Eastridge v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 12 March 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 00-3045 (RMC).
• Citation: Eastridge v. U.S., 602 F.Supp.2d 66 (D. D.C. 2009)
• Parties: Joseph Wayne EASTRIDGE, et al., Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

602 F.Supp.2d 66

Joseph Wayne EASTRIDGE, et al., Petitioners, v.UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 00-3045 (RMC).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

March 12, 2009.

Andrew B. Weissman, Brent J. Gurney, Joel Andrew Nichols, Mark M. Oh, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Patrick M. Regan, Paul J. Cornoni, Regan Zambri & Long, PLLC, Washington, DC, John Kenneth Zwerling, Zwerling, Leibig & Moseley, PC, Alexandria, VA, for Petitioners.

Carolyn K. Kolben, U.S. Attorney's Office, Janice Traver, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, District Judge.

After serving decades in prison for a murder they did not commit, PetitionersJoseph Wayne Eastridge, Joseph N. Sousa, and the Estate of Salvatore Infantolino, a.k.a. Michael A. Damien, now petition for a Certificate of Innocence so that they can proceed with wrongful conviction claims before the United States Court of Federal Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495,2513.In its habeas opinion, this Court found "that this is the rare case in which Petitioners can prove their `actual innocence' of the crime charged as well as violations of their constitutional rights at trial."Eastridge v. United States,372 F.Supp.2d 26, 29(D.D.C.2005).The United States opposes the petition, asserting that Petitioners are ineligible because they brought about their own prosecution by engaging in misconduct.The United States also argues that Mr. Damien's petition should be denied because he did not, and could not, receive habeas relief from the Court inasmuch as he had died in 2002, before the Court's decision.The Court agrees that it did not formally adjudicate Mr. Damien's innocence and it cannot, therefore, issue a Certificate of Innocence to his Estate.The Court will otherwise grant the petitions of Messrs. Eastridge and Sousa.

I.FACTS

Johnnie Battle, a Black man, was horribly stabbed to death by a group of White men in 1976 because of racial animus and alcohol.The crime occurred near Wisconsin Avenue and Ellicott Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. Its racial overtones immediately captured the intense attention of the entire city.

Decedent Michael A. Damien, Joseph W. Eastridge, Stephen C. Jones, and Joseph N. Sousa were convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia of first degree murder, while armed.Mr. Jones did not appeal his conviction.Messrs. Damien, Eastridge, and Sousa pursued— individually and collectively—numerous appeals for the entire time they were incarcerated.Mr. Damien died on December 10, 2002, while incarcerated at the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary.Mr. Sousa served twenty years in jail before being released on parole.Mr. Eastridge served twenty-nine years (including time for a prison assault on a guard) before being released on parole.For reasons fully explained in its earlier opinion, this Court granted the writ of habeas corpus to Messrs. Eastridge and Sousa under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.SeeEastridge,372 F.Supp.2d at 29.The Court found them innocent of murder as principals and innocent of aiding and abetting.It also determined that the rule imposed by the trial judge regarding cross-examination and introduction of evidence violated their constitutional rights.Finally, it found that the prosecution had failed to release Grand Jury transcripts that contained exculpatory testimony, in violation of Brady v. Maryland,373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215(1963).The Court then set aside their convictions.In its decision, the Court commented that "Mr. Damien, a co-petitioner at the time initial briefing was completed, passed away on December 9, 2002.As a result, the habeas record and briefs do not focus on him.Presumably, the same analysis would apply."SeeEastridge,372 F.Supp.2d at 29 n. 3.The Government filed a notice of appeal of the grant of habeas relief but then withdrew it.See Gov. Notice of Interlocutory Appeal [Dkt. #67] and Dismissal Order [Dkt. # 68].

On April 17, 2008, Petitioners filed their Motion for Certificate of Innocence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2513, the Unjust Conviction Act.In order to receive compensation based on an unjust conviction, a petitioner must prove:

(1) His conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the offense of which he was convicted, or on new trial or rehearing he was found not guilty of such offense, as appears from the record or certificate of the court setting aside or reversing such conviction ... and

(2)He did not commit any of the acts charged or his acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, and he did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution.

