Eastwood v. North Central Missouri Drug Task Force

Decision Date11 April 2000
Parties(Mo.App. W.D. 2000) Billy L. Eastwood, Appellant, v. North Central Missouri Drug Task Force, Respondent. WD56803 0
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Grundy County, Hon. James T. Holcomb

Counsel for Appellant: Steven D. Wolcott
Counsel for Respondent: David S. Baker

Opinion Summary: Billy Eastwood appeals from a judgment granting the North Central Missouri Drug Task Force's motion to dismiss Mr. Eastwood's civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Mr. Eastwood claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim, arguing that it sufficiently alleged the liability of the Drug Task Force under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for his wrongful arrest and incarceration.

Division Four holds: The trial court did not err in dismissing Mr. Eastwood's petition for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted, as Mr. Eastwood failed to plead a policy or custom of the Drug Task Force which violated his constitutional rights. Mr. Eastwood based his 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim solely on a theory of respondeat superior, and case law is clear that a governmental entity, such as the Drug Task Force, cannot be held liable on a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim under the theory of respondeat superior.

Patricia Breckenridge, Chief Judge

Billy Eastwood appeals from a judgment granting the North Central Missouri Drug Task Force's motion to dismiss Mr. Eastwood's civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Mr. Eastwood claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim, arguing that it sufficiently alleged the liability of the Drug Task Force under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for his wrongful arrest and incarceration. Because Mr. Eastwood's claim was based solely on a theory of respondeat superior, which the United States Supreme Court and Missouri courts have repeatedly rejected in section 1983 claims, the trial court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural History

On or about February 10, 1996, the Grundy County Sheriff's Department arrested Billy Eastwood pursuant to a warrant issued by the Grundy County Circuit Court. The warrant was issued after the Grundy County prosecuting attorney filed a felony complaint. The prosecutor's complaint was based upon a report of the North Central Missouri Drug Task Force describing an alleged sale of marijuana occurring in Grundy County on September 13, 1995, which was observed by undercover detectives and representatives of the Drug Task Force. The report indicated that the transaction involved a person identified as "Lawrence Newton," who was accompanied by Billy Eastwood.

When the court issued the arrest warrant, it set Mr. Eastwood's bond at $150,000.00. He was unable to post bond and remained incarcerated in the Grundy County Jail for 28 days. At that point, one of the undercover officers who witnessed the original drug transaction observed Mr. Eastwood in open court while present for another proceeding, and he informed the State that the wrong man had been arrested. The charges against Mr. Eastwood were then dismissed.

On February 9, 1998, Mr. Eastwood filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Grundy County against the North Central Missouri Drug Task Force, the Grundy County Sheriff's Department and unknown undercover member or members of the Drug Task Force. The petition asserted three claims against the defendants: Count I - false imprisonment; Count II - malicious prosecution; and Count III - a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. In response to the petition, the Drug Task Force filed its answer and a motion to dismiss, with suggestions in support of the motion. The motion and its suggestions requested the dismissal of the false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims on the basis of sovereign immunity, and of the civil rights claim because Mr. Eastwood improperly based his claim on a theory of respondeat superior. Mr. Eastwood then filed an amended petition, which substituted Grundy County and its sheriff, Greg Coon, as defendants instead of the Grundy County Sheriff's Department, a named defendant in the original petition. The amended petition contained virtually the same allegations against the Drug Task Force as those in the original petition. At the request of the Drug Task Force, the trial court considered its motion to dismiss as filed in response to the amended petition. Thereafter, on August 4, 1998, the trial court sustained the motion to dismiss. Mr. Eastwood voluntarily dismissed the other defendants, and filed an appeal of the dismissal of the Drug Task Force. On May 10, 1999, the trial court entered a Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, to ensure that the judgment was a final judgment under Rule 74.01(a). On appeal, Mr. Eastwood challenges only the dismissal of his section 1983 civil rights claim.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the following standard of review applies:

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is solely a test of the adequacy of the plaintiff's petition. It assumes that all of plaintiff's averments are true, and liberally grants to plaintiff all reasonable inferences therefrom. No attempt is made to weigh any facts alleged as to whether they are credible or persuasive. Instead, the petition is reviewed in an almost academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.

Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. banc 1993) (internal citations omitted).

A section 1983 Claim against a Governmental Entity Is Not Cognizable under a Theory of Respondeat Superior

In his sole point on appeal, Mr. Eastwood asserts that the trial court erred in granting the Drug Task Force's motion to dismiss his section 1983 civil rights claim for failure to state a claim. Mr. Eastwood concedes on appeal that the Drug Task Force is a governmental entity and that "both federal and state cases are replete with the concept that civil liability cannot be established against a governmental entity exclusively on the basis of respondeat superior." In urging reversal on appeal, Mr. Eastwood argues that imposition of liability against a governmental entity under section 1983 is permitted if a policy or custom of the governmental entity is responsible for the deprivation of rights, and he claims that the Drug Task Force's motion to dismiss was prematurely granted because he was entitled to conduct extensive discovery to determine the policies and procedures of the Drug Task Force.

The argument Mr. Eastwood raises on appeal is different from the argument he made to the trial court. In the trial court, Mr. Eastwood relied solely on a theory of respondeat superior. During oral argument on the Drug Task Force's motion to dismiss, the parties agreed that the sole issue before the trial court was whether a section 1983 claim against a governmental entity could be premised on a respondeat superior theory. Specifically, when the trial court was attempting to frame the issues raised by the motion to dismiss, the following colloquy occurred:

The Court: [S]o factually, we don't have a question about the application of respondeat superior if it is not applicable to the 1983 action.

Counsel for Mr. Eastwood: Under the motion to dismiss. I'm not arguing with the facts.

Counsel for the Drug Task Force: As I understand the legal question that therefore is before the court is very simple. It is a one sentence question. Is respondeat superior a sufficient basis upon which to proceed against a governmental entity under Section 1983 claims.

Counsel for Mr. Eastwood: That's correct.

On appeal, a party remains bound to the position it took in the trial court. Canania v. Director of Revenue, 918 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Mo. App. 1996). Mr. Eastwood is bound by his position in the trial court that the Drug Task Force is liable under the theory of respondeat superior, rather than his theory on appeal that his civil rights claim under section 1983 was premised on the existence of a policy or custom of the Drug Task Force.

In the Civil Rights Act of 1971, the United States Congress enacted 42 USC section 1983 to impose civil liability upon a "person" who, under color of law, deprives another of any federally protected right, privilege, or immunity. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .

The Supreme Court originally held that Congress did not intend to impose liability on municipalities or local governmental entities in section 1983, so local governmental entities were immune from liability. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, 81 S.Ct. 473 (1961). The Supreme Court overruled Monroe v. Pape in Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., finding for the first time that local governments could be found liable under section 1983. 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In Monell, the United States Supreme Court stated:

Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1971 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom section 1983 applies. Local governing bodies, therefore,...

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