Ebelt v. County of Ogemaw

• Decision Date: 30 September 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-10093-BC.,01-10093-BC.
• Citation: 231 F.Supp.2d 563
• Parties: Cheryl EBELT, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF OGEMAW, Ronald Knight, and Clyde Sheltrown, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

231 F.Supp.2d 563

Cheryl EBELT, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF OGEMAW, Ronald Knight, and Clyde Sheltrown, Defendants.

No. 01-10093-BC.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division.

September 30, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Victor J. Mastromarco, Jr., Russell C. Babcock, Cady, Mastromarco, Saginaw, MI, for plaintiff.

Ruth E. Mason, Cohl, Stoker, Lansing, MI, Michael R. Kluck, Michael R. Kluck Assoc., Okemos, MI, Gary J. Goodman, Chasnis, Dogger, Saginaw, MI, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S RECOMMENDATION IN PART, GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND SCHEDULING STATUS CONFERENCE

LAWSON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court for a de novo review of the defendants' motions for summary judgment following a recommendation by Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder that the motions be granted and this case dismissed. The motions were referred for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and E.D.Mich.LR 72.1. The plaintiff filed objections and the Court has reviewed the matter. The Court finds that although the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the plaintiff stated no valid state law claim against any defendant, the report erroneously concludes that the plaintiff's civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not trial-worthy. The plaintiff has stated a valid discrimination claim based on sexual harassment against defendant Knight, and valid retaliation claims against defendants Knight, Sheltrown, and Ogemaw County, all arising from federal constitutional violations and all requiring a trial for resolution. The Court, therefore, will adopt the magistrate judge's recommendation in part and dismiss the state law claims, and reject it in part. The defendants' motions seeking dismissal of the plaintiff's federal claims will be denied.

I.

This case arises from the plaintiff's tenure as a custodian at the Ogemaw County Building. The plaintiff began working there in 1997 as an employee for Crystal Clean Janitorial Services. During that time, she testified that she was subject to several unwelcome advances by defendant Knight, including vulgar comments, gestures, and undesired touching. The plaintiff complained to her boss, who told her that she should be able to handle it herself. The plaintiff did not report the conduct to the Michigan Department of Civil Rights until 1999.

In April 1999, the owner of Crystal Clean decided not to seek renewal of his contract with the County, and encouraged the plaintiff to bid for the contract herself. The plaintiff established a proprietorship known as Cheryl's Cleaning Company and submitted a bid to the County for cleaning services, which was accepted. During the time between the submission of her bid and its acceptance in July 1999, the plaintiff alleges that Knight approached her in a hallway and made a lewd reference to his size of his genitalia. She promptly reported the incident to the Clerk of Court.

After she received the cleaning contract, the plaintiff alleges that Knight's harassment took the form of subverting her work effort. He was one of two commissioners who voted against awarding the cleaning contract to the plaintiff in September 1999. The plaintiff also testifies that she soon noticed a pattern of coffee spills on rugs and urine on the floor of the men's bathroom after her company had cleaned those areas. On one day in particular, the plaintiff states that she specifically observed defendant Knight enter a bathroom she had just cleaned, and that after he left, she discovered urine all over the floor.

Shortly after the plaintiff was awarded the cleaning contract, the plaintiff testified that she was approached by defendant Clyde Sheltrown, also an Ogemaw County Commissioner, who apologized to her for the treatment she had been receiving and claimed that defendant Knight "would be out to make [her] life hell." Pl.'s Dep. at 55.

The Ogemaw County Board renewed the plaintiff's contract in September 2000. Defendant Knight, along with one other commissioner, voted against renewing the contract, claiming that the job should be performed by union employees. After the contract was renewed, the plaintiff alleges that defendant Sheltrown grabbed her and threatened that the Board would not renew her contract again unless she dropped her civil rights complaint against defendant Knight. He asserted that rather than merely cancelling her contract, they would simply stop outsourcing the work altogether.

The plaintiff filed her complaint in this Court in February 2001, approximately six months into the second year of her contract with the County. The complaint alleges claims against Ogemaw County and defendants Knight and Sheltrown in their official and individual capacities. On September 12, 2001, the Ogemaw County Board of Commissioners voted to no longer solicit or accept bids for janitorial services, but rather to begin immediately to have union employees of the County to perform the work. The plaintiff alleges that she was informed one-and-a-half hours before she was planning to show up to work on the 12th of September that she was out of a job.

The plaintiff alleges that she has suffered considerable economic injury and that the termination of her contract was a pretext for discrimination against her, and constitutes retaliation for complaining about the sexual harassment visited upon her by Knight.

II.

A motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 presumes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court is required to take the plaintiff's properly supported factual assertions as true for the purposes of this summary judgment motion. See Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir.1994).

The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Univ., Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir.2002). The party opposing the motion then may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact," but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the nonmoving party, after sufficient opportunity for discovery, is unable to meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The central issue is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

A summary judgment motion is not a trial by affidavits; the Court's sole function is to determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Furthermore, summary judgment is unlikely to be appropriate when motive and intent are at issue and where most of the evidence is in possession of the alleged wrongdoers. Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 2000). If a jury reasonably could return a verdict for the plaintiff, then a genuine dispute of material fact exists and summary judgment may not be granted. Satterfield v. State of Tenn., 295 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir.2002).

A.

The plaintiff brought her action against defendants Knight and Sheltrown in both their individual and official capacities. The magistrate judge correctly determined that suit against the individual defendants in their official capacities was duplicative of the suit against the County itself, and recommended that the official capacity claims be dismissed as redundant. See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D.Cal.1996). The parties did not object to this recommendation, and it will be adopted. The action against defendants Knight and Sheltrown in their official capacities will be dismissed.

B.

The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the plaintiff's harassment and retaliation claims against defendant Knight, finding that Knight was entitled to qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity is designed to protect public officials from liability in an atmosphere of evolving constitutional rights. When a government actor performs a discretionary function, civil liability for damages will not emerge if the actor's "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known" because "an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to `know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity provides "ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Scott v. Clay County, Tenn., 205 F.3d 867, 873 n. 9 (6th Cir.2000).

The Supreme Court has directed lower courts to analyze the qualified immunity affirmative defense in...