Eaton v. Long Island Rail Road Company, No. 422

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: LUMBARD, , and WATERMAN and KAUFMAN, Circuit
• Citation: 398 F.2d 738
• Parties: Robert T. EATON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The LONG ISLAND RAIL ROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: Docket 31970.,No. 422
• Decision Date: 28 May 1968

398 F.2d 738 (1968)

Robert T. EATON, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
The LONG ISLAND RAIL ROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 422, Docket 31970.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued April 10, 1968.

Decided May 28, 1968.

398 F.2d 739

Henry J. O'Hagan, New York City (Edward G. Dougherty, Peter M. J. Reilly, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Paul J. Donnelly, Jr., Jamaica, N. Y. (George M. Onken, Jamaica, N. Y., on the brief), for defendant-appellant.

Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and WATERMAN and KAUFMAN, Circuit Judges.

IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Circuit Judge:

The question before us on this appeal is a recurring one in litigation under the Federal Employers' Liability Act "FE LA", 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. — Was there sufficient evidence of the defendant's negligence to warrant submitting the case to the jury?

The pertinent evidence before the jury can be briefly summarized. The principal witness at the trial was plaintiff Robert T. Eaton, a car repairman welder in the Morris Park Truck Shop of the defendant Long Island Rail Road Company "railroad". He testified that it was his job to burn off worn parts from

398 F.2d 740

the undercarriages or "trucks" of railroad cars with either an acetylene torch or electric welding machine.¹ The undercarriages were apparently placed on tracks running over large pits that were approximately 200 feet long and 38 inches deep.² The pit in which Eaton worked was not provided with a ladder, concrete steps or other means of egress, and, because of the nature of the activity and the general conditions in the railroad yard, was covered with oil and grease

Eaton testified further that some of the workmen left the pit by crawling out over the top. This method was impractical for him, however, because as a user of flame emitting equipment it was necessary for him to remain as free as possible of the oil and grease that pervaded the pit. Accordingly, on May 31, 1963, the day of the accident, Eaton attempted to leave the pit by taking hold of two appurtenances on the truck frame and lifting himself up by extending his right foot to the top of the pit and pushing upward with his left foot. This maneuver placed great pressure on the right leg and as he came up to a sitting position he heard his right knee "click." It later developed that Eaton had suffered an internal derangement of the knee joint; he required extensive medical treatment including hospitalization and surgery on two occasions. One of the operating doctors testified that the injury to the knee could have resulted from climbing out of a pit in the manner described.

As argued to the jury by counsel for both parties, the crucial factual issue was whether the railroad had provided Eaton with a safe place to work and an adequate, non-hazardous means of leaving the pit.³ Thus, Eaton maintained that the pit should have been provided with either steps or a ladder and placed great emphasis on the fact that he had previously complained about the absence of steps. He also claimed that comparable pits in the Morris Park yard had steps.⁴ Counsel for the railroad saw the issue before the jury in much the same light. He told the jury that:

"If you believe that a man who worked there in the yards for eight years and did not know how to get in and out of those pits and that, madam and gentlemen, that is the end of the world as far as I am concerned.

"You heard the testimony in here, I believe, about some ladders. I submit if the railroad put ladders in the pit, the ladder is going to be covered with grease and we will have people falling off the ladders."

In addition, he suggested to the jury that Eaton should have used allegedly available wooden blocks as steps to leave the pit.⁵ The experienced trial judge submitted the case to the jury on careful instructions that posed in a clear and precise manner the issue as argued by the parties:

"He Eaton says that it the pit was greasy and oily; that he used a method of getting out by which he held himself by some protrusion of the truck of the railroad car and then brought his leg up to the top of the pit and that as he did that, the increased pressure caused the injury.

398 F.2d 741

"In effect, he says, in more legalistic language, that the Rail Road sic failed to provide a safe place to work, in that it failed to provide a safe means of egress from the pit. That is a fact question for you."

On this record, the jury found the railroad negligent and set the amount of Eaton's damages at $36,000. The jury also determined, however, that Eaton had been contributorily negligent and, in accordance with the provisions of the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 53, diminished the amount of his recovery by 25 per cent. Judgment for Eaton in the amount of $27,000 was then entered and this appeal followed.

Before considering the arguments presented by the defendant railroad, it is well to clarify the unique role of an appellate court in reviewing the evidentiary basis for a jury verdict in an FELA case. While the issue continues to arouse a good deal of heat, certain relatively clear principles have emerged from the controversy. The FELA is not a workmen's compensation statute for, as we recently had occasion to note, evidence of defendant's negligence is required and "it is fundamental * * * that the fact an employee is injured is not proof of negligence of the carrier." Kuberski v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 359 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1036, 87 S.Ct. 1475, 18 L.Ed.2d 600 (1967). See also Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 340 U.S. 573, 577-578, 71 S.Ct. 428, 95 L.Ed. 547 (1951); Gill v. Pa. R. Co., 201 F.2d 718, 720-722 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816, 74 S.Ct. 27, 98 L.Ed. 343 (1953). A reading of the cases makes manifest, however, that the FELA has been construed as an avowed departure from the rules of the common law and as imposing "special features" with respect to the standard of negligence that is significantly different from that found in ordinary negligence actions. See Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 509, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957). See also Shepard v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 300 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1962); Gill v. Pa. R. Co., supra; Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 564, 77 S.Ct. 459, 1 L.Ed.2d 515 (1957) (opinion of Harlan, J., dissenting); Prosser, Torts § 82, p. 560 (3d ed. 1964); Funkhauser, What Is a Safe Place to Work, 17 Ohio St.L.J....