Eby v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 03 January 2017
• Docket Number: 15–CV–6543L
• Citation: 227 F.Supp.3d 275
• Parties: Paul Addison EBY, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

227 F.Supp.3d 275

Paul Addison EBY, Plaintiff,

v.Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

15–CV–6543L

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed January 3, 2017

Martha Alice Roberts, Legal Assistance of Western New York, Inc., Geneva, NY, for Plaintiff

Benil Abraham, Social Security Administration, New York, NY, Kathryn L. Smith, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY, for Defendant

DECISION AND ORDER

DAVID G. LARIMER, United States District Judge

Plaintiff appeals from a denial of disability benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"). The action is one brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the Commissioner's final determination.

On January 9, 2014, plaintiff, then twenty-six years old, filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, and an application for Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. In both applications, plaintiff alleged an inability to work since October 30, 2013. (Administrative Transcript, Dkt. # 9 at 15).¹ His applications were initially denied. Plaintiff requested a hearing, which was held on May 14, 2014 before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") John P. Costello. The ALJ issued a decision on April 16, 2015, concluding that plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Dkt. # 9 at 15–24). That decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied review on July 16, 2015. (Dkt. # 9 at 5–7). Plaintiff now appeals from that decision. The plaintiff has moved (Dkt. # 10), and the Commissioner has cross moved (Dkt. # 13) for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(c). For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff's motion is denied, the Commissioner's cross motion is granted, and the Commissioner's decision that plaintiff is not disabled is affirmed.

DISCUSSION

Determination of whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act requires a five-step sequential evaluation. See Bowen v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 467, 470–71, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520. If the ALJ concludes that the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful employment and suffers from a severe impairment, the ALJ examines whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals the criteria of those listed in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4. If the impairment does, and has continued for the required duration, the claimant is disabled. If not, analysis proceeds and the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), (f). If the claimant's RFC permits him to perform relevant jobs he has done in the past, he is not disabled. If not, analysis proceeds to the final step, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled, by presenting evidence demonstrating that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of his age, education, and work experience. See Rosa v. Callahan , 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Bapp v. Bowen , 802 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1986) ). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).

The Commissioner's decision that a plaintiff is not disabled must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, and if the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ; Machadio v. Apfel , 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is defined as "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B. , 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) ). "The Court carefully considers the whole record, examining evidence from both sides ‘because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight.’ " Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Quinones v. Chater , 117 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1997) ). Still, "it is not the function of a reviewing court to decide de novo whether a claimant was disabled." Melville v. Apfel , 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999). "Where the Commissioner's decision rests on adequate findings supported by evidence having rational probative force, [this Court] will not substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner." Veino v. Barnhart , 312 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2002).

The ALJ summarized plaintiff's medical records, particularly his treatment notes for bipolar disorder

and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), which he concluded together constituted a severe impairment not meeting or equaling a listed impairment. I believe the evidence supports the ALJ's findings concerning plaintiff's nonexertional limitations, and that his finding that the plaintiff was not disabled was supported by substantial evidence and contained no legal error.

When assessing nonexertional limitations, in addition to the usual five-step analysis, the regulations "require application of a ‘special technique’ at the second and third steps of the five-step framework." Kohler v. Astrue , 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008). If the claimant is found to have a medically determinable mental impairment

, the ALJ must assess the claimant's degree of resulting limitations in four broad functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2) social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). If and how the analysis proceeds from that point depends upon the degree of impairment found. However, the ALJ must document his analysis, and his written decision must "reflect application of the technique, and ... ‘include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the [four] functional areas.’ " Kohler , 546 F.3d 260 at 266, quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e)(2).

Here, the ALJ found that the plaintiff was mildly restricted in activities of daily living, moderately restricted in social functioning, moderately restricted with regard to concentration, persistence and pace, and had experienced no episodes of decompensation. He determined that plaintiff could perform work at all exertional levels, with a non-exertional limitation restricting him to work that is low-stress and goal-oriented (as opposed to production pace work), involves only simple tasks, and requires no more than occasional interaction with coworkers and the general public. (Dkt. # 9 at 19).

The plaintiff initially argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider whether plaintiff was per se disabled under Listing 12.04, Paragraph B, of Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P. Paragraph B of Listing 12.04 specifies that an individual is disabled if he suffers from a mood disorder which results in at least two of the following: (1) marked restriction of activities of daily living; (2) marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; and (3) marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. Plaintiff argues that his inpatient psychiatric hospitalization (for six days in December 2013, after expressing suicidal thoughts), followed immediately by eight months of outpatient therapy (three hours, three days a week) as part of a part-time program designed to serve mentally ill persons with marked functional limitations, provides sufficient evidence of his marked limitations to satisfy the requirements of Listing 12.04. Plaintiff further points to his ongoing restrictions in activities of daily living, social functioning, and concentration, persistence, and pace, as demonstrated by his alleged inability to consistently engage in self-care and housekeeping without supervision and direction, his lack of friendships and isolation, and his inability to complete routine tasks, such as paperwork, without prompting and/or assistance.

The Court disagrees. The ALJ's finding that Listing 12.04 does not apply was based on substantial evidence in the record, including: (1) treatment notes and self-reports by plaintiff noting that plaintiff lives independently and performs most activities of daily living, including shopping by himself, preparing meals, cleaning, driving, maintaining personal hygiene and washing laundry (the latter with prompting and sometimes assistance from relatives); (2) plaintiff's testimony that although he had no friends, he interacted with family members and with others online, and treatment records attesting to plaintiff's appropriate and pleasant interactions with therapists and physicians; and (3)...