production of [the disputed emails], nor any particular harm likely to result from their production.” Id. His summary argument “that the subpoena [was] a ‘clear effort to chill the speech' of the Select Committee's ‘political adversaries'” fell flat. Id.
Similarly, here, Eastman generally points to emails that he claims are protected by a First Amendment right to political association. Yet he acknowledges the Supreme Court's holding “that disclosure is only appropriate when there is ‘a sufficiently important governmental interest.'” Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-00099, Doc. 356 at 22 (quoting Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S.Ct. 2373, 2383 (2021) (plurality opinion)); see also Rio Grande Found. v. City of Santa Fe, 437 F.Supp.3d 1051, 1062 (D.N.M. 2020), appeal dismissed sub nom., 7 F.4th 956 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom., 142 S.Ct. 1670 (2022) (“Compelled disclosures must survive exacting scrutiny - there must be a substantial relationship between the governmental interest and the information that must be disclosed.”) (citations omitted). The undersigned agrees with my colleague's opinion in the Central District of California: The Government's interest in investigating the January 6 attacks on the Capitol is substantial. See Rio Grande Found., 437 F.Supp.3d at 1062 () ). Because Eastman has not identified “any specific associational interest . . . nor any particular harm likely to result from” disclosure of information on his phone, see Eastman, 2022 WL 1307965, at *8, he has not met his burden to show a likelihood of success on a violation of his rights under the First Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment requires warrants to “particularly describ[e] the places to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Eastman contends that the warrant here violated his Fourth Amendment rights because (1) it did not describe the items to be seized with particularity; (2) the authorization for “all information in such devices” is overbroad; and (3) the warrant did not mention any criminal activity for which evidence was sought. (Doc. 6 at 10.) The Court finds that Eastman has not met his burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits on this issue.
To establish that the warrant is invalid on its face, Eastman relies primarily on United States v....
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