Eaton v. Weaver Mfg. Co., s. 76-1650
| Decision Date | 05 September 1978 |
| Docket Number | 76-1651,Nos. 76-1650,s. 76-1650 |
| Citation | 582 F.2d 1250 |
| Parties | Elmer EATON and Donovan Eaton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WEAVER MANUFACTURING CO., an Illinois Corporation, Defendant, Volkswagen of America, Inc., a corporation, and Volkswagen South Central, Inc., a corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
John M. Merritt, Oklahoma City, Okl. (D. Chad Ransdell, Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants.
Larry D. Ottaway, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon, Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, and BRIMMER, District Judge. *
This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaints as to defendant-appellee Volkswagen South Central, Inc., on the ground that a state court judgment deciding that there was no personal jurisdiction over defendant had, Inter alia, reached the merits of the jurisdictional issue and as such is res judicata, precluding relitigation thereof between these parties on these claims in any trial court in Oklahoma.
Plaintiffs originally filed suits in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, each alleging that he was injured in the course of his employment with Gangas-Whitfield Volkswagen (hereinafter Gangas-Whitfield), with whom defendants Volkswagen South Central, Inc. (hereinafter Volkswagen South) and Volkswagen of America, Inc. (hereinafter Volkswagen) 1 were contractually related in a franchisor- franchisee relationship. Each plaintiff claimed he was injured while operating an allegedly defective lift machine manufactured by defendant Weaver, which caused a vehicle which was being lifted to fall, injuring plaintiff. 2 Plaintiffs' specific allegations relevant to this appeal are that Volkswagen South, franchisor was negligent in failing to notify Gangas-Whitfield, franchisee, that certain modifications were required to make the lift safe and suitable for elevating certain new model Volkswagens.
In both cases the state court ultimately sustained defendant Volkswagen South's motions to quash and pleas to the jurisdiction of the court, although its Journal Entries stated no findings or specific grounds for the ruling. The orders entered August 24, 1973, read in pertinent part as follows:
(T)he Court having considered said motion with attached affidavit and brief, and the records on file in this case, and having heard argument of counsel . . . (t)he Court is of the opinion that it does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant Volkswagen South Central, Inc. (R. I, 23; R. II, 283-84). 3
Subsequently within one year, pursuant to 12 O.S. § 100, 4 plaintiffs filed actions in the federal district court on the same claims as were before the state court. Both Volkswagen South and derivatively, Volkswagen, were named as defendants in the federal complaints. 5 In motions to dismiss filed in both cases, defendants urged that the rulings made by the state court were res judicata and therefore binding determinations that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over these defendants was not authorized in any court in the State of Oklahoma.
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order in March 1975 the district court found:
. . . The State court did not delineate the reasons for ordering the dismissal of Volkswagen South. . . . It is crucial to this action, however, that the ground could have been the unavailability of the long-arm statute and thus the inaccessibility of all the courts of this State to such litigation, or a ground based upon a curable defect which would not preclude bringing suit without such defect in a court in the State. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832) (1947). This Court cannot by surmise infer a bar. (R. I, 175).
The court proceeded to require hearing on the merits of the jurisdictional issue, but the hearing was continued pending further discovery. While the federal jurisdictional question was pending, defendants filed a Motion for Clarification of Journal Entry in state court with respect to the previous judgment respecting Volkswagen South. The state court judge did not enter any order in response to this motion, but did, on December 22, 1975, write a letter (R. I, 237) to attorneys for both parties in which he noted:
The Court is therefore of the opinion that the judgment of August 24, 1973, with respect to Volkswagen South Central, Inc., should be clarified by containing the finding that while said defendant maintains the necessary contacts with the State of Oklahoma to authorize the Court to exercise jurisdiction over it, this cause of action did not arise from such contacts and the Court does not have jurisdiction over said defendant for the purpose of this suit. (R. I, 238).
Although the judge said that the judgment "should be clarified," we are not advised of any corrective judgment or order being entered.
