Easton v. College of Lake County

• Citation: 584 F.Supp.2d 1069
• Decision Date: 10 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07 CV 6127.,07 CV 6127.
• Parties: Marlaina EASTON, Plaintiff, v. COLLEGE OF LAKE COUNTY, Dr. Jean Kartje and Board of Trustees of the College of Lake County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

584 F.Supp.2d 1069

Marlaina EASTON, Plaintiff, v. COLLEGE OF LAKE COUNTY, Dr. Jean Kartje and Board of Trustees of the College of Lake County, Defendants.

No. 07 CV 6127.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

July 10, 2008.

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Robert V. Gildo, Law Offices of Robert V. Gildo, Wheaton, IL, for Plaintiff.

Lynn Urkov Thorpe, Elizabeth A. McDuffie, Gonzalez, Saggio and Harlan, L.L.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN W. DARRAH, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Marlaina Easton ("Easton"), filed suit against the Defendants College of Lake County ("the College"), Dr. Jean Kartje ("Dr.Kartje"), and the Board of Trustees of the College of Lake County ("the Board") alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and disability in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101¹ et seq. ("ADA"), the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Illinois Constitutions, and 775 ILCS 5/1-101. Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

BACKGROUND

A reading of Plaintiff's Complaint supports the following summary of the alleged conduct of the parties.

Easton is an English Professor in the Communication Arts Division of the College of Lake County. Easton is of African-American and Puerto Rican decent and suffers from Multiple Sclerosis. The College is a state owned and operated college in Grayslake, Illinois. The Board is the governing body of the College. Dr. Kartje was the Dean of the Communication Arts Division of the College from about August 2004 to July 2007 and, during that time, was the direct supervisor of Easton.

From 2001 to 2003, the Dean of the Communication Arts Department was Dr. Sandria Rodriquez, who hired Easton. From 2001 to 2003, Easton received excellent evaluations of her work and was recognized for her efforts in working with developmental students of color and students with disabilities. During this time period, her Multiple Sclerosis was under control, and she was a productive member of the faculty. At no time during this period did she exceed the permitted absences allowed under her contract. Easton was on a tenure track that would allow her to reach tenure in 2004, and she did become a tenured teacher in 2004.

On or about August 2004, Dr. Kartje was hired as the Dean of the Communication Arts Department. During the period from August 2004 to July 2006, Dr. Kartje engaged in various acts of harassment and discrimination against Easton, including: docking her pay without cause for a justifiable absence, accusing her of excessive absenteeism despite her absences not being excessive under the standards of her contract, denying her a column movement (an earned pay increase) and refusing to reimburse her for her PhD classes, requiring her to notify Dr. Kartje if she would be out of her office for more than fifteen minutes, misrepresenting her absences to the Board, and restricting her teaching for the summer to online classes, which did not allow her to have contact with her developmental students. Additionally, Dr. Kartje told Easton that the developmental students were not worthy of a full-time faculty or her time, chastised her for having an illness that causes her to be absent "all of the time," and responded to Easton's complaints about this treatment by telling her, "You are an excellent teacher, but you do not fit into the College of Lake County Community." Dr. Kartje did not require notification when leaving the office, nor dock pay for justifiable absences, nor refuse column movement and PhD reimbursement for other similarly situated professors who were white and did not suffer from a disability. Easton reported this behavior to the Board, its Vice-President, and the head of human resources for the College on several occasions between August 2004 and July 2006, but no action was taken to correct this conduct. Dr. Kartje's treatment of Easton progressively worsened after these complaints to the Board in apparent retaliation for Easton's complaints.

As a result of the treatment she received from Dr. Kartje, Easton's medical condition deteriorated. She suffered from anxiety that exacerbated her Multiple Sclerosis and many physical symptoms, such as tightening in her chest, canker sores, inability to hold down food, rapid weight loss, general numbness in her body, visual impairment including a loss of peripheral vision, and some hearing loss. In August 2006, due to her worsening medical condition, Easton was forced, on advice of her doctor, to take a one-year medical leave of absence from the College. Dr, Kartje's employment with the College was terminated in July 2007, and in July 2007, Easton returned to her position at the College. Thereafter, Easton has continued to do her job and has had no return of medical symptoms.

On August 1, 2006 Easton filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that the College discriminated against her because of her race, national origin, and disability and that they retaliated against her after she made complaints to the Board. On August 3, 2007, Easton received notice from the EEOC of her right to sue and filed the complaint with this court within 90 days thereof.

ANALYSIS

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under which relief can be granted under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel, Ind., 361 F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir.2004). Federal Rule 8(a)(2) requires that the complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." In order to meet 8(a)(2)'s requirements, the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail "in order to `give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests [.]'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (Bell Atlantic) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). "Second, its allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a `speculative level'; if they do not, the plaintiff pleads itself out of court." E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Serv. Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.2007) (citing Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1973).

Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To bring a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of a constitutional right, a plaintiff must allege that a state or municipal actor, acting under color of law, violated a federal law or constitutional right and that the impermissible government action caused the denial of that right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981).

Defendants assert that all claims arising prior to October 30, 2005 should be time barred. The statute of limitations for a suit under § 1983 follows the statute of limitations for a personal injury tort in the state in which the violation occurred. Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir.2006) (Savory). In Illinois, the statute of limitations for a personal injury claim is two years. 725 ILCS 5/13-202; Kelly v. City of Chicago, 4 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1993), Plaintiff argues that the actions complained of are part of a continuing violation that should not be barred by the two-year statute of limitations. In construing the continuing-violation doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that there are two kinds of discriminatory actions: (1) discrete discriminatory acts and (2) acts contributing to a hostile work environment. National Railroad Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (Morgan). The Plaintiff here has plausibly pled a claim of hostile work environment. Moreover, actions such as denial of transfer, refusal to promote or refusal to hire are discrete discriminatory acts. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 2061. Discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time-barred even if they are related to timely filed charges of later acts. Morgan; 536 U.S. at 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061.

The Seventh Circuit has found the existence of a continuing violation in the cases Plaintiff cites: Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, (7th Cir.1995); Hardin v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 167 F.3d 340, (7th Cir.1999). However, the Seventh Circuit has since made it clear that the continuing-violation doctrine is only applicable where the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to perceive the violation before the statutory period has run. Savory 469 F.3d at 673. The Seventh Circuit has further acknowledged that Morgan forecloses the use of the continuing-violation doctrine for discrete discriminatory acts in Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dept. of Natural Resources, 347 F.3d 1014, 1026 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that in cases alleging a claim regarding discriminatory pay, each paycheck represents a new violation that starts a separate clock on the statute of limitations). Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007) (Ledbetter), held that if an employer engages is a series of acts, each of which is intentionally discriminatory, then a fresh violation occurs when each act is committed. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618, 127 S.Ct. at 2169, 167 L.Ed.2d 982.

The actions Plaintiff complains of— denying column movement, refusing to reimburse her for PhD classes, restricting her to online teaching, docking her pay, requiring notification if she leaves the office, and the statements made by Dr. Kartje on several occasions—as pled, are both...