Eaton's Appeal
| Decision Date | 02 January 1877 |
| Citation | 83 Pa. 152 |
| Parties | Eaton's Appeal. Eaton <I>versus</I> Williams. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, GORDON, PAXSON and WOODWARD, JJ. WILLIAMS and MERCUR, JJ., absent
Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford county: Of October and November Term 1876, No. 100.
Roger Sherman, for the appellants.—The taxes were assessed under the Act of February 28th 1866 (Pamph. L. 116), incorporating the city of Titusville; this provides only that `all taxes assessed upon real estate shall be a lien upon said real estate until paid.' Unless they are made prior liens by construction of this act, they are subsequent to Eaton and Cole's judgment. The language of the act does not bring the case within the decision in the city of Pittsburgh's Appeal, 20 P. F. Smith 142. Nor does it contain the provision of the Act of February 3d 1824, relating to taxes in Philadelphia and afterwards extended to Pittsburgh, which was held in Allegheny City's Appeal, 5 Wright 60, to give priority to taxes without regard to the date of their levy. Gormley's Appeal, 3 Casey 49, rules this case.
Keys Brothers could not keep their lien and at the same time appeal from it: Christy v. Crawford, 8 W. & S. 101; Lentz v. Lamplugh, 2 Jones 344.
Guthrie & Byles, for the appellees.—The taxes are a first charge upon the fund: Parker's Appeal, 8 W. & S. 449. The Act of 1866 provides that the taxes shall be a lien till "fully paid and discharged;" similar words in other acts have been interpreted to give taxes a prior lien: Allegheny City's Appeal, supra; City of Pittsburgh's Appeal, supra. In Gormley's Appeal, supra, there was no such provision in the act.
The appeal from the award does not affect its lien: M'Kennan v. Henderson, 5 W. & S. 370; Wilkinson's Appeal, 15 P. F. Smith 189. In Lentz v. Lamplugh, 2 Jones 344, the award was reversed on appeal, and a larger judgment recovered.
The provision of the sixth section of the Act of February 28th 1866, Pamph. L. 116, entitled "An Act to incorporate the borough of Titusville, Crawford county, into a city," that — does not change the established law that a judicial sale divests all liens and turns them over to the proceeds, but qualifies it only to this extent, that so far as the taxes are not reached and paid in full, they shall continue to be a lien. Such have been the decisions of this court upon the construction of the first section of the Act of February 3d 1824, Pamph. L. 18, "An Act relating to taxes on certain real estate in the city and county of Philadelphia" — which, in this respect, does not materially differ from this law: Allegheny City's Appeal, 5 Wright 60; Pittsburgh's Appeal, 20 P. F. Smith 142. It is true that the act before us does not expressly give the taxes priority over prior liens — but that necessarily follows from the provision that they shall continue a lien until fully paid and discharged. Gormley's Appeal, 3 Casey 49, is not applicable. It was a question of subrogation — the claim to which was destitute of equity. The tenant had paid the taxes, and his right to reimbursement was from his landlord, who was bound to pay them — and not from any prior mortgage or lien creditor. It was not a claim by the public authorities on the fund in court for unpaid taxes. They had been paid. The case does not state what the taxes were — whether state or city. The court evidently did not regard the special provisions of the acts creating the lien material to the only question in the cause. It is very important that bidders at public judicial sales should have a plain, simple rule to go by. They are bound to ascertain the amount of the public charges, and they can then understand that the taxes will be paid from the purchase-money certainly, and they will hold clear and discharged of the lien unless in the rare case, where the amount of the fund raised by the sale is not...
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...by the statute making it ‘a lien upon all the real and personal property * * * until the same is paid in full.’ Tax Law, § 197; Eaton's Appeal, 83 Pa. 152. It was paramount, for the reason that the tax was upon the privilege of exercising the corporate franchise and of carrying on the busin......
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...to priority over the mortgage and judgment which were senior encumbrances in point of time: Philadelphia v. Cooke, 30 Pa. 56; Eaton's App., 83 Pa. 152; Northern Liberties Swain, 13 Pa. 113; Tionesta Boro. v. Randall, 9 Pa. Dist. 763; Germania Savings Bank v. Miller, 38 Pittsburg Leg. Journ.......
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