Eben v. State
| Citation | 599 P.2d 700 |
| Decision Date | 07 September 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 3525,3525 |
| Parties | Vincent EBEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Alaska (US) |
Dana Fabe, Asst. Public Defender, Brian Shortell, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.
John A. Scukanec, Asst. Dist. Atty., Joseph D. Balfe, Dist. Atty., Anchorage, Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.
Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CONNOR, BOOCHEVER, BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ.
After trial by jury Vincent Eben was found guilty of two counts of second degree murder. 1 The only significant issue litigated at trial was the extent of Eben's culpability and legal responsibility for his parents' deaths.
The evidence produced at trial showed the following. On the afternoon of December 6, 1976, Vincent Eben went to a bar to shoot pool and drink beer. At about 6 p. m. that evening, Eben called his friend, Cecelia, and told her to meet him at the Elbow Room bar because he was drunk and wanted her to be with him. When Cecelia arrived at the Elbow Room at about 7:30 p. m., Vincent appeared to her to be drunk. Throughout the evening and until about 4:30 the next morning, Eben drank continuously. 2
At about 4:30 a. m., Eben and Cecelia took a cab to the family apartment. Cecelia testified that she had to assist him because he was drunk and "kind of staggering." 3 They arrived at the apartment a little before 5 a. m., December 7, 1976.
Vincent Eben took off his coat and shoes, went to the kitchen and ate some spareribs. He initiated an argument with Cecelia, became angry, and slapped her once in the face. She went to the bathroom to clean her face. When she returned to the kitchen, his expression had changed. He was quiet, but his muscles were "all tensed up" and his eyes were open wide and had a "wild look" in them.
Eben then said "something about his mom and dad always wanted to die," opened a kitchen drawer, pulled out a knife, and started walking toward his parents' bedroom. Cecelia attempted to stop him, but he pushed her to the floor. This struggle and Cecelia's screaming awakened Eben's two sisters. His sister Charlotte came out of her room and attempted to stop him, but he hit her in the stomach with his hand and the knife handle and proceeded into his parents' room. He stabbed his father, Francis, once in the chest, and his mother, Rebecca, three times in the back, killing them both.
Vincent emerged from the room and threw down the knife, which stuck in the floor. He walked down the hall to the living room and sat on the couch. Charlotte called the police.
Anchorage Police Officers Loy and Haakenson were only a half block away when they received the dispatcher's call and arrived at the Eben apartment shortly after the stabbings had occurred. The three young women were "very excited and yelling." Charlotte pointed down the hall and stated: "(H)e just stabbed my mom and dad." The police officers saw Eben standing in the hall without a shirt or shoes or socks. At this time, Eben made a statement which one of the officers summarized as follows:
(T)hey wanted to go to hell so I sent them there, I stabbed them. You better get an ambulance, . . . I stabbed them bad.
Eben then turned around and held his hands behind his back in what the officers described to be a "handcuffing position."
While Officer Loy investigated the parents' room, Officer Haakenson attempted to advise Eben of his rights, but Eben interrupted him, shouting that he knew his rights. Haakenson shortly thereafter took Eben outside to transport him to the police station. 4
Haakenson testified that he detected a moderate odor of alcohol on Eben's breath. Both officers testified that Eben was not greatly intoxicated and did not seem much impaired in either speech or movement. 5
Haakenson and Eben arrived at the police station at about 5:30 a. m. and went to an "interview room," where Eben's handcuffs were removed. Haakenson read Eben his rights from a standard Miranda rights advisement form, and Eben replied that he understood each of these rights. The officer pushed the rights waiver form across the table for Eben to read. As Eben started to pick it up, he observed the blood on his hands and became "quite upset at the sight of the blood asking where did this blood come from." Eben was Officer Haakenson further testified:
(I) advised him at that time that if he did not calm down that I would have to put the handcuffs back on him. He seemed to calm down considerably, however he began to spit on his hands and wipe the blood off on his pants.
Eben refused to sign the rights form, stating that he wished to speak to a lawyer and wanted a court-appointed lawyer. Officer Haakenson did not call the public defender agency at that time because he was not aware that they could be reached at night and he "did not have the number handy."
