Eazor Express, Inc. v. General Teamsters Local 326

• Decision Date: 11 February 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4476.
• Citation: 388 F. Supp. 1264
• Parties: EAZOR EXPRESS, INC., Plaintiff, v. GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL 326, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

388 F. Supp. 1264

EAZOR EXPRESS, INC., Plaintiff, v. GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL 326, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 4476.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

February 11, 1975.

Arthur J. Sullivan, of Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff; Martin R. Lentz, of Pelino, Wasserstrom, Chucas & Monteverde, Philadelphia, Pa., of counsel.

Francis S. Babiarz, of Biondi & Babiarz, Wilmington, Del., for defendant.

OPINION

STAPLETON, District Judge.

Plaintiff's amended complaint in this action seeks damages from the defendant labor union pursuant to section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 187,¹ for activity allegedly in violation of section 8 (b)(4)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4)(D).² Presently before the Court is plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. The sole question presented concerns the effect to be given a prior Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") finding that the defendant did engage in the unfair labor practice alleged in the complaint. General Teamsters Local 326 (Eazor Express, Inc.), 208 NLRB No. 99 (1974), enforced by the Court of Appeals for this Circuit, General Teamsters Local 326 v. N.L.R.B., 505 F.2d 730 (3rd Cir. 1974). For the reasons which follow, I conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation here of the issues decided in the cited proceeding.

Plaintiff Eazor Express, Incorporated ("Eazor") is a trucking company whose operations include shipping auto parts from Chrysler's plant in Detroit to its assembly plant in Newark, Delaware. Eazor's drivers are members of Teamsters Locals 299 of Detroit and 377 of Youngstown, Ohio.

According to the findings of fact adopted by the Board, the Delaware Teamsters Local 326 established a picket line at the Newark plant on September 25, 1972, seeking to have its men assigned to work on Eazor's trucks there. Chrysler attempted to free itself of this intra-union dispute by establishing a separate gate for Eazor deliveries, but Local 326 continued to picket the main gate, and brought the plant to within a few hours of shutting down. In order to stop the picketing, Chrysler then closed its gates to Eazor.

On October 6, Eazor filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board against Local 326, alleging violation of the "jurisdictional dispute" section, section 8(b) (4)(D) of the NLRA.³ Pursuant to section 10(k) of that Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(k),⁴ a hearing was held on the merits of the jurisdictional dispute, and on May 31, 1973, the Board issued its "Decision and Determination of Dispute" finding that Local 326 was not entitled, through means proscribed by section 8(b)(4)(D), to force or require Eazor to assign this work to members of Local 326. 203 NLRB No. 154.

Local 326 refused to comply with the Board's award of the work, and, as a result, the Board issued an unfair labor practice complaint under section 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). The matter was heard before an Administrative Law Judge on September 10, 1973; on October 9, 1973, she issued a decision concluding that Local 326 had engaged in the unfair labor practices charged. Local 326 took Exceptions to her findings, but on January 23, 1974, the Board, acting pursuant to section 10(c), 29 U. S.C. § 160(c), affirmed her Decision and adopted her proposed Order as its own. General Teamsters Local 326 (Eazor Express, Inc.), supra.

Local 326 then petitioned the Court of Appeals to review and set aside the Board's Order. The Board filed a cross-application for its enforcement, and Eazor was granted leave to intervene. On October 22, 1974, the Third Circuit entered a Judgment Order denying Local 326's Petition and enforcing the Board's Order. General Teamsters Local 326 v. N.L.R.B., supra.

This action was filed on October 3, 1972, but was not actively prosecuted by plaintiff while matters were pending before the Board.⁵ In June, 1974, it was stayed by Order of the Court, pending the Court of Appeals' decision.

In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966), the Supreme Court gave the green light to the application of the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel to administrative decisions. The Court said:

When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.

Id., at 422, 86 S.Ct. at 1560. Following this lead, the Courts of Appeals for three Circuits, in cases virtually identical to the instant case, have held Labor Board unfair labor practice findings binding in later suits for damages under section 303. Painters District Council 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1969); Texaco, Inc. v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons Local 685, 472 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1091, 94 S.Ct. 721, 38 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973); International Wire v. Local 38, 475 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867, 94 S. Ct. 63, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973); Paramount Transport Systems v. Teamsters Local 150, 436 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1971). No Court of Appeals has held to the contrary since Utah Construction.⁶

The proceedings in this case satisfied the standards outlined in Utah Construction and the cases that have followed it. As the charged party in the section 10 (b) proceeding, Local 326 had the right "to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony" before the Administrative Law Judge. The statute requires that such proceedings be, "so far as practicable . . . conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure." The Board's decision must "state its findings of fact" and must be based on "the preponderance of" the evidence adduced; any person aggrieved may obtain direct review under section 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f), in the Court of Appeals, where the Board's findings of fact are conclusive only if supported by "substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole."

Local 326 appeared by counsel, argued its case, and presented such evidence as it desired.⁷ The Administrative Law Judge's decision was careful and comprehensive, and supported by substantial evidence.⁸ "Considerations of economy of judicial time and public policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations," — the bases of res judicata and collateral estoppel, see Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S.Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948) — appear properly applicable in these circumstances.⁹

Defendant argues, however, that there are special factors involved in the treatment of unfair labor practices under the labor laws that militate against application of collateral estoppel in these circumstances. Four district court cases that have arguably so held are cited in support. These cases are either distinguishable or not persuasive.

In the first, Tucci v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 316 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (W.D.Pa.1970), the Court stated "We recognize that the N. L.R.B. proceeding is an independent proceeding and that the Board's findings are not res judicata in a suit under section 303." There was no discussion of this point and no citation of authority to support it. The Court went on to rest its decision on the uncontradicted evidence which had been adduced before the Board.

In Shell Chemical Co. v. Teamsters Local 676, 353 F.Supp. 480 (D.N.J.1973), Judge Cohen held that res judicata did not apply in a case where the plaintiff had not been a party to the only prior proceeding at which a record had been made, and where the board proceedings relied upon were held under section 10 (k) rather than sections 10(b) and (c). Those proceedings had thus been non-adversary and non-judicial in nature. Moreover, the judge specifically noted that he was not reaching the "broad conclusion" that "the doctrine can never be applied in unfair labor practice i. e., § 10(c) decisions." 353 F.Supp., at 485. In another decision seven months later, Judge Cohen re-emphasized the limited nature of his holding in Shell Chemical Co., and noted that most authority favored the application of res judicata principles to Board findings. United Engineers and Constructors, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 363 F.Supp. 845, 847 and n. 5 (D.N.J. 1973).

The third, and best-reasoned district court decision refusing to apply res judicata principles in a section 303 case is that of Judge Mishler in Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Local 584, 281 F.Supp. 971 (E.D.N.Y.1968). Accepting the guidance of Utah Construction, the judge noted that "Where there is some good reason for a new judicial inquiry into the same facts, however, the courts will not view the administrative findings as final. . . . The crucial issue here, therefore, is whether there is some factor present either in the prior proceedings or the nature of an action under § 303 which militates against the application of the doctrine." Judge Mishler found such a factor in the "congressional scheme of parallel enforcement of section 8(b)(4) violations by the courts and the Board," citing International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed. 275 (1952); N.L.R.B. v. Radio & Television Broadcast Engineers Union the CBS case, 364 U.S. 573, 81 S.Ct. 330, 5 L.Ed.2d 302 (1964); Kipbea Baking Co. v. Strauss, 218 F.Supp. 696 (E.D.N.Y.1966); United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897, 73 S.Ct. 277, 97 L.Ed. 694 (1952); and N.L.R.B....