Eaton v. Town of Wells

• Decision Date: 20 October 2000
• Citation: Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, 760 A.2d 232 (Me. 2000)
• Parties: Lisle A. EATON et al. v. TOWN OF WELLS et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

760 A.2d 232

2000 ME 176

Lisle A. EATON et al. v.TOWN OF WELLS et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued September 6, 2000.

Decided October 20, 2000.

Robert M.A. Nadeau(orally), Amy B. McGarry, Nanette M. Ardry, Nadeau McGarry & Smith, P.A., Sanford, for plaintiffs.

Durward W. Parkinson(orally), Susan Bernstein Driscoll, Michael W. MacLeod-Ball, Bergen & Pakinson, LLC, Kennebunk, John J. Wall III, Thomas F. Monaghan, Monaghan, Leahy, Hochadel & Libby, LLP, Portland, Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, Paul Stern, Dep. Attorney General(orally), Augusta, for defendants.

Panel: WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.

WATHEN, C.J.

[¶ 1]Lisle A. Eaton, Alice M. Eaton, and Priscilla Jane Eldridge(the Eatons) appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court(York County, Kravchuk, C.J.) after a non-jury trial granting the public and the Town of Wells an easement over a portion of Wells Beach and from the court's order clarifying its final judgment.¹The Town cross-appeals from the judgment declaring record title in the Eatons and denying its claim for adverse possession and from the summary judgment denying its claim of title to said property.Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

I.Background

[¶ 2] On December 31, 1997, Lisle A. Eaton, individually and as attorney-in-fact for his siblings, Donald H. Eaton, Jr. and Priscilla Jane Eldridge, filed a complaint against the Town of Wells, the Town selectmen, and all users of plaintiffs' property and all persons unascertained, not in being, or unknown claiming under such users.The complaint was amended to add and dismiss claims and to dismiss and redesignate parties.As amended, it identified plaintiffs as Lisle A. Eaton, individually and attorney-in fact for Priscilla Jane Eldridge, and Alice M. Eaton; defendant as the Town of Wells; and the remaining claims as a quiet title action at law and a quiet title action in equity.²[¶ 3] The Town filed an answer and counterclaim, which included claims for declaratory judgment—fee simple; adverse possession; title by acquiescence; declaratory judgment—easement; easement by prescription; dedication and acceptance; implied easement; and offset taxes.The State of Maine was allowed to intervene and filed an answer raising as an affirmative defense the public trust rights in the intertidal zone to encompass walking and other recreational and amusement activities, in addition to fishing, fowling, and navigation.

[¶ 4] During the pendency of the action, the Town filed a motion for preliminary injunction to authorize the Army Corps of Engineers access on and across the 2200 linear feet of sand beach in dispute for the purpose of laying pipeline and incidental construction in connection with the Wells Harbor Federal Navigation Project.It later requested the court's consent to withdraw its motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Eatons filed a motion for sanctions and attorney fees in relation to the motion.The court deferred action on the motion until the trial.

[¶ 5] Both sides filed motions for summary judgment and the court entered judgment denying the Town's motion as to the Eatons' complaint because of issues of material fact as to the Eatons' record title to the property; granting the Eatons' motion as to the counts of the Town's counterclaim involving the Town's record title and tax offsets; and denying the Eatons' motion as to the remaining counts of the Town's counterclaim.

[¶ 6]The court held a bifurcated trial to first address the Eatons' claim of record title; and, second, if the Eatons prevailed, to address the Town's equitable use claims.On the first part of the bifurcated trial, the court found that the Eatons are the record title owners of any residual land not conveyed from the parcel of land originally purchased by William Eaton in 1892 and shown on the plans of the Wells Beach Improvement Company.On the second part of the bifurcated trial, the court found, inter alia, that the Town established the public's right to use "Wells Beach" both on the dry sand and the intertidal zone for general recreational purposes, including but not limited to bathing, sunbathing, picnicking and walking, through an easement by prescription and, in the alternative, through dedication and acceptance.The Town also established the Town's right to use the beach through a prescriptive easement for purposes associated with beach maintenance and preservation including raking, litter control, maintaining wildlife habitats, and seasonal lifeguard stands, but did not prove it has a right to install pipe over the subject parcel to aid in its harbor dredging project and did not prove title to the beach by adverse possession.The judgment also ordered the Town to pay the Eatons' costs but not attorney fees in connection with the Eatons' motion for sanctions and attorney fees relating to the Town's motion for preliminary injunction.The court then entered a final judgment based on the prior decisions in the bifurcated trial.

[¶ 7] The Eatons filed a motion for proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law that the court denied.The Eatons appealed and the Town cross-appealed.Thereafter, the Town filed a motion to suspend M.R. Civ. P. 73(f) to allow the Superior Court to act on a motion to clarify its judgment, which we granted.The court entered an order clarifying that its final judgment and all other orders in this case did not establish the boundaries of the house lots that abut the concrete sea-wall to the west of the subject sand beach.The Eatons appealed this order as well, and the appeals were consolidated.

[¶ 8] A general overview of the relevant facts may be summarized as follows: The case involves title to and equitable use of a certain portion of Wells Beach.The Eatons' great grandfather, William Eaton, acquired approximately 40 acres on the peninsula containing Wells Beach in 1892 from Samuel Littlefield, Augustus Littlefield and George Chaney.The peninsula is bounded on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, on the west by Webhannet River, on the north by the mouth of the Webhannet River, and on the south by land of another.With others, William Eaton formed the Wells Beach Improvement Co. and developed the peninsula initially with 300 lots, situated on both sides of Atlantic Avenue, a road running through the development and parallel with the ocean.For purposes of the easement, focus was on the portion of Wells Beach extending over one mile in length between Mile Road (a/k/a the casino area) to the south and the jetty (a/k/a Wells Harbor or the mouth of the Webhannet River) to the north.

[¶ 9] Through the years, William Eaton's portion of the peninsula development was reduced to certain lots on the westerly side of Atlantic Avenue and the 44 lots on the easterly side of Atlantic Avenue within the portion between the Mile Road and the jetty.The individual lots were sold, and the subject premises is the remaining strip of sand beach easterly of the 44 lots beginning approximately 3000 feet to the north of the Mile Road and encompassing 2200 linear feet of sand, which is not contiguous because certain lots in the development were sold with the land extending to the Atlantic Ocean.During and after William Eaton's development of the property, the public used the beach, both the dry sand portion and the intertidal portion, for sunbathing, walking, and other recreational purposes, and the Town maintained the beach.

II.Record Title

A.Town's title

[¶ 10] The Town argued that the court erred in granting the Eatons' motion for summary judgment dismissing the Town's claim of record title to the subject premises.We review the Superior Court's "entry of summary judgment for errors of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was entered."Rodrigue v. Rodrigue,1997 ME 99, ¶ 8, 694 A.2d 924, 926(citation omitted).Summary judgment will be upheld if the evidence produced demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Seeid.(citation omitted).

[¶ 11] The Town argued in its counterclaim that it holds record title to the subject premises through two sources.First, it contends that in 1643, Thomas Gorges, acting as agent for Lord Proprietor of Maine Sir Ferdinando Gorges, granted John Wheelright, Henry Boade, and Edward Rishworth

full and absolute power to allott, bound and sett forth any lotts or bounds vnto any man that shall come to inhabitt in their Plantacon.... the bounds of the said Plantacon to begin from the northeast side of Oegungig Riuer vnto the southwest side of Kinnibuncke and to runne eight miles vp into the countrey

....

The Town argues that Wheelwright, Boade and Rishworth were the original proprietors of the Town of Wells and received the grant in that capacity.They argue that "as the feudal concept of property ownership gave way to fee ownership, this grant of authority ... had the effect of conveying fee title to the land described to the Town of Wells."

[¶ 12] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Town and assuming for purposes of summary judgment that Messrs. Wheelright, Boade, and Rishworth were the original proprietors and that proprietors obtained both "the right of soil" as well as jurisdiction, seeMontgomery v. Ives,21 Miss. 161(13 Smedes & Marshall 161)(Err. & App.1849)(stating that whereas in royal provinces, the crown retained both the right of soil and jurisdiction, in the proprietary governments, the proprietors acquired the right of soil, as well as jurisdiction, from a grant), the trial court correctly concluded that based on those facts the Town as a matter of law did not prove its title because the proprietors did not convey any interest to the Town by deed.SeeHoward v. Hutchinson,10 Me. 335(1833), cited inGlidden v. Belden,684 A.2d 1306(Me.1996).

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