Easton v. Fessenden, 8251.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Citation14 A.2d 508
Docket NumberNo. 8251.,8251.
PartiesEASTON v. FESSENDEN.
Decision Date16 July 1940

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Jeremiah E. O'Connell, Presiding Justice.

Proceeding by Charles R. Easton, executor, against Mary L. Fessenden, administratrix, wherein plaintiff filed a petition, as executor of the will of Agnes A. Fessenden, deceased, for an allowance and setoff to plaintiff, as executor, of the household furniture and effects of Russell F. Fessenden, deceased. The petition was denied by the superior court, and plaintiff brings exception.

Exception overruled, and case remitted to superior court for further proceedings.

Charles R. Easton, of Providence, for appellant.

Tillinghast, Collins & Tanner and Henry W. Rigby, all of Providence, for appellee.

CAPOTOSTO, Justice.

This case is before us on the appellant's single exception to the decision of a justice of the superior court, sitting without a jury, denying appellant's petition, as executor of the will of Agnes A. Fessenden, for an allowance and set-off to him, as such executor, of the household furniture and effects of the late Russell F. Fessenden, husband of the said Agnes A. Fessenden.

The facts are undisputed. Russell F. Fessenden, of the town of Cumberland, died intestate in 1907, leaving a widow, Agnes A. Fessenden, and an adult son, Benjamin F. Fessenden, husband of Mary L. Fessenden. No administrator of Russell's estate being appointed, his widow remained in possession of his personal property until her death in March, 1938. She left a will naming the appellant as executor, and he duly qualified as such executor in April of that year.

Russell's son, Benjamin, died testate in 1915. The appellee, his widow, is the executrix of and sole beneficiary under his will. Shortly after the appointment and qualification of the appellant as executor under the will of Agnes A. Fessenden, the appellee was named and qualified as administratrix of Russell's estate. Thereafter certain proceedings were had in the probate court for the town of Cumberland concerning the personal property in Russell's estate which had remained in the possession of his widow, Agnes, from the time of his death in 1907 to her death in 1938. The instant case is the result of those proceedings.

The appellant's contention, in substance, is that, under General Laws 1938, chapter 577, § 6, which has remained unchanged since 1905, Court and Practice Act, § 871, his testatrix, Agnes A. Fessenden, was entitled in her own right to the household effects of her deceased husband, Russell F. Fessenden, and that her right to such personal property could be defeated only at the instance of Russell's creditors. The appellee takes an opposite position, contending that, subject to the rights of creditors, Russell's household effects were part of his estate to be administered in accordance with our law of descent and distribution governing personal property, unless the household effects or some portion thereof were, upon application by the widow in her lifetime, set off to her by the probate court.

The section upon which these conflicting contentions rest is as follows: "§ 6. The wearing apparel of the widow and minor children of a deceased person shall belong to them, respectively. The widow shall be entitled, for herself and for the family under her care, to such household effects, supplies, and, in addition thereto, such other personal property of the husband, exempt from attachment by law, as the probate court shall deem necessary, having regard to all the circumstances of the case; or, if there is no widow, the minor children shall be entitled to the same, or the use thereof, in such manner as the court shall direct."

This statute is in derogation of the common law and, therefore, must be understood as effecting no change in that law beyond what is clearly indicated in express terms or by necessary implication. Michael v. McGovern, 56 R.I. 133, 184 A. 571. A statute is to be construed with reference to its intended scope in order to carry out the apparent objects and purposes of the legislature. Romoli v. Motta, 59 R.I. 201, 205, 194 A. 733; Blais v. Franklin, 31 R.I. 95, 77 A. 172. Whenever the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, such reasonable interpretation will be adopted as will best carry out the evident purposes of the statute. Art Metal Construction Co. v. Knight, 56 R.I. 228, 235, 185 A. 136. Long acquiescence in a particular construction of a statute, though not controlling in the absence of cases in which the point is specifically raised, is entitled to serious consideration. Probate Court of East Providence v. McCormick, 56 R.I. 308, 321, 185 A. 592.

The statute in question here appears in substantially the same form in P.L. 1798, pp. 288, 289, sec. 2. To our knowledge this is the first time since that date that the contention which the appellant makes in the instant case has come before this court. We cannot ascribe such a situation to oversight or lack of ingenuity on the part of the members of the bar; on the contrary, their inaction over the years is strong evidence that they considered the right which the appellant claims in this case as purely personal to the widow and minor children.

This § 6, chap. 577, G.L. 1938, now before us, is the first of four sections under the second main subdivision of that chapter, which is entitled: "Allowance To Widows, Minor Children And Family Of Deceased." Throughout these sections the statute speaks only of the widow and minor children of a deceased person without any reference whatsoever to their executors, administrators or assigns. The language of these sections, especially when considered in connection with other coordinate statutory provisions, makes it evident that the legislature intended to assist the widow and family of a deceased person in the widow's lifetime, and not to benefit her estate after her death. See G.L.1938, c. 578, § 33, and c. 569, § 1. See also P.L. 1939, chap. 664, § 1.

In arguing for his contention, the appellant does violence to the language of the legislature in the second sentence of § 6. He makes the first clause of that sentence read: "The widow shall be entitled, for herself and for the family under her care, to such household effects", and entirely disregards all the rest of that sentence. With this as a premise, he seizes upon the word "entitled" and construes that word as vesting in the widow a property right in the household effects, and then concludes that this right passes to her executor or administrator upon her death, subject only to the rights of creditors of her deceased husband.

Said § 6 does not merely say that the widow shall be entitled to certain property it says that she shall be entitled "to such household effects, supplies, and, in addition thereto, such other personal property of the husband * * * as the probate court shall deem necessary, having regard to all the circumstances of the case." The statute of 1798. supra, provided that the widow was entitled to such "household goods as the Court of Probate shall determine necessary according to her situation and the circumstances of the estate." This provision was retained without substantial change...

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    ...legislative intent, we consider statutory language in its contextual relation to the section as a whole. Easton v. Fessenden, 65 R.I. 259, 264, 14 A.2d 508, 511 (1940); see Flanagan v. Pierce Chevrolet, Inc., R.I., 410 A.2d 428 (1980); Deignan v. Cowan Plastics Products Corporation, 99 R.I.......
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    ...ensure the accomplishment of the purposes for which such acts are passed. Nunes v. Town of Bristol, R.I., 232 A.2d 775; Easton v. Fessenden, 65 R.I. 259, 14 A.2d 508. Relative to this aim, we have declared recently that we will not allow ourselves to be blindly enslaved to the literal readi......
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    ...express terms or by necessary implication." Da Costa v. Rose, 70 R.I. 163, 168, 37 A.2d 794, 797 (R.I. 1944); Easton v. Fessenden, 65 R.I. 259, 262, 14 A.2d 508, 510 (R.I. 1940). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet to address whether § 6A-3-419 displaces a negligence cause of action. A n......
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