Easton v. United States

• Decision Date: 25 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-397.,86-397.
• Citation: 533 A.2d 904
• Parties: John L. EASTON, Jr., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 904

533 A.2d 904

John L. EASTON, Jr., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 86-397.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted April 23, 1987.

Decided November 25, 1987.

Jan Schneider, Washington, D.C., appointed by this court, was on the brief, for appellant.

Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., with whom Michael W. Farrell, John H. Palmer, Jr., and Joan C. Barton, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before MACK, NEWMAN and BELSON, Associate Judges.

BELSON, Associate Judge:

Appellant was charged with armed robbery, D.C.Code §§ 22-2901, -3202 (1981 & 1987 Supp.); kidnapping while armed, D.C. Code §§ 22-2101, -3202 (1981 & 1987 Supp.); and unauthorized use of a vehicle, D.C.Code § 22-3815 (1987 Supp.). He was tried before a jury and found guilty on all counts. Appellant asks this court to overturn his convictions on the ground that the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding a prior crime of which he had been convicted. We agree, reverse, and remand for a new trial.

I.

At trial, the court admitted evidence regarding appellant's prior crime as tending to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes charged, based on the similarities between those crimes and the prior crime. Thus, it is necessary to discuss the facts of both incidents in some detail.

We turn first to the facts of the case now before us. On June 21, 1983, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Raymond Martin, a parttime driver for the Diamond Cab Association, was dispatched to pick up a fare at the Adams Printing Company in the 1200 block of K Street, N.W. When he arrived, a man whom Martin later identified in court as appellant approached the cab, said that he had called for it, got into the back seat, and asked to be driven to the 700 block of Delaware Avenue, S.W. As the journey proceeded, the passenger engaged in some general conversation with Martin, indicating that he had just gotten off work at the printing company and discussing some chemicals used in the printing process.

When they arrived at the requested destination, appellant stated that he did not have any money but that he could get some from his sister in an apartment nearby. He then went into the apartment building, and then returned a few minutes later to say that his sister was not at home and that he needed to return to near the place where he had been picked up in order to get a key.

When the cab reached the 1200 block of Twelfth Street, N.W., appellant asked Martin to stop. A man standing in front of a building approached the cab and entered its right front seat. Appellant then told Martin to return to Southwest.

When they arrived again at Delaware Avenue, appellant leaned forward, put a knife to Martin's throat, directed him into the parking lot of a church, and ordered him to hand over his money. Martin gave appellant less than twenty-five dollars. Appellant and the other passenger accused Martin of lying about the amount of money he had and proceeded to ransack the cab, searching for more.

The passengers ordered Martin out of the cab, holding him at knifepoint while they searched the trunk. Still unable to find anything, they threatened to "finish him off." They then forced Martin into the back seat of the cab, where appellant continued to hold a knife against his rib cage. The second passenger took the wheel of the cab and proceeded to drive in a meandering course through Southwest, all the while continuing to threaten Martin that they would "finish him off."

Finally, about one hour after the ordeal began, the attackers pulled the cab into an alley on Thirteenth Street just south of Logan Circle, N.W. The two men wiped unspecified portions of the cab with a rag and fled on foot, leaving Martin behind. Martin called the cab dispatcher, reported of the robbery, and asked that the police be summoned.

The police arrived within five minutes, took a report, and dusted the cab for fingerprints. Two of the fingerprints, one lifted from the right rear door and the other from a book inside the cab, later were matched with those of appellant and formed the basis for his arrest warrant.

Prior to trial, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding the government's intention to offer evidence of a 1981 robbery of which appellant had been convicted, for the purpose of establishing appellant's identity as Martin's robber. The government argued that the circumstances of the prior crime were so similar to the instant crime that there was a "reasonable probability that the same person committed both crimes," and thus that the evidence was admissible under the "identity exception" set forth in Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 16, 331 F.2d 85, 90 (1964). The court ruled that the testimony could be admitted.

Pursuant to the court's ruling, the government adduced the testimony of Thurston Plummer, a part-time driver for the Imperial Cab Company. Plummer stated that between 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. on February 10, 1981, appellant approached him at a cab stand at the Flagship Restaurant in Southwest Washington. At first, Plummer told appellant that the cab was not available. After appellant told Plummer that he worked at the Flagship and had difficulty getting a cab there, however, Plummer agreed to take appellant to the 700 block of I Street, N.E. During the ride, appellant and Plummer conversed about appellant's family. Appellant asked Plummer if cab drivers were permitted to carry guns, to which Plummer replied that he did not carry one.

When they arrived at appellant's destination, appellant reached in his back pocket and said that he must have left his wallet at work. He pointed to a nearby house, saying that he lived there and would go in and get the money for the fare.

Suddenly, appellant put a sharp instrument to Plummer's throat and said "Okay Pop, give it up." Appellant reached into Plummer's shirt pocket and jacket pocket and took a few dollar bills and some change. He then told Plummer to leave as soon as he (appellant) exited the cab or he would "blow him away" with a German Luger. Appellant left the cab, and Plummer drove to a police station.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.

II.

It is well established that evidence of one crime is generally inadmissible to prove the defendant's disposition to commit another crime or to show the defendant's bad character, criminal temperament, or propensity toward criminal behavior. See Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52, 56 (D.C.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 464, 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986) and cases cited therein; E. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (3d ed. 1984); 1A. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 57 (Tillers rev. 1983).

Exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility, however, have been allowed when the evidence is admitted for some substantial, legitimate purpose. Five major exceptions have been recognized in this jurisdiction:

(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of the one tends to establish the other, and; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.

Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App.D.C. at 16, 331 F.2d at 90.

Although evidence may come in under one or more of these exceptions, the claimed exception must, of course, bear upon a contested issue. Furthermore, because there is substantial risk that the evidence will unfairly prejudice the defendant, there must be a "reasonable need for the evidence" and it must promise "a real contribution in the process of proof." Bittle v. United States, 410 A.2d 1383, 1387 (D.C. 1980) (per curiam) (quoting Bradley v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 7, 13, 433 F.2d 1113, 1119 (1969)). As we stated in Willcher v. United States, 408 A.2d 67 (D.C. 1979):

To assess the probativeness and relevance of a prior incident, two threshold determinations must be made: (1) was an issue raised on which other crimes evidence could be received; and (2) was the proffered evidence relevant to that issue. Whether an issue has been raised for purposes of receiving other crimes evidence depends upon both the elements of the offense charged and the defense presented.

Id. at 75. It is also necessary that the trial court take prophylactic measures to ensure that the jury does not confuse the two incidents. See Gates v. United States, 481 A.2d 120, 124 (D.C. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S.Ct. 1772, 84 L.Ed.2d 832 (1985).

It is obvious that the evidence here was offered to prove a contested issue. The identity of Martin's attacker was the only issue in controversy, and evidence that tended to prove that identity was unquestionably material and relevant. Furthermore, to the extent that the evidence was probative of that issue, we are satisfied that there was a reasonable need for it. Even though the presence of appellant's fingerprints on the taxi door and on a book inside the taxi was strong evidence of appellant's guilt, its force was diminished somewhat by the fact that there was no evidence of when the prints had been placed there. Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, other evidence of appellant's guilt did not undermine the government's need for the evidence in question, since the government bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Likewise, we are satisfied that the trial court's prophylactic measures were sufficient to make it clear to the jury that the sole purpose of the evidence was to establish identity and not to allow it to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the defendant. The trial court admitted the evidence only after careful consideration following pretrial briefing and argument, and instructed the jury about its limited use before opening statements, after testimony was presented, and in final jury instructions at the close of the trial.

III.

However, it is on the...