Soon thereafter, Officer McCollum joined Officer Haakenson in the room with Eben. McCollum told Haakenson that he knew Eben and that Eben might talk more freely with him. Eben recognized McCollum, greeted him by his first name, and asked him for a cigarette.
The police officers then once more advised Eben of his rights. Eben told them that he would sign the rights waiver form after he talked to Cecelia, who had remained at the family apartment. He gave the officers the phone number. One of them dialed it for him and asked a police sergeant at the apartment to bring Cecelia to the phone. The officers remained in the room during Eben's conversation with Cecelia. 6 At no time to this point had Eben indicated that he was willing to talk to the police officers and answer their questions. After the phone call, Eben again refused to sign the waiver form.
Eben was then taken to the jail and placed in a "detox" unit at about 6 a. m. Correctional Officer Strutko testified at trial that, over the monitoring microphones, he heard Eben yelling to Eben's brother Owen, who was also in jail. He quoted Eben as saying: "Hey, I just killed mom and dad."
Prior to the trial, Eben's counsel sought a protective order prohibiting Officers McCollum and Haakenson from testifying regarding admissions which they claimed Eben made during the phone call from the police station to Cecelia. After a full hearing on this motion, it was denied by the superior court. 7
The prosecution and defense presented widely conflicting testimony as to the degree of intoxication from which Eben was suffering at the time of the stabbing and in the hours that followed. The testimony of the law enforcement officials portrayed Eben as smelling moderately of alcohol and abusive in manner, but not severely intoxicated or impaired in speech, balance, or movement. In contrast, and in addition to Cecelia's testimony that Eben was very drunk, defense witnesses who saw him from four to seven hours after the stabbing testified that Eben's breath smelled strongly of alcohol and estimated from his demeanor that he must have been very intoxicated at the time of the stabbings.
At the conclusion of the prosecution's case in chief, Eben's attorney moved for a judgment of acquittal of first degree murder on both counts. The superior court granted this motion only as to the killing of Eben's mother, Rebecca. The court again denied a similar motion with respect to acquittal of the charge of first degree murder of Eben's father, Francis, made after all evidence had been presented to the jury. As indicated previously, the jury returned unanimous verdicts of guilty of second degree murder on both counts.
We first address Eben's argument that the superior court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of first degree murder of Francis Eben. The applicable standard which this court employs on review is the same as that used by the trial courts in ruling on such motions:
On a motion for a judgment of acquittal the judge must take the view of the evidence and the inferences therefrom most favorable to the state. If he determines that fair minded men in the exercise of reasonable judgment could differ on the question of whether guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, then he must submit the case to the jury. 8
As Eben's brief argues, the effective difference between first and second degree murder for the purposes of analyzing the superior court's ruling is that sufficient evidence of "premeditation" and "deliberation" must be presented to warrant submission of a charge of first degree murder to the jury. The jury instructions in this case summarized the definitions of these terms:
"Deliberate" means that the act was not the result of a sudden impulse; that some thought and consideration was given by the defendant before arriving at the purpose or intent to kill. "Premeditated" means that a deliberate thought process was used; that the purpose to kill was turned over in the defendant's mind and that a decision to kill was made prior to the commission of the act. 9
The trial court specifically noted the evidence that Eben had threatened to kill his father because of "verbal attacks on his girlfriend," which a jury might see as evidence of "a very deep smoldering conflict or hatred . . . between the defendant and his father." The court also relied upon evidence that Eben deliberately went to his father to kill him first. 10 In addition to the threats and hostility in evidence between Eben and his father and the fact that he stabbed his father first, the court noted that there was testimony that Eben felt that he had stabbed his father only once but "far enough into his father's heart that he didn't think he would . . . live."
Eben argues that this court should focus only on the evidence which differentiates the killings of his father and mother in evaluating the merits of the superior court's denial of part of his motion for a judgment of acquittal....
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...Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time she gave her statement on the afternoon of December 13. See Eben v. State, 599 P.2d 700, 705-707 (Alaska 1979). Whether we are here faced with reliance upon the true Sixth Amendment right to counsel or the Miranda right to counsel, pre......