28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1) & (2)."A petitioner has the burden of proof showing an entitlement to the certificate," while "a district court judge has broad discretion in deciding whether or not to issue such a certificate."Humphrey v. United States,52 Fed.Cl. 593, 597(Fed.Cl.2002), aff'd,60 Fed.Appx. 292(Fed.Cir.2003)(citations omitted).

Ideal justice would seem to require that in the rare and unusual instances in which a person has served the whole or part of a term or imprisonment, is later found to be entirely innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, should receive some redress.On the other hand, reversals in criminal cases are more frequently had on the ground of insufficiency of proof or on the question as to whether the facts charged and proven constituted an offense under some statute.Consequently, it would be necessary to separate from the group of persons whose convictions have been reversed, those few who are in fact innocent of any offense whatever.

Burgess v. United States,20 Cl.Ct. 701, 704(Cl.Ct.1990)

II.ANALYSIS

The United States does not dispute that Petitioners fulfill the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1): their convictions were reversed on the ground that they were not guilty of the offense of which they were convicted.It also does not dispute that they"did not commit any of the acts charged," as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2).It concentrates its argument on the last provision of § 2513(a)(2) and argues that both Petitioners, in varying ways, engaged in misconduct that caused or brought about their own prosecution.Petitioners dispute the government's interpretation of the statute and its analysis of the facts.

A.Statutory Interpretation

The Government argues that Section 2513(a)(2) is not satisfied because Petitioners' "actions and/or failure to act contributed to their prosecution and made it easy for the jury to convict them."Gov. Opp'n [Dkt # 72]at 20.Petitioners respond that there are only two elements to the legal standard and that they meet both: (1)the Court set aside their convictions based upon their actual innocence and (2)they did not commit the acts charged.Pet'rs Reply [Dkt # 75]at 4.According to Petitioners, the statute should be read:

(2)He did not commit any of the acts charged or[a] his acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such charged constituted no offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia, and [b]he did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution.

28 U.S.C. § 2513(1948)(emphasis and insertion added).Only if a petitioner cannot prove that he did not commit any of the acts charged might he, as an alternative, prove what follows the "or,"i.e., none of his acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with the criminal charges constituted an offense against the United States or any State andhe did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution.In other words, according to Petitioners, if they can prove that they did not commit any of the charged acts (already determined by the Court), they do not need to prove that they did not in any way cause or bring about their own prosecution.Petitioners' reading of the statute may be reasonable, but in the Court's view, it is incorrect.

A brief exposition of the relevant case law sheds light on the dispute.In Burgess v. United States, the Claims Court described a prior case, Hadley v. United States,106 Ct.Cl. 819, 66 F.Supp. 140(Ct. Cl.1946), as holding that "construction of § 2513(a)(2) requires that the certificate of the court establishing [petitioner's] innocence must specifically recite (1) that [petitioner] did not commit any of the acts with which he was charged, and(2) that his conduct did not constitute a crime against the United States or against the sovereignty within which the acts were committed."20 Cl.Ct. at 704 n. 4(emphasis in original).However, the Claims Court then continued: "In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has construed these necessary recitations as disjunctive.SeeOsborn v. United States,322 F.2d 835(5th Cir.1963).The court need not reach the issue of whether these requirements should be interpreted as being disjunctive or conjunctive" since it would not affect Mr. Burgess's case.Id.

In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Osborn clearly held that the "alternative conditions of § 2513(a)(2) require that the claimant show either that he did not commit any of the acts or that his acts constituted no offense against the United States or a State."Osborn v. United States,322 F.2d at 841.The Fifth Circuit explained:

We accept appellant's argument that the "or" in the statute means that he may prove either; he does not have to prove both.Logically, it would not be justifiable to require a claimant to prove both.If he did not commit the act charged it would be immaterial whether the act was unlawful, and conversely, if the act was not criminal it should make no difference whether he had done it.

Id.(citations omitted).Clearly, these rulings focus on a particular either/or question: if a...