Subsequently on January 16, 1976, the attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants appeared before the state court judge in open court. At this hearing the court stated that at the time of his August, 1973, order of dismissal as to Volkswagen South, the court had not considered the franchisor-franchisee relationship as a possible basis for in personam jurisdiction over Volkswagen South, noting, "All those things (liability under the franchisor-franchisee relationship) were not before me." (R. V, 9-10, 11, 13).
After the state court's letter and this January, 1976, hearing, the defendants filed in the federal district court a Motion to Reconsider the Opinion and Order of March 1975, asking the court to vacate that order on the ground that the state court had entertained defendant's Motion for Clarification of Journal Entry with respect to the judgment regarding Volkswagen South, and that that clarification establishes a binding determination in the defendants' favor.
The federal district court reconsidered its previous order in light of the state court's letter of December 22, 1975, and that court's determination as revealed in the transcript of the state court hearing held on January 16, 1976, and dismissed the suits against Volkswagen and Volkswagen South, noting that:
. . . (I)t is clear that the (state) court's ruling was not based upon the characterization of Volkswagen South's activities, but the absence of a nexus between any contacts with this state and the claims asserted. . . . Such determination reaches to the merits of the jurisdictional issue and precludes relitigation thereof between these parties on these claims in any trial court in (Oklahoma). (R. I, 241-42).
Plaintiffs then made a motion for new trial, attaching to their brief an affidavit executed on May 17, 1976, by the state court judge, wherein he stated in part:
That I made no ruling as to whether any alleged breaches of duties of said defendant, alleged to arise under its franchisor- /franchisee relationship, were or were not related to plaintiff's injuries.
That I made no ruling as to whether said defendant, in its franchisor/franchisee relationship as alleged, did or did not have sufficient contacts to invoke the jurisdiction of my court.
There was no evidence presented as to the latter two issues. (R. I, 251).
The federal district court denied the motion for a new trial and the plaintiffs bring this appeal.
On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that the federal court could not look behind the face of the state court judgment, after the state court term had ended, to determine what findings might support application of the doctrine of res judicata, especially where there are no notes or memoranda by the state court judge and the findings did not appear on the judgment, citing Stevens Expert Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Stevens, 267 P.2d 998 (Okl.), Inter alia. (Appellants' Brief on Appeal, 6).
Further plaintiffs contend that even if evidence presented to the federal court by affidavit, the state court judgment and the like were competent, it does not show that the state court made a finding that Volkswagen South's contacts were not the nexus of plaintiffs' injuries, and that the record fails to establish a basis for applying res judicata. (Id. at 25, 30-34). And plaintiffs say that the duty of Volkswagen to act as a consultant and require modifications of the lift and to warn dealers of making modifications arose under defendant's franchisor-franchisee relationship, which is the gravamen of the federal court complaint; that the affidavit of the state court judge clearly shows there was no evidence before him and no ruling by him as to whether such acts in connection with the franchisor-franchisee relationship were related to plaintiffs' injuries; and that therefore the federal court's Memorandum and Order is clearly in error as to what the state court had ruled in the state action. (Id. at 36-37).
At the outset we should note that in connection with various statements made by the state court judge, subsequent to his rulings, the parties all discuss the appropriateness and effectiveness of an order nunc pro tunc. Actually, we feel that the various statements by the state judge do not constitute an order nunc pro tunc and do not have the effect of such an order. A court has inherent power, by an order nunc pro tunc, to correct the record of a judgment in order that such record shall truly reflect the judgment actually rendered, and may do so at a subsequent term of court; the court has no power, by such an order nunc pro tunc, to render another and different judgment. Hawkins v. Hurst, 467 P.2d 159, 163 (Okl.). 6 In the instant case, no such order nunc pro tunc appears in our record.
We must agree that the statements of the state court judge at the hearing, his letter and his affidavit all occurring long after the entry of his judgment cannot be considered in these circumstances. In construing a judgment which is...
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