Eberhart v. Kurtz
| Decision Date | 23 July 1986 |
| Parties | I.W. EBERHART v. Jack KURTZ. Civ. 5295-X. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Patricia C. Kellett of Kellett & Gillis, Fort Payne, for appellant.
Roger Killian, Fort Payne, for appellee.
This is an appeal from the trial court's order of a remittitur or, alternatively, a new trial.
This action began when Randall Chambers, Susan Chambers, and Nick Gorham filed a complaint against Jack Kurtz. They alleged that Kurtz had obstructed a roadway which was the sole ingress to and egress from to their property. Later the complaint was amended to add I.W. Eberhart as a party defendant. The amendment stated that Eberhart was the predecessor in title to the realty and that he had represented that the plaintiffs would have free and unlimited access by the existing road.
Eberhart then filed a cross-claim against Kurtz. The cross-claim contained separate counts for trespass and for injunctive relief. Kurtz filed a counterclaim against Eberhart, alleging trespass and slander of title.
Subsequently, the original plaintiffs conveyed their property to Eberhart and, at their request, their complaint was dismissed because they no longer had any interest in the litigation. On the same occasion, Eberhart moved to have his claim for injunctive relief dismissed. The trial court dismissed the claim with prejudice and set the claim for money damages for a jury trial.
Kurtz filed a motion for summary judgment. He contended that the dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief constituted an adjudication of the issue of the ownership of the roadway. The trial court denied the motion.
A trial before a jury was held in October 1985. The court instructed the jury that punitive damages could be assessed. After deliberation the jury returned a verdict in favor of Eberhart and assessed damages at $2,500. Judgment was entered on this verdict.
Kurtz filed a motion for a new trial, contending that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive and unsupported by the evidence. He also argued that the dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief was an adjudication on the merits, and, therefore, that the verdict and judgment were in conflict with the prior action of the court.
In its order on this posttrial motion, the trial court stated that since no actual damages were proved by Eberhart during the trial the award of $2,500 must "therefore be viewed by the court as substantially a punitive damages award." The trial court further stated:
The trial court ordered Eberhart to remit $2,000 or a new trial would be granted. Eberhart did not file a remittitur within the prescribed time and a new trial was granted. Eberhart appealed and Kurtz cross-appealed.
On appeal Eberhart contends that the posttrial ruling of the court, which ordered a remittitur or, alternatively, a new trial, was improper. The impropriety of the ruling, according to Eberhart, results from the court's application of an erroneous legal standard for evaluating punitive damages and a misapprehension of the evidence as it related to the quantum of proof necessary to support a punitive damages award.
The rule is that the amount of punitive damages to be awarded is for the jury, in its discretion, to decide. Shiloh Construction Co. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 392 So.2d 809 (Ala.1980). The trial court should not order remittitur or a new trial simply because the court is of the opinion that the jury awarded too much. Id. The court is authorized to order remittitur only when the jury's verdict is the result of bias, prejudice, or other improper motive. Id.
In his brief Eberhart points out that in the posttrial order the judge acknowledged that the evidence presented at trial warranted the imposition of punitive damages. However, the judge determined that the degree of rudeness established by the evidence was "insufficient to support an award of $2,500." Hence, it appears that the trial court concluded that the jury "awarded too much" to Eberhart. Moreover, the trial court did not find that the verdict was the result of bias, prejudice, corruption, or other improper motive, nor have we been cited to any such evidence in the record.
In the absence of evidence of bias or other improper motive on the part of the jury, the trial court was not authorized to order a remittitur just because it considered the verdict excessive, and by so doing the trial court committed error.
Eberhart also contends that the evidence supports the jury's verdict and, as a consequence, that the remittitur was an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
The decision to order a remittitur or grant a new trial is within the discretion of the trial court and such decision is accompanied by a presumption that the trial court properly exercised this discretion. Todd v. United Steelworkers of America, 441 So.2d 889 (Ala.1983). However, this presumption of correctness can be overcome if the evidence at trial plainly and palpably supported the jury's verdict. Merkle v. Armstrong, 342 So.2d 788 (Ala.Civ.App.1976).
A review of the record indicates that in the spring of 1980 Eberhart told Kurtz that the road was located on Eberhart's property. Although the ownership of the road was in dispute, Kurtz never had a survey made prior to obstructing the road.
The Chamberses purchased their property from Robert Pence and wife, Dorris Pence. The Pences purchased the property from Eberhart and were told by Eberhart that the road was on Eberhart's property and that they could use the road for ingress and egress.
Without discussing the matter with Eberhart or having a survey made, Kurtz erected...
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