Eaton v. Marion County Fair Ass'n, 4-01-CV-90294.

• Court: United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States State District Court of Southern District of Iowa
• Citation: 172 F.Supp.2d 1184
• Docket Number: No. 4-01-CV-90294.,4-01-CV-90294.
• Parties: Christoper EATON, Plaintiff, v. MARION COUNTY FAIR ASSOCIATION, Defendants.
• Decision Date: 30 October 2001

172 F.Supp.2d 1184 Christoper EATON, Plaintiff,
v.
MARION COUNTY FAIR ASSOCIATION, Defendants. No. 4-01-CV-90294. United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division. October 30, 2001.

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Lawrence L. Marcucci, John C. Conger, West Des Moines, Iowa, for Plaintiff.

Michael G. Voorhees, Des Moines, Iowa, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PRATT, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Christopher Eaton, brings this action in diversity against Defendant, Marion County Fair Association (the "MCFA"), asserting interference with prospective business advantage, conversion, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, as well as violations of Iowa competition law and federal antitrust law. The MCFA has counterclaimed for breach of contract and raised affirmative defenses related to a mutual release the parties had previously signed. Defendant now moves for summary judgment, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion.

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I. Facts

These claims arise out of the court order which MCFA secured to confiscate Mr. Eaton's sales merchandise at the national sprint car championships (the "Race"), which is run by the MCFA. On August 11th, the MCFA filed a lawsuit against Mr. Eaton for trademark infractions related to the t-shirt merchandise he was selling at the Race. In doing so, the MCFA obtained a court order instructing law enforcement authorities to seize Mr. Eaton's merchandise. In his resistance to the MCFA's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Eaton claims that he had spent $16,000 for all the merchandise he was selling between August 9 and August 12, but does not identify how much of that was confiscated on August 11th or went unsold as a result.

Mr. Eaton, through his brother and under the advice of counsel, negotiated for the return of this merchandise in exchange for $1540 in past royalties, fees, and costs, 15% in future royalties, and a "Mutual Release." A handwritten agreement was signed that day by Timothy Eaton and a representative of the MFCA (the "Settlement Agreement"). The agreement states "Re: Injunction on 8-11-2000," then lists six conditions, numbered 1-6, relating to the financial conditions and the return of the merchandise. Then, after the numbered list, the words "Mutual Release," stand alone before the parties' signatures. On August 22, 2000, the District Court of the State of Iowa in Marion County issued an Order dismissing the case, "having been advised that all matters have been settled." The Order does not specify whether it is with or without prejudice.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required." Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030, 113 S.Ct. 1845, 123 L.Ed.2d 470 (1993). Summary judgment "allows courts and litigants to avoid full-blown trials in unwinnable cases, thus conserving the parties' time and money and permitting courts to [conserve] scarce judicial resources." Id.

The precise standard for granting summary judgment is well-established and oft-repeated: summary judgment is properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994). The Court does not weigh the evidence nor make credibility determinations, rather the court only determines whether there are any disputed issues and, if so, whether those issues are both genuine and material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), cited in Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1345 (8th Cir.1997); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Once the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual

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dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." An...