Eastwood v. Wyoming Highway Dept.

Decision Date25 September 1956
Docket NumberNo. 2742,2742
Citation76 Wyo. 247,301 P.2d 818
PartiesLester E. EASTWOOD, Plaintiff, v. WYOMING HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, Defendant.
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Greenwood, Ferrall & Bloomfield, Bard Ferrall, Cheyenne, for plaintiff.

George F. Guy, Atty. Gen., Robert H. McPhillamey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert L. Duncan, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Justice PARKER delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff, Lester E. Eastwood, filed an application in the district court, asking that a revocation of his driver's license by the Motor Vehicle Division of the State Highway Department under § 60-1615(3)(c), W.C.S.1945 [Cum.Pocket Supp.1955], be set aside on the ground that such revocation contravened §§ 6, 7, 8, and 34, Art. 1, Wyoming Constitution; and the case has been sent to this court on the following reserved constitutional question:

'Is Subsection (3)(c) of Chapter 171 of the Session Laws of Wyoming, 1953, unconstitutional and void as in contravention of one or more of the provisons of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming and particularly in contravention of one or more of the provisions designated as Sections 6, 7, 8 and 34 of Article 1?'

The facts leading up to the action are not stated in the pleadings but appear from the statements of counsel for the plaintiff in the brief and argument. On September 4, 1955, the car driven by plaintiff collided at an intersection with the car driven by George W. Wade; and as a result of the accident, Mr. Wade died on September 5, 1955. On October 31, 1955, the Motor Vehicle Division delivered to plaintiff a 'Notice of Suspension or Revocation of Driver's License' which stated, inter alia:

'By authority of Chapter 162, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1947, as amended by Chapter 171, Session Laws of Wyoming 1953.

'You are hereby notified that your privileges to operate a motor vehicle in the State of Whoming is revoked for the period from September 4, 1955 to September 4, 1956, for the reason Departmental Investigation under Session Laws, 1953, Chapter 171, Section 1, (3)(c).

'(3) They Motor Vehicle Division may conduct an investigation to determine whether the license shall be suspended, cancelled or revoked upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee;

'(c) Has been involved as a driver in any accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another or serious property damage.'

In accordance with defendant's order, plaintiff surrendered his license on November 5, 1955, and thereafter brought the present action.

The period of 'revocation' of license expired September 4, 1956, and the case is therefore moot. Even so, we consider the principles involved to be of sufficient public interest and importance to merit full discussion.

Plaintiff's contention is that the statute under which defendant purported to act 'provides for the revocation or suspension of a license upon grounds other than the wrongdoing, fault, negligence, crime, misdemeanor, incompetence, mental or physical infirmities or disabilities of a driver,' or, stated in another way, that in this situation there are no standards for the licensee, the violation of which would be cause for revocation of license.

The controversy in this case arises from a difference in viewpoint regarding the meaning of § 60-1615(3)(c), W.C.S.1945 [Cum. Pocket Supp. 1955], the plaintiff insisting that the revocation was upon grounds other than wrongdoing, and, in fact, that there are no stated grounds; while defendant urges that (a) the legislature can and must delegate certain discretionary duties to the Wyoming Highway Department and (b) as far as plaintiff was concerned, the statute was not administered arbitrarily or capriciously.

In order to approach this matter logically, it is desirable to discuss the history of the statute in controversy; and in so doing, a designation of portions thereof by short titles will eliminate emphasis on verbiage. The chapter containing the controversial section (hereafter called subsection (3)(c) was first passed as the Chauffeurs' and Drivers' License Act (hereafter called the Act) by ch. 162, S.L. of Wyoming 1947, was amended by ch. 150, S.L. of Wyoming 1949, and again by ch. 171, S.L. of Wyoming 1953. During its existence, subsection (3)(c) of the Act has remained unchanged except for the unimportant substitution of the words 'Motor Vehicle Division' in lieu of 'Department.' Subsection (4) of the Act immediately following the subsection in controversy, is actually most important in the determination of this case. For ease of identification, it will be designated herein merely as subsection (4).

We quote herewith that portion of subsection (4) of the 1947 Act germane to the decision in this case--and in order to focus attention on deficiencies in the statute have supplied emphasis to certain words therein.

'Upon the conclusion of such investigation, the person or persons holding such investigation shall prepare findings based upon the evidence received and considered. If the findings are to the effect that the person referred to therein is incompetent or is unfit to operate a motor vehicle upon any grounds upon which license might be refused, as stated in this Act, the Department, upon a review of such findings, shall have authority to forthwith revoke the license of such person, or if the findings are to the effect that the person therein referred to has by reason of negligence or reckless driving endangered life, limb, or property, or has thereby caused loss of life or injury to person or property, the Department, upon a review of such findings, shall have power to suspend the license of such person not exceeding six (6) months, or may revoke such license * * *. Any person * * * whose license has been * * * revoked shall have the right to file an application within thirty (30) days thereafter for a hearing * * * before the district court * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)

As the italicized portions indicate, subsection (4) of the 1947 Act provided for the revocation of a driver's license by the State Highway Department if (a) the licensee 'is incompetent or is unfit to operate a motor vehicle upon any grounds upon which license might be refused, as stated in this Act' or (b) the licensee 'has by reason of negligence or reckless driving endangered life, limb, or property, or has thereby caused loss of life or injury to person or property'. The provision for revocation because a licensee was 'incompetent or * * * unfit' was meaningless, inasmuch as that statute contained no section providing grounds upon which a license might be refused. (As a matter of interest, many operators' and chauffeurs' license laws, especially those based on uniform or model acts, in effect provide such grounds by stating what persons shall not be licensed.) Thus, the acts of 'negligence or reckless driving' of a licensee were the only grounds upon which a license could be revoked under the original subsection (3)(c) [and subsection (4)].

It is significant to note that when the Act of 1947 was amended and re-enacted in 1949, subsection (4), as amended, failed to include any reference to findings relating to negligence or reckless driving. The portion of the amendment relevant to this discussion read:

'Upon the conclusion of such investigation, the person or persons holding such investigation shall prepare findings based upon the evidence received and considered. The Department upon review of such findings may dismiss the proceeding or it may suspend or revoke the license of such person for a period not to exceed twelve (12) months * * *. Any person * * * whose license has been * * * revoked shall have the right to file an application within thirty (30) days thereafter for a hearing * * * before the district court * * * .'

This portion of subsection (4) remained the same under the 1953 amendment with the exception of the unimportant substitution of the words 'Motor Vehicle Division' for 'Department.'

Inasmuch as subsection (3)(c) remained unchanged and its provisions for revocation of license were, both in the original law and in the amendments, dependent upon the provisions of subsection (4), an analysis requires that we consider the provisions of subsection (4), first, under the 1947 Act, and, second, as it now stands. Under the 1947 Act, subsection (4) provided for the revocation of a license if (a) 'the person * * * is incompetent or is unfit to operate a motor vehicle upon any grounds upon which license might be refused, as stated in this Act [wholly meaningless, as previously indicated]' or (b) 'the person * * * has by reason of negligence or reckless driving endangered life, limb, or property, or has thereby caused loss of life or injury to person or property'.

Unfortunately, subsection (4) under the 1949 amendment of the Act, as above noted, omitted all reference to 'negligence or reckless driving', and, thus, after the amendment, contained no basis for revocation except the meaningless reference to incompetency or unfitness.

The motor vehicle codes of other states have often contained provisions by which the administrators might revoke drivers' licenses more or less summarily. Such laws have frequently been challenged on the ground of unconstitutionality, and the resulting cases indicate that there is no unanimity of viewpoint in the several jurisdictions. In some instances there has even been marked disagreement within the courts, necessitating issuance of majority and minority opinions. See statements, discussions, and cases cited in 5 Am.Jur., Automobiles, § 157; 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, § 160; 1 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice (1948), § 580; and 1-2 Huddy, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (1932), § 248; and Annotations at 71 A.L.R. 616, 108 A.L.R. 1162, 125 A.L.R. 1459, and 10 A.L.R.2d 833.

In general, it may be said that those courts who have disapproved statutes which provided for summary revocation of a driver's license...

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