Eaton v. City of Tulsa 8212 5925
Decision Date | 25 March 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 73,73 |
Citation | 39 L.Ed.2d 693,94 S.Ct. 1228,415 U.S. 697 |
Parties | Terry Dean EATON v. CITY OF TULSA. —5925 |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
In answering a question on cross-examination at his trial, in the Municipal Court of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for violating a municipal ordinance, petitioner referred to an alleged assailant as 'chicken shit.' In consequence he was prosecuted and convicted under an information that charged him with 'direct contempt,' in violation of another Tulsa ordinance, 'by his insolent behavior during open court and in the presence of (the judge) to wit: by using the language 'chicken-shit' . . ..' The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in an unreported order and opinion, affirmed.
This single isolated usage of street vernacular, not directed at the judge or any officer of the court, cannot constitutionally support the conviction of criminal contempt. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1255, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947). In using the expletive in answering the question on cross-examination '(i)t is not charged that (petitioner) here disobeyed and valid court order, talked loudly, acted boisterously, or attempted to prevent the judge or any other officer of the court from carrying on his court duties.' Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136, 85 S.Ct. 1375, 1377, 14 L.Ed.2d 290 (1965); see also In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972). In the circumstances, the use of the expletive thus cannot be held to 'constitute an imminent . . . threat to the administration of justice.'
In affirming, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected petitioner's contention that the conviction must be taken as resting solely on the use of the expletive. Rather, that court concluded from its examination of the trial record that, in addition to the use of the expletive, petitioner made 'discourteous responses' to the trial judge. The court therefore held that the conviction should be affirmed because '(c)oupling defendant's expletive with the discourteous responses, it is this Court's opinion there was sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could find defendant was in direct contempt of court.' (Emphasis supplied.)
However, the question is not upon what evidence the trial judge could find petitioner guilty but upon what evidence the trial judge did find petitioner guilty. There is no transcript of the contempt proceeding since the proceeding was not stenographically recorded. The trial judge did, however, enter a 'Judgment and Sentence,' and we read that document clearly to establish that the trial judge rested the conviction upon the use of the expletive only. For the single charge of 'insolent behavior' specified in the information was 'to wit: by using the language 'chicken-shit' . . .,' and the Judgment and Sentence, referring expressly to the information, records that petitioner was 'duly and legally tried and convicted of said offense' and, further, that 'the Court does now hereby adjudge and sentence the said defendant for the said offense by him committed.' (Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Criminal Appeals thus denied petitioner constitutional due process in sustaining the trial court by treating the conviction as a conviction upon a charge not made. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 68 S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948).*
The motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceeding not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
I concur in the Court's per curiam opinion. I write briefly only to make clear my understanding of the limited scope of its holding. Whether the language used by petitioner in a courtroom during trial justified exercise of the contempt power depended upon the facts. Under the circumstances here, the imposition of a contempt sanction against petitioner denied him due process of law.
The phrase 'chicken shit' was used by petitioner as a characterization of the person whom petitioner believed assaulted him. As noted in the Court's opinion, it was not directed at the trial judge or anyone officially connected with the trial court. But the controlling fact, in my view, and one that should be emphasized, is that petitioner received no prior warning or caution from the trial judge with respect to court etiquette. It may well be, in view of contemporary standards as to the use of vulgar and even profane language, that this particular petitioner had no reason to believe that this expletive would be offensive or in any way disruptive of proper courtroom decorum. Language likely to offend the sensibility of some listeners is now fairly commonplace in many social gatherings as well as in public performances.
I place a high premium on the importance of maintaining civility and good order in the courtroom. But before there is resort to the summary remedy of criminal contempt, the court at least owes the party concerned some sort of notice or warning. No doubt there are circumstances in which a courtroom outburst is so egregious as to justify a summary response by the judge without specific warning, but this is surely not such a case.
The Court summarily reverses petitioner's conviction for contempt of court on the grounds that the expletive which petitioner used could not by itself constitute a contempt, and that the additional 'discourteous responses' petitioner made to the trial judge could not be properly considered by either the Municipal Court of Tulsa or the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals which affirmed petitioner's conviction. I disagree with the Court as to each of these grounds.
Even the Court appears to shy away from a flat rule, analogous to the hoary doctrine of the law of torts that every dog is entitled to one bite, to the effect that every witness is entitled to one free contumacious or other impermissible remark. The Court, quoting language from Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136, 85 S.Ct. 1375, 1377, 14 L.Ed.2d 290 (1965), says that "(i)t is not charged that (petitioner) here . . . talked loudly, acted boisterously, or attempted to prevent the judge or any other officer of the court from carrying on his court duties." But we do not have any transcript of petitioner's trial for contempt, and we simply do not know whether the evidence in that trial may or may not have shown that petitioner 'talked loudly' or 'acted boisterously' in the course of his rather unusual colloquy with the judge. Respondent in its brief in opposition certainly makes no concession in petitioner's favor. If, as appears likely, neither party is in a position to furnish any judicially cognizable account of the petitioner's contempt trial, this hiatus in the record cannot be filled in by what amounts to no more than speculation in favor of petitioner's position:
'If the result of the adjudicatory process is not to be set at naught, it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality.' Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 281, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942).
See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 198, 72 S.Ct. 599, 607, 96 L.Ed. 872 (1952).
Having assumed that the 'single expletive' uttered by petitioner could not by itself constitutionally constitute a contempt, the Court goes on to hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals' reliance on petitioner's discourteous additional remarks during the course of his colloquy with the trial court, amounted to 'treating the conviction as a conviction upon a charge not made,' in violation of Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 68 S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948). While we do not have the transcript of the contempt trial, the record does show the colloquy which occurred between petitioner and the trial judge in the Municipal Court during petitioner's trial for an alleged violation of a Tulsa ordinance. During cross-examination in response to a question asked him by the assistant city prosecutor, the following exchange occurred (emphasis supplied